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The Student Session has been a part of the ESSLLI tradition every year since its inaugu-
ral session in 1996 in Prague, making this the fourteenth. The quality of papers in these
proceedings is a testament to the fact that the Student Session continues to be an excellent
venue for students to present original work in quite diverse areas of logic, language, and
computation. This year’s authors also comprise a very international group, with students
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are what really make the Student Session such an exciting event.
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viDESCRIPTION LOGICS FOR RELATIVE TERMINOLOGIES
OR
WHY THE BIGGEST CITY IS NOT A BIG THING
Szymon Klarman
Department of Computer Science, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Abstract. Context-sensitivityhasbeenforlongasubjectofstudyinlinguistics, logic
and computer science. Recently the problem of representing and reasoning with con-
textual knowledge has been brought up in the research on the Semantic Web. In this
paper we introduce a conservative extension to Description Logic, the formalism
underlying Web Ontology Languages, supporting representation of ontologies con-
taining relative terms, such as ‘big’ or ‘tall’, whose meaning depends on the selection
of comparison class (context). The solution rests on introduction of modal-like op-
erators in the language and an additional modal dimension in the semantics, which
is built upon the standard object dimension of the Description Logic languages and
whose states correspond to selected subsets of the object domain. We present the
syntax and semantics of the extended language and elaborate on its representational
and computational features.
1. Introduction
It is a commonplace observation that the same expressions might have different mean-
ings when used in different contexts. A trivial example might be that of the concept
The Biggest. Figure 1 presents three snapshots of the same knowledge base that focus
on different parts of the domain. The extension of the concept visibly varies across the
three takes. Intuitively, there seem to be no contradiction in the fact that individual Lon-
don is an instance of The Biggest, when considered in the context of European cities,
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Figure 1: Example of a context-sensitive concept The Biggest.
an instance of ¬The Biggest, when contrasted with all cities, and ﬁnally, not belonging
to any of these when the focus is only on Australian cities. Natural language users re-
solve such superﬁcial incoherencies simply by recognizing that certain terms, call them
relative, such as The Biggest, acquire deﬁnite meanings only when put in the context of
speciﬁed comparison classes (Shapiro 2006, van Rooij to appear, Gaio 2008).
The problem of context-sensitivity has been for a long time a subject of studies in lin-
guistics, logic and even computer science. Recently, it has been also encountered in the
research on the Semantic Web (Bouquet, et al. 2003, Caliusco, et al. 2005, Benslimane,
et al. 2006) where the need for representing and reasoning with imperfect information
becomes ever more pressing (Lukasiewicz & Straccia 2008, Laskey, et al. 2008). Relativ-
ity of meaning appears as one of common types of such imperfection. Alas, Description
1Logics (DLs), which form the foundation of the Web Ontology Language (Horrocks, et al.
2003), the basic knowledge representation formalism on the Semantic Web, were origi-
nally developed for modeling crisp, static and unambiguous knowledge, and as such, are
incapable of handling the task seamlessly. Consequently, it has become clear that it is
necessary to look for more expressive, ideally backward compatible languages to meet
the new application requirements on the Semantic Web. Current proposals focus mostly
on the problems of uncertainty and vagueness (Lukasiewicz & Straccia 2008, Straccia
2005), with several preliminary attempts of dealing with different aspects of contextu-
alization of DL knowledge bases (Grossi 2007, Goczyla, et al. 2007, Benslimane et al.
2006). In this paper we propose a simple, conservative extension to the classical DLs,
which is intended for representation of relative, context-sensitive terminologies, where
by contexts we understand speciﬁcally the comparison classes with respect to which the
terms acquire precise meanings.
To take a closer look at the problem consider again the scenario from Figure 1. On a
quick analysis it should become apparent there is no straightforward way of modeling the
scenario within the standard DL paradigm. Asserting both London : The Biggest and
London : ¬The Biggest in the same knowledge base results in an immediate contradic-
tion, which is obviously an unintended outcome. To avoid this consequence one can resort
to the luring prospect of indexing, and instead assert London : The BiggestEuropean City
and London : ¬The BiggestCity, with an implicit message that the two indexed concepts
are meant to be two different ‘variants’ of The Biggest, corresponding to two possible
contexts of its use. The contradiction is indeed avoided, but unfortunately the baby has
been thrown out with the bath water, for the two ‘variants’ become in fact two unrelated
concept names, with no common syntactic or semantic core. More precisely, using this
strategyonecannotimposeglobalconstraintsonthecontextualizedconcepts, forinstance,
to declare that regardless of the context, The Biggest is always a subclass of Big. Even if
this goal was achieved byrewritingconstraintsoverall individualcontexts, another source
of problems is reasoning about the contexts themselves, for example, deciding whether
an individual occurs in a given comparison class or not.
The extension proposed in this paper is, to our knowledge, unique in addressing this
particular type of context-sensitivity in DL, and arguably, it cannot be simulated within
any of the approaches present in the literature. Technically, the solution rests on the pres-
ence of special modal-like operators in the language and a second modal dimension in the
semantics of the language, which is deﬁned over the standard object dimension of DL and
whose states correspond to selected subsets of the object domain. In the following section
we formally deﬁne the language, next we elaborate on some of its basic representational
and computational features, and ﬁnally, in the last two sections, we shortly position our
work in a broader perspective and conclude the presentation.
2. Representation Language
We start be recalling preliminary notions regarding DLs and follow up with presentation
of the syntax and the semantics of the proposed extension, for brevity denoted as DLC.
22.1. Basic Description Logics
Description Logics are a family of knowledge representation formalisms, designed partic-
ularly for expressing terminological and factual knowledge about a domain of application
(Baader, et al. 2003). For instance, the following DL formula deﬁnes the meaning of
the concept European city by equating it to the set of all and only those individuals that
are cities and are located in Europe; the next one asserts that New York is not in fact an
instance of that concept:
European City   City    located in.{Europe}
New York : ¬European City
Formally DLs can be seen as fragments of modal and ﬁrst-order logic, with an intu-
itively appealing syntax (Schild 1991). A DL language L is speciﬁed by the vocabulary
  =( NI,NC,NR), consisting of a set of individual names NI, concept names NC, and
role names NR, and by a selection of logical operators   (e.g.:  ,  ,  , ¬,  ,  , ...),
which allow for constructing complex expressions: concept descriptions, complex roles
and axioms. A knowledge base K = (T ,A), expressed in L, consists of the TBox T ,
containing terminological constraints, (typically) of the form of inclusion C   D or
equivalence axioms C   D, for arbitrary concept descriptions C and D, and the ABox
A, including concept assertions a : C and role assertions (a,b) : r, for individual names
a, b, a concept C and a role r.
The semantics is deﬁned in terms of an interpretation I = ( I,·I), where  I is a
non-empty domain of individuals, and ·I is an interpretation function, which speciﬁes
the meaning of the vocabulary by mapping every a   NI to an element of  I, every
C   NC to a subset of  I and every r   NR to a subset of  I    I. The function is
inductively extended over complex terms in a usual way, according to the ﬁxed semantics
of the logical operators. An interpretation I satisﬁes an axiom in either of the following
cases:
• I |= C   D iff CI   DI
• I |= a : C iff aI   CI
• I |= (a,b) : r iff  aI,bI    rI
Finally, I is said to be a model of a DL knowledge base, i.e. it makes the knowledge
base true, if and only if it satisﬁes all its axioms.
2.2. Syntax
We consider an arbitrary DL language L and extend it with special operators for express-
ing contextualized concept descriptions, roles and axioms.
Let C and D be concept descriptions in L and r a role. Then the following are proper
concept and role descriptions, respectively:
C,D    C |  C |  D C | [D]C
r    r |  r |  D r | [D]r
3The modal operators give access to the meaning of the bound terms in speciﬁc subcontexts
of the current context of representation. The diamonds point at certain subcontexts, which
might be either anonymous ( -modality) or named by the qualifying concepts placed
inside of the operators ( · -modality). In the former case the designated comparison class
is unspeciﬁed, whereas in the latter it consists of all and only those individuals that, in
the current context, are instances of the qualifying concept. Analogically, the dual box
operators refer to all anonymous ( -modality), or named subcontexts ([·]-modality) of
the current context.
For instance,  City The Biggest describes the individuals that are the biggest as con-
sidered in the context of cities,  ¬The Biggest refers to the individuals that are never
The Biggestregardlessoftheconsideredsubcontext, while  City nicer.European City
uses the meaning of the role nicer as interpreted when talking about cities, and denotes
those individuals which in this sense are nicer than some European cities.
InasimilarmannerweallowforcontextualizationofDLaxioms. If isaTBox/ABox
axiom and D is a concept description, then the following are also proper TBox/ABox
axioms in DLC, respectively:
D,       |    |  D   | [D] 
For example,  Australian City (Sidney : The Biggest) asserts that there exists a con-
text, namely that of Australian cities, in which Sidney is considered the biggest. The
TBox axiom  (The Biggest   Big) enforces that regardless of the comparison class the
concept The Biggest is always subsumed by Big.
2.3. Semantics
The central semantic notion underlying DLC is context structure, which can be seen as
a special type of an interpretation of a multi-dimensional DL (Wolter & Zakharyaschev
1999b).
Deﬁnition 1 (Context structure) A context structure over a DLC language L, with a set
ofoperators andthevocabulary  = (NI,NC,NR), isatupleC =  W, , ,{Iw}w W ,
where:
• W    ( ) is a set of possible contexts, such that     W and      W;
•     W   W is an accessibility relation, such that for any w,v   W, w   v if and
only if v   w. In such cases we say that v is a subcontext of w;
•   is a non-empty domain of interpretation;
• Iw = ( Iw,·Iw) is a (partial) interpretation of L in the context w:
–  Iw = w is the domain of interpretation in w,
– ·Iw is a standard interpretation function for language Lw, deﬁned by   and a
subset  w     of the vocabulary of L.
Note that the contexts are uniquely identiﬁable by their corresponding domains of
interpretation and are ordered by   according to the decreasing size of the domains, i.e.
for every context structure and every w,v   W the following conditions hold:
4• w   v iff  Iv    Iw,
• if  Iw =  Iv then w = v.
Finally, we observe there exists a special element ˆ w   W, denoted as the top context,
such that  I ˆ w =  . Given the conditions above, it follows that   imposes a partial order
(reﬂexive, asymmetric and transitive) on the set of contexts, with ˆ w as its least element.
Thus context structures are built upon rooted partially ordered Kripke frames.
For an arbitrary context structure C, a context w, concept descriptions C, D and a role
r, the meaning of contextualized terms is inductively deﬁned as follows:
( C)Iw = {x    Iw |  w   v : x   CIv}
( C)Iw = {x    Iw |  w   v : x    Iv   x   CIv}
( r)Iw = { x,y     Iw    Iw |  w   v :  x,y    rIv}
( r)Iw = { x,y     Iw    Iw |  w   v : x,y    Iv    x,y    rIv}
Terms contextualized via named contexts are interpreted analogically, except for an
extra restriction imposed on the accessibility relation: only the subcontexts that match the
extension of the qualifying concept are to be considered.
( D C)Iw = {x    Iw |  w   v,  Iv = DIw : x   CIv}
([D]C)Iw = {x    Iw |  w   v,  Iv = DIw : x    Iv   x   CIv}
( D r)Iw = { x,y     Iw    Iw |  w   v,  Iv = DIw :  x,y    rIv}
([D]r)Iw = { x,y     Iw    Iw |  w   v,  Iv = DIw : x,y    Iv    x,y    rIv}
Noticeably, the modalities involving named contexts nearly collapse, as there can al-
ways be only one such subcontext that matches the qualifying concept. Thus the inclusion
 ( D C   [D]C) is valid in DLC, although its converse  ([D]C    D C) is not, as
there might be individuals that are instances of [D]C simply because they do not exist in
the subcontext designated by D. In fact, it is easy to prove that for any C, D and r the
following equivalences hold: [D]C = ¬D    D C and  D C = [D]C   D.
3. Reasoning with relative terminologies
In this section we deﬁne the problem of satisﬁability and discuss some issues concerning
computational properties of DLC. Next, we present two examples embedded in a decid-
able subset of the language.
3.1. Satisﬁability and computational properties
As for most formalisms within the DL paradigm, the basic reasoning service being of
interest for DLC is satisﬁability checking. The notion of satisfaction of an axiom is rel-
ativized here to the context structure and a particular context. For a context structure C,
a context w, and a TBox/ABox axiom  , we say that   is satisﬁed in C in the context w,
or shortly C,w |=   iff Iw |=  . Consequently, satisfaction of contextualized axioms
conservatively extends the deﬁnition of satisfaction used in the basic DLs:
• Iw |=    iff  w   v : Iv |=  
5• Iw |=    iff  w   v : Iv |=  
• Iw |=  D   iff  w   v,  Iv = DIw : Iv |=  
• Iw |= [D]  iff  w   v,  Iv = DIw : Iv |=  
We say that a knowledge base is satisﬁed in a context w whenever all its axioms are
satisﬁed in w. Finally, a context structure C with the top context ˆ w is a model of a knowl-
edge base when all axioms in the knowledge base are satisﬁed in ˆ w. Considering the
satisﬁability conditions and the formal properties of the underlying Kripke frames, we
strongly suspect that decidability of the satisfaction problem, and consequently of other
standard reasoning problems in DLC (e.g. subsumption, instance checking, etc. (Baader
et al. 2003)), should be preserved. In the next section we will discuss a syntactic restric-
tion of the language whose decidability we show by a simple argument.
As an interesting consequence of the formulation of the framework, we are able to
deﬁne the notions of global (context-independent) and local (context-dependent) terms.
Deﬁnition 2 (Globality/locality) A DL term   is global in a context structure C iff for
every w,v   W such that w   v it holds that:
• if   is an individual name a then aIv = aIw iff aIw    Iv, else aIv is unspeciﬁed,
• if   is a concept description C then CIv = CIw    Iv,
• if   is a role r then rIv = rIw    Iv    Iv,
Otherwise,   is local in C.
Notably, the dichotomy of global vs. local terms, in the above sense, follows the dis-
tinction between rigid and non-rigid designators, as they are often denoted in the philos-
ophy of language. Rigid designators are terms which designate the same things in all pos-
sible worlds in which those things exist, and do not designate anything in the remaining
worlds. Non-rigid designators are exactly those terms which fail to satisfy the same con-
dition. A suitable and explicit selection of assumptions regarding globality/locality of the
employed vocabulary is of a great importance from the perspective of reasoning with rela-
tiveterminologies. Ontheonehand, therulesofthereasoningcalculusshouldbeproperly
aligned with the modeling intentions with respect to which parts of the represented ter-
minology are actually context-dependent and which are to be interpreted rigidly.1 On the
other one, the choice of assumptions is known to directly affect computational properties
of the resulting models, i.e. decidability and complexity of reasoning.2
3.2. Reasoning in ALCC – examples
Let us ﬁnally present two small examples of (in)valid inferences in the DLC. To this end
we will ﬁrst specify a small, yet still sufﬁciently expressive subset of DLC, which can
be easily shown to be decidable. As the basis we will use the DL ALC, whose concept
constructors and their semantics are presented in Table 1. We extend ALC to ALCC by
posing the following requirements:
1E.g. in typical applications ambiguity of individual names is not considered an issue, hence it is natural
to impose their rigid interpretation on the level of inference rules.
2Some authors report, for instance, that presence of global roles dramatically increases the complexity
of the decision problem (Wolter & Zakharyaschev 1999b, Wolter & Zakharyaschev 1999a).
6(¬C)I =  I \ CI
(C   D)I = CI   DI
(C   D)I = CI   DI
( r.C)I = {x |  y( x,y    rI   y   CI)}
( r.C)I = {x |  y( x,y    rI   y   CI)}
Table 1: Concept constructors in the DL ALC
1. Every axiom in ALC is a proper axiom in ALCC.
2. If C, D are concept descriptions in ALC, then  D C and [D]C are proper concept
descriptions in ALCC.
3. If   is a TBox axiom in ALC, then    is a proper axiom in ALCC.
4. No other expressions are allowed in ALCC.
5. (Only) individual names are interpreted rigidly in ALCC.
The resulting language is decidable. First, observe that we strictly separate TBox ax-
ioms containing modalized concept descriptions from the ones bound by the   operator.
Moreover, note that axioms of the former type might contain only a ﬁnite number of  · 
and [·] operators (while no   nor  ), where each occurrence of [D]C can be replaced by
¬D    C  (see Section 2.3). Similarly, the ABox can be reduced to the form in which
there is only a ﬁnite number of occurrences of  ·  and no other non-ALC constructs. Con-
sequently, since every  ·  uniquely determines the accessible subcontext, it follows that
every satisﬁable DLC knowledge base has to be satisﬁed in a model based on a ﬁnite con-
text structure. Thus the problem of checking satisﬁability of a DLC knowledge base can
be reduced to the problem of checking satisﬁability of a ﬁnite number of ALC knowledge
bases, which is of course decidable.3
Example 1 (The biggest city is not a big thing) ConsiderthescenariopresentedinFig-
ure 1 from the introductory section. Let us assert that New York is indeed the biggest city
and further assume that in every possible context the concept The Biggest is subsumed
by Big:
1. A = { New York :  City The Biggest }
2. T = {  (The Biggest   Big) }
Given no additional knowledge the following statement does not follow:
3. New York : Big
Since New York is the biggest in the context of cities (1) it must be also big in the same
context (2). Nevertheless, the interpretation of Big in the context of cities is independent
3In (Klarman & Schlobach 2009) we present a tableau-based decision procedure for the same language
without TBox axioms bound by the   operator. Given the ﬁniteness of the involved context structures,
however, presence of these constructs obviously does not affect the complexity of reasoning and can be
straightforwardly covered in the calculus.
7from its interpretation in other contexts, in particular in the top context, in which our
query (3) should be satisﬁed. Hence New York does not have to be an instance of Big in
the top context. As an illustration consider the following canonical model invalidating the
inference (x is any object different from New York):
W = { ˆ w,w}
  = {  ˆ w,w }
  = {New York,x}
ˆ w =  I ˆ w = {New York,x}
w =  Iw = {New York}
City
I ˆ w = {New York}
The Biggest
I ˆ w = Big
I ˆ w =  
The Biggest
Iw = Big
Iw = {New York}
Example 2 (Are tall men tall people?) Consider a simple terminology deﬁning a per-
son as a man or a woman, where the last two are disjoint concepts. Further, we assume
the concepts Tall and Short are globally disjoint, and assert that individual John is tall
as compared to men.
1. T = { Person   Man   Woman
2. Man   Woman    
3.  (Tall   Short    ) }
4. A = { John :  Man Tall }
The following assertion is entailed by the knowledge base:
5. John :  Person   ¬Woman ¬Short
Notice that since the concept Person   ¬Woman is equivalent to Man in the top
context (1,2) then obviously both of them designate exactly the same context. Since John
is tall in that context (4), and in every context tall objects cannot be short at the same time
(3), it follows naturally, that John is in that context also an instance of ¬Short. Observe,
however, that it cannot be inferred that John is a non-short person, as nothing is known
about the tallness of John in the context of all people.
4. Related work
The language DLC can be classiﬁed as an instance of modal or multi-dimensional (Wolter
& Zakharyaschev 1999b, Wolter & Zakharyaschev 1999a) DLs, a family of expressive
description languages being a fragment of multi-dimensional modal logics (Marx & Ven-
ema 1997, Kurucz, et al. 2003). To our knowledge, DLC constitutes a unique proposal
explicitly employing this framework for the problem of contextualization of DL knowl-
edge bases, and moreover, it is the only attempt of addressing the speciﬁc problem of
relativity, i.e. contextualization of DL constructs by comparison classes. The most com-
monly considered perspectives on contextualization in DLs focus instead on:
81. Integration of knowledge bases describing local views on a domain (Bouquet et al.
2003, Benslimane et al. 2006, Borgida & Seraﬁni 2003). In this perspective, one
considers a ﬁnite set of DL knowledge bases related by bridge rules, of a certain
form, which allow for relating concepts belonging to different sources.
2. Contextualizationaslevelsofabstraction(Goczylaetal.2007,Grossi2007). Within
this approach, a knowledge base is modeled as a hierarchical structure organized ac-
cordingtothelevelsofabstractionovertherepresentedknowledge. Theentailments
of the higher levels hold in the more speciﬁc ones, but not vice versa.
Although the underlying models can be in both cases embedded in two-dimensional
Kripke semantics, analogical to ours, the expressive power of the modal machinery is not
utilized on the level of language, and thus the formalisms remain strictly less expressive
than DLC. It can be expected, however, that restricted fragments of DLC and enriched
variants of the other approaches to contextualization might coincide on some problems in
terms of expressiveness and semantical compatibility.
DLC shares also some signiﬁcant similarities with dynamic epistemic logics, in par-
ticular, with the public announcement logic (PAL) (van Ditmarsch, et al. 2007), which
studies the dynamics of information ﬂow in epistemic models. Interestingly, our modal-
ities involving named contexts can be seen as public announcements, in the sense used
in PAL, whose application results in a dynamic reduction of the description (epistemic)
model to only those individuals (epistemic states) that satisfy given description (formula).
Unlike in PAL, however, we allow for much deeper revisions of the models, involving also
the interpretation function, e.g. it is possible that after contextualizing the representation
by  C  there are no individuals that are C, simply because C gets essentially reinterpreted
in the accessed world.
Finally, we should mention the loosely related problem of vagueness, inherent to the
use of relative terms, such as considered in this paper. Traditionally, the problem has
been analyzed on the grounds of fuzzy logics, which recently have been also successfully
coupled with description languages, giving raise to fuzzy DLs (Straccia 2005). The ideas
underlying fuzzy semantics, however, are orthogonal to the ones motivating our work,
and thus can in principle complement each other. While fuzzy logic replaces a binary
truth function with a continues one when deﬁning an interpretation of a relative term, the
semantics of DLC allows for applying a number of truth functions instead of a single one,
depending on the context of interpretation. Clearly, none of the two semantics can solve
the problems handled by the other, while together they give a very broad account of the
problem of relativity of meaning.
5. Conclusions
Motivated by the current challenges of the research on the Semantic Web, we have pre-
sented an extension to the standard Description Logics for representing and reasoning
with relative terms, i.e. terms whose precise meaning depends on the choice of a particu-
lar comparison class. We have argued that the language is powerful enough to capture a
number of intuitions associated with the natural use of such terms, and we moreover be-
lieve that a thorough investigation of its expressivity should reveal even more interesting
applications. Naturally, the gain in expressivity is expected to come at a price of worse
9computational properties, the subject which we aim to study as part of the future research.
It is likely that in order to achieve an optimal balance it will be necessary to restrict the
syntax, possibly down to the most useful modalities   and  · , along the same lines as we
have explored in the examples presented in the paper (Section 3.2.).
In principle, a clear advantage of the formalism is its backward compatibility with the
standard DL languages. Note that every satisﬁable DL knowledge base is at the same time
a satisﬁable DLC knowledge base. Also, grounding the approach on multi-dimensional
DLs gives good prospects for integrating it with other potential extensions embedded
within the same paradigm, which slowly get to attract more attention in the context of the
Semantic Web, as potentially useful for numerous representation and reasoning tasks.
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11A NOTE ON THE THEORY OF COMPLETE
MEREOTOPOLOGIES   †
Yavor Nenov
Department of Computer Science, University of Manchester
Abstract. We investigate theories of Boolean algebras of regular sets of topological
spaces. By RC(X), we denote the complete Boolean algebra of regular closed sets
over a topological space X. By a mereotopology M over a topological space X,
we denote every dense Boolean sub-algebra of RC(X); M is called a complete
mereotopology if it is a complete Boolean algebra.
In this paper we consider mereotopologies as L-structures, where L is the language
of Boolean algebras extended with the binary relational symbol C interpreted as the
contact relation. We show that the L theories of complete mereotopologies and all
mereotopologies are different. We also show that no complete mereotopology M,
over a connected, compact, Hausdorff topological space X, is elementarily equiv-
alent to a mereotopology M , over X, that is a closed base for X and is ﬁnitely
decomposable — i.e. every region in M  has only ﬁnitely many connected compo-
nents.
1. Introduction
Formal systems for reasoning about space can be classiﬁed as point-based or region-
based, depending on whether the variables of their formal languages are interpreted as
points or sets of points. A notable example of a point-based theory of space is the decid-
able and complete theory of the Euclidean plane axiomatized by Tarski in (Tarski 1959).
An early example of a region-based theory of space can be seen in another work of Tarski.
In (Tarski 1956), he axiomatized the second-order theory of the regular closed sets of the
3-dimensional Euclidean space, with respect to the language consisting of the two predi-
cates for the binary relation part-of and the property of being a sphere.
Authors usually motivate their interest in region-based spatial logics by arguing that
they are more natural in comparison with point-based spatial logics, for people think in
terms of objects, rather than in terms of the sets of points that these objects occupy. There
are also practical advantages: greater expressive power, as noted in (Aiello, et al. 2007);
ability to reason with incomplete knowledge, which was argued in (Renz & Nebel 2007);
spatial reasoning free of numerical calculations.
In most region-based spatial logics, variables range over sets of a topological space,
but it is a matter of choice whether arbitrary sets should count as regions. An example of
a formal system for reasoning about arbitrary sets of topological spaces is given by McK-
insey and Tarski in (McKinsey & Tarski 1944). The regular sets of a topological space are
widely accepted as an appropriate choice for regions when it comes to spatial reasoning
about real world objects. Regular closed (open) sets of a topological space X are those
equal to the closure of their interior (the interior of their closure), and the set of all regular
closed (open) sets is denoted by RC(X) (RO(X)). RC(X) and RO(X) form complete
 The author is grateful to Dr Ian Pratt-Hartmann for his supervision, guidance and helpful comments on
the content of the current document on all stages of its development.
†The author thanks the three anonymous reviewers for their useful comments, and especially the re-
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12Boolean algebras, as can be seen in (Koppelberg, et al. 1989). The aforementioned work
of Tarski (Tarski 1956), is an example of a formal system in which variables range over
all regular closed sets of the Euclidean space. Pratt and Schoop in (Pratt & Schoop 1998),
restricted the variables of their formal system to range over the ROP(R2) — the Boolean
algebra of regular open polygons ofR2, which is a dense Boolean sub-algebra of RO(R2).
A mereotopology over a topological space X, is any dense Boolean sub-algebra of
RC(X); M is a complete mereotopology if it is a complete Boolean algebra — i.e. M
is RC(X). We consider this slightly weaker deﬁnition when compared to the one pro-
posed by Pratt-Hartmann in (Pratt-Hartmann 2007), in order to allow mereotopologies
over topological spaces that are not semi-regular.
In the recent years, the L theories of different classes of mereotopologies have been
axiomatized, where L is the language of Boolean algebras extended with the binary
relational symbol C interpreted as the contact relation. Roeper in (Roeper 1997) ax-
iomatized the L theory of the mereotopologies over compact, Hausdorff topological
spaces. D¨ untsch and Winter in (D¨ untsch & Winter 2005) established an axiomatization
of the L theory of the mereotopologies over weakly regular, T1 topological spaces. The
L theory of the class of all mereotopologies was axiomatized by Dimov and Vakarelov
in (Dimov & Vakarelov 2006).
To the best of our knowledge, there are no published results about the L theory of
complete mereotopologies. In this paper we show that this theory is different from the
theory of all mereotopologies. In particular, we introduce a sentence that is true in every
complete mereotopology, but is not true in the incomplete mereotopology of the regular
closed polygons of the real plane. As a corollary of our main result, we show that no com-
plete mereotopology M, over a Hausdorff topological spaceX, is elementarily equivalent
to a mereotopology M , over X, that is a closed base for X and is ﬁnitely decomposable
— i.e. every region in M  has only ﬁnitely many connected components.
We provide our main results in Section 4. The necessary deﬁnitions and basic facts
about topological spaces and mereotopologies we give in Section 2. In Section 3, we
summarize the main axiomatization results of classes of mereotopologies, established in
(Dimov & Vakarelov 2006, D¨ untsch & Winter 2005, Roeper 1997), and some related
results provided in (Pratt-Hartmann 2007). We discuss possible future work in Section 5.
2. Preliminary Notions
In this section we recall the deﬁnition and some examples of mereotopologies. We also
prove a result about topological spaces that we use in Section 4. We assume that the
reader is familiar with the basic deﬁnitions and results about Boolean algebra (see e.g.
(Koppelberg et al. 1989)), and topological spaces (see e.g. (Kelley 1975)).
We start by deﬁning the Boolean algebra of the regular closed sets over a topological
space X.
Deﬁnition 1. Let X be a topological space with ·  and ·  the closure and interior opera-
tions in X. A subset A of X is called regular closed if it equals the closure of its interior,
i.e. A = A  . The set of all regular closed sets in X is denoted by RC(X). The Boolean
operations, relations and constants can be deﬁned in RC(X) in the following way: for
a,b   RC(X), a+b = a b, a·b = (a b)  ,  a = (X \a) , a   b iff a·b = a, 0 =  
and 1 = X . The topological contact relation C(x,y), is deﬁned by: C(a,b) iff a b  =  .
13Recall that B is a complete Boolean algebra, if each set of elements of B has an inﬁ-
mum and a supremum. It is a well-know fact, that the structure (RC(X),+,·, ,0,1, )
is a complete Boolean algebra (see e.g. (Koppelberg et al. 1989)). For the deﬁnition
of mereotopology, recall that, a Boolean sub-algebra B  of B is dense in B, if for every
non-zero element a   B there is some non zero element a    B  such that a    a .
Deﬁnition 2. A mereotopology over a topological space X is any dense Boolean sub-
algebra, M, of the complete Boolean algebra RC(X).
In a dual way, one can deﬁne a mereotopology of regular open sets. Note that Deﬁni-
tion 2 is weaker than the one given by Pratt-Hartmann in (Pratt-Hartmann 2007). We do
not require the mereotopology to form a base for the topological space, in order to have
mereotopologies over arbitrary topological spaces.
A well-studied example of an incomplete mereotopology of regular open sets, is that
of the regular open polygons in the real plane (see (Pratt & Schoop 1998, Pratt & Schoop
2000, Pratt-Hartmann 2007)). The dual mereotopology, RCP(R2), of the regular closed
polygons of the real plane, plays an important role in proving our main result in Section
4. The formal deﬁnition of RCP(R2) follows.
Deﬁnition 3. Each line in R2 divides the real plane into two regular open sets called open
half-planes. The closure of an open half-plane is regular closed, and is called half-plane.
The product in RC(R2) of ﬁnitely many half planes is called a basic polygon. The sum
of ﬁnitely many basic polygons is called a polygon. The set off all polygons is denoted
by RCP(R2).
We need the following lemma for Section 4. Recall that in a topological space X the
non-empty sets A,B   X are said to separate the set C   X iff C = A B, A  B =  
and A   B  =  ; a set C   X is connected iff no pair of non-empty sets separates it; a
connected component of a set A   X is a maximal connected subset of A.
Lemma 4. Let X be a topological space and A,A1 and A2 be subsets of X such that A1
and A2 separate A. Then the following are true:
i) A is closed iff A1 and A2 are closed;
ii) A is regular closed iff A1 and A2 are regular closed.
Proof. First notice, that the right to left implications are obvious, since the union of two
(regular) closed sets is a (regular) closed set.
i) ( ) From A
 
1   A  = A = A1   A2, we get A
 
1   A
 
1   (A1   A2) = (A
 
1   A1)  
(A
 
1   A2) = A
 
1   A1 = A1, so A1 is closed. Similarly for A2.
ii) ( ) From i) it follows that A1 and A2 are closed. We want to show that A  = A 
1 A 
2
because this implies A1 = A X \A2 = A   X \A2 = (A
  
1  A
  
2 ) X \A2 =
A
  
1   X \ A2 = A
  
1 . The inclusion A    A 
1   A 
2 is trivial. Suppose p   A  and
w.l.o.g. let p   A1. Then p   X \A2 since A1  A2 =  . We get p   A   X \A2.
This set is open because A2 is closed and subset of A1, and, hence, p   A 
1.
143. Representation Theorems for Mereotopologies
We consider mereotopologies as L structures, where L is the language
{C,+,·, ,0,1, }(seeDeﬁnition1). TheL theoriesofdifferentclassesofmereotopolo-
gies were axiomatized in (Dimov & Vakarelov 2006, D¨ untsch & Winter 2005, Roeper
1997), although different terminology was used. In this section we give a translation
of the original results in terms of mereotopologies in a way almost identical to the one
in (Pratt-Hartmann 2007). Nice discussions on the algebraic approach taken in (Dimov
& Vakarelov 2006, D¨ untsch & Winter 2005, Roeper 1997), can be seen in (Bennett &
D¨ untsch 2007, Vakarelov 2007).
We assume the reader is familiar with some basic notions in Model Theory (see e.g.
(Marker 2002)). Before we continue, we recall deﬁnitions of semi-regular and weakly
regular topological spaces.
Deﬁnition 5. A topological space X is called semi-regular, if the set of all regular closed
sets in X form a closed base for X. A semi-regular topological space is called weakly
regular (D¨ untsch & Winter 2005), if for each nonempty open set A   X, there exists a
nonempty open set B such that B    A.
Deﬁnition 6. We denote by  CA the set of axioms for Boolean algebra, together with the
following sentences:
 1 :=  x y(C(x,y)   x  = 0);
 2 :=  x y(C(x,y)   C(y,x));
 3 :=  x y z(C(x,y + z)   C(x,y)   C(x,z));
 4 :=  x y(x · y  = 0   C(x,y)).
AswewillseeinTheorem9,  CA isanaxiomatizationfortheclassofallmereotopolo-
gies. Extending  CA with different combinations of the axioms  ext, int and  conn (see
bellow), leads toaxiomatizations formereotopologies overdifferent classes oftopological
spaces.
In the following deﬁnition we abbreviate ¬C(x, y), by x   y.
Deﬁnition 7. Consider the following sentences:
 ext :=  x(x  = 0    y(y  = 0   y   x)) - extensionality axiom;
 int :=  x y(x   y    z(x   z   z   y)) - interpolation axiom;
 conn :=  x(x  = 1   x  = 0   C(x, x)) - connectedness axiom.
Theorem 8. (Pratt-Hartmann 2007) Let M be a mereotopology over a topological space
X, considered as an L structure.
i) M |=  CA.
ii) If X is weakly regular, then M |=  ext.
iii) If X is compact and Hausdorff and the elements of M form a closed base for X,
then M |=  int.
15Theorem 9. Let A be an L-structure.
i) If A |=  CA, then A is isomorphic to a mereotopology over a compact semi-regular T0
topological space X. (Dimov & Vakarelov 2006)
ii) If A |=  CA { ext}, then A is isomorphic to a mereotopology over a weakly regular
and T1. (D¨ untsch & Winter 2005)
iii) If A |=  CA   { ext, int}, then A is isomorphic to a mereotopology over a compact
and Hausdorff. (Roeper 1997)
Additionally, A |=  conn implies X is connected.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no results in the literature about the L theory
ofcompletemereotopologies. ItturnsoutthatthisL theoryisdifferentfromtheL theory
of all mereotopologies. We devote the next section to establish this result.
4. The L theory of Complete Mereotopologies
In this section we show that the theory of complete mereotopologies differs from the the-
ory of all mereotopologies. We accomplish this by introducing a ﬁrst-order sentence that
is true in each complete mereotopology but that is not true in RCP(R2), which is an
incomplete mereotopology. This result relies on the fact, that every non-trivial complete
mereotopology satisfying { ext, int, conn}, has a pair of regions that are in contact, such
that neither connected component of the ﬁrst region is in contact with the second. The lat-
ter, however, is false for all ﬁnitely decomposable mereotopologies, including RCP(R2),
which on the other hand, is a non-trivial incomplete mereotopology satisfying the set of
axioms { ext, int, conn}.
Connected regions play an important role in the proof of the main result, so we start
by introducing a formula, which deﬁnes the set of connected regions in RCP(R2) and
each complete mereotopology M. We make use of the fact that regular closed sets can be
separated only by regular closed sets (Lemma 4).
Lemma 10. Let M be a complete mereotopology. Then for all a   M, a is connected
iff M |=  c[a], where
 c(x) := ( y)( z)(y  = 0   z  = 0   y + z = x   C(y,z)).
Proof. ( ) From M  |=  c[a] it follows that there are regular closed sets b,c that separate
a, thus a is not connected.
( ) From a is not connected and Lemma 4, it follows that there are nonempty regular
closed sets b,c such that a = b + c and ¬C(b,c). So b and c are witnesses for M  |=
 c[a].
In order to establish the same result for RCP(R2), we have to show that a regular
closed polygon can be separated only by regular closed polygons.
Lemma11. ConsiderthemereotopologiesRC(R2)andRCP(R2). Foreacha   RCP(R2)
and b,c   RC(R2), if a = b + c and ¬C(b,c), then b,c   RCP(R2).
16Figure 1: (Lemma 14) At least one of b :=
 
i   bi and c :=
 
i   ci is in contact with
( a), but none of {bi}i   and {ci}i   is.
Proof. Since a is a regular closed polygon it is the sum of ﬁnitely many basic polygons,
e.g. a =
 n
i=1 ai. Let bi := b.ai and ci := c.ai. Since ai is connected, ¬C(bi,ci) and
ai = bi + ci, we get that ai = bi or ai = ci. So bi and ci are basic polygons (either equal
to 0 or to ai). Since b =
 n
i=1 ai and c =
 n
i=1 ci, we get that b and c are polygons, as
ﬁnite sums of basic polygons.
Lemma 12. For a   RCP(R2), a is connected iff RCP(R2) |=  c[a].
Proof. As in Lemma 10, considering Lemma 11.
So far, we deﬁned the set of connected regions in RCP(R2) and each complete
mereotopology by the formula  c. Having shown that, we continue by constructing for
every non-trivial complete mereotopology satisfying { ext, int, conn}, a pair of regions
which are in contact, such that no connected component of the ﬁrst is in contact with the
second.
Lemma 13. Let M be a complete mereotopology such that M |=  ext    int    conn  
¬ triv, where  triv := ( x)(x = 0   x = 1). Then there are elements a and {ai}i   in
M such that:
i) C(a, a); ii) a =
 
i   ai;
iii) ai   ai+1, for i    ; iv) ai   a, for i    .
Proof. From M |= ¬ triv it follows that there is some b   M such that b  = 0 and
b  = 1. Now from M |=  ext, we get that there is some element a0   M such that
a0   b and a0  = 0. Considering that M |=  int, it follows that there is some a1 such
that a0   a1   b and again by M |=  int, we get that there is some a2 such that
a1   a2   b. Arguing in a similar way one can construct a sequence {ai}i   such that
17a0   ai   ai+1   b for i    . Now we take a :=
 
i   ai, which is in M, for M is
complete. It is easy to see that i)   iv) hold. We give details only in the case i).
i) From a0  = 0 and a0   a, we get a  = 0. On the other hand, a   b since b is an
upper bound of {ai}i   and since b  = 1, we get also that a  = 1. Now considering  conn,
we get that C(a, a).
In the following lemma we introduce an L  sentence, denoted by  cmp, and show that
it is true in each complete mereotopology.
Lemma 14. For each complete mereotopology M, M |=  cmp, where
 cmp :=  ext    int    conn   ¬ triv   ( x)( y)(  (x,y)) and
  (x,y) :=   (x,y) := C(x,y)   ( x )(x    x    c(x )   ¬C(x ,y)).
Proof. If M |=  ext    int    conn   ¬ triv, it follows from Lemma 13, that there are
elements a and {ai}i   in M, such that C(a, a), a =
 
i   ai and for i    , ai   ai+1
and ai   a. Take a 1 = 0 and consider the following deﬁnitions:
bi = a2i   a2i 1, b =
 
i   bi, bi  =
 
j<i bj, bi+ =
 
j>i bj,
ci = a2i+1   a2i, c =
 
i   ci, ci  =
 
j<i cj, ci+ =
 
j>i cj.
Since M is complete, it follows that b,c,bi ,ci ,bi+,ci+   M. (See Figure 1.)
Claim 1 For i    , ¬C(bi,b   bi) and ¬C(ci,c   ci)
Proof. From bi    a2i 2   a2i 1 and bi    a2i 1, we get that ¬C(bi,bi ). From
bi+    a2i+1    a2i and bi   a2i, we get ¬C(bi,bi+). From b   bi = bi  + bi+, we get
that ¬C(bi,b   bi). Similarly ¬C(ci,c   ci).
Claim 2 From b    b and M |=  c[b ], it follows b    a. From c    c and M |=
 c[c ], it follows c    a.
Proof. We will show that there is some i     such that b    bi. Since b    b and
b =
 
i   bi there is some i     such that b  · bi  = 0. We have that b  = b  · b =
b ·(b+bi bi) = b ·bi+b ·(b bi). From Claim 1 it follows that ¬C(bi,(b bi) and thus
¬C(b ·bi,b ·(b bi)). Now from M |=  c[b ] and b ·bi  = 0 it follows that b ·(b bi) = 0
and thus b  = bi · b , which is b    bi. Finally, we get that b    bi   a. Similarly c    c
and M |=  c[c ] imply c    a.
Finally, from a = b + c and C(a, a), it follows that either C(b, a) or C(c, a).
W.l.o.g., let C(b, a) be the case. By Claim 2 we get that M |=   [b, a] and so
M |=  cmp.
Lemma 15. RCP(R2)  |=  cmp .
Proof. It is well known that RCP(R2) |=  ext    int    conn   ¬ triv, so it sufﬁces to
show that RCP(R2)  |= ( x)( y)(  (x,y)). Let a and b be regular closed polygons, such
that a b  =  . Since a is a polygon, it can be represented as a ﬁnite sum of basic polygons,
say a =
 n
i=1 ai. Since the sum of ﬁnitely many regular closed sets is just their union, we
get that aiCb for some i   n. Since the basic polygons are connected and Lemma 12, we
get that RCP(R2)  |=   [a,b]. So, we get that RCP(R2) |= ( x)( y)(¬  (x,y)) and
thus RCP(R2) |= ¬ cmp.
18Theorem 16. The L theory of complete mereotopologies is different from the L theory
of:
i) the class of all mereotopologies;
ii) the class of mereotopologies over weakly regular topological spaces;
iii) the class of mereotopologies over compact Hausdorff topological spaces.
Proof. RCP(R2) is a member of each of the above classes.
Theorem 17. Let X be a connected, compact, Hausdorff topological space and let the
complete mereotopology, M, over X be non-trivial. Then the L theory of M is different
from the L theory of every ﬁnitely decomposable mereotopology, M , over X, that is a
close base for X.
Proof. From Theorem 8 and M being non-trivial, it follows that M  |=  ext    int  
 conn   ¬ triv. Since M  is ﬁnitely decomposable, one can show, as in Lemma 15, that
M   |=  cmp. But since M is a complete mereotopology, we have that M |=  cmp. So M
and M  have different L theories.
Corollary 18. The L theories of RC(R2) and RCP(R2) are different.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
We showed that the theory of complete mereotopologies is different from the theory of
all mereotopologies. As a future step, one can establish an axiomatization for the theory
of complete mereotopologies or the theories of speciﬁc complete mereotopologies such
as the mereotopologies of the regular closed sets in the real line, real plane or higher
dimensional topological spaces.
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Abstract. We consider the problem of specifying properties of an asynchronous
transition system with unbounded-ly many processes. We introduce a temporal logic
and shows that it is decidable. We then discuss various issues related to enhancing
the expressiveness and model-checking. Finally we end with a discussion on data
languages.
1. Introduction
Temporal logics, which are modal logics dealing with ﬂows of time (irreﬂexive and tran-
sitive frames), had been highly successful as speciﬁcation languages for describing the
behaviours of computing systems. The simplest of all, LTL (propositional discrete linear
time temporal logic) (Pnueli 1977) formulas work on historiesa of the form
w = w1w2...wn,wi   2P
where P is the set of all propositions and is evaluated with respect to a particular time
point i    w b. The commonly used temporal connectives are   for FUTURE,   for PAST,
  for TOMORROW,   for YESTERDAY, u for UNTIL and s for SINCE. The duals of  
and   are   for HENCEFORTH and   for HITHERTO.
It is well-known that LTL(s,u, , ) is expressively complete with respect to FO(<)
(Kamp 1968), whereas LTL( , , , ) and LTL( , ) are complete with respect to
FO
2(<, ) and FO
2(<) respectively(Etessami, et al. 1997)cd. The fact that the logic is
propositional and the lower complexity of its decision problemse makes LTL a suitable
speciﬁcation mechanism for describing sequential behaviours of computing machineries.
A transition system describing a
printer system with only one pro-
cess. The actions are request, wait,
queue and print abbreviated here as
r, w, q, p respectively.
s0 s1 s2 s3
r
w
q
w
p
w w
Every request is eventually followed by a queue and in turn by a print. A sample
execution trace of the above described system is given below.
w w r w w q w w p w
aIn this paper we consider only LTL over ﬁnite histories.
b w  denote the length of w.
cFO
2 is the two variable fragment of ﬁrst order logic.
d  denotes the successor relation, which is the Hasse covering relation for <.
eLTL satisﬁability problem is in PSPACE whereas FO(<) satisﬁability is NON-ELEMENTARY (Stock-
meyer 1974) and FO
2 satisﬁability is NEXPTIME-COMPLETE(Etessami et al. 1997).
21A desirable property is fairness which states that every request is eventually queued and
then printed. Stated in the language of LTL it is as follows.
r    (q   p)  (r    (q   p))
If we have two asynchronous processes, we could still use LTL by adding identity to
actions corresponding to each process by means of additional propositional variables, as
shown below.
A transition system describing
a printer system with two asyn-
chronous processes. The actions
request, wait, queue and print
are paired with the identity of the
process, a boolean value. The invari-
ant that every request is eventually
followed by a queue and in turn by
a print holds individually in each of
the processes. The behaviour of the
whole system will be the arbitrary
interleaving-s of the behaviours of
the individual processes.
s0 s1 s2 s3
rs
ws
qs
ws
ps
ws ws
t0 t1 t2 t3
rt
wt
qt
wt
pt
wt wt
The fairness is stated in terms of actions of each processes, in the following way.
(rs    (qs   ps) rt    (qt   pt))  (rs    (qs   ps) rt    (qt   pt))
This way of adding propositional variables for identities does not generalize if the system
contains an unbounded number of processesf. In which case, one way to represent the
execution trace is by annotating the sequential trace ordered by <, by yet another order  
as shown below. The following is an execution trace of printer system, the coloured edges
denote the execution of each process.
r r r w w q w w q p w q p w w p
The order   satisﬁes the following properties,
1.   is compatible with <, that means, if i   j implies that i < j.
2. The order relation   is a disjoint union of chains, this is by virtue of the fact that
each chain in   is a sequential trace of a process.
Henceforth < denotes a total order and   stands for a subset of < which satisﬁes the
above properties. One way to specify properties of such structures is to deﬁne temporal
connectives which take into account both order relations. Linear orders with added rela-
tions have been studied recently, from different perspectives. CARET introduced in (Alur,
fUnbounded here means ﬁnite but not bounded by a constant.
22et al. 2004, Alur & Madhusudan 2006) works over nested words, where the words are or-
namented with a relation µ–which is a union of chains of length two, looks at program
executions where the relation µ corresponds to call-return patterns which are inherently
nested. Another logic one ﬁnds in the literature is the LTL  , LTL with freeze quantiﬁers,
introduced in (Demri & Lazic 2006, Demri & Lazic 2009), which addresses words over
an alphabet     where   is a ﬁnite alphabet and   is an inﬁnite data domain. We deﬁne
the following temporal logic,
    = p                           ¬     1   2
The semantics of the logic is given with respect to histories ordered by < and  , in the
following way, boolean cases are as usual,
w,i   p   wi = p
w,i          j. i   j  w,j    
w,i          j. i < j  i     j  w,j    
w,i          j. j   i w,j    
w,i          j. j < i j     i w,j    
We say that the history w     if w,1    . We can deﬁne     = ¬    ¬ ,     =
¬    ¬ ,    =          ,    =          . Symmetrically we can deﬁne the past
modalities as well. The fairness condition can be expressed in this logic as
(r     (q    p))  (r     (q    p))
To give some more examples, ¬( (p   p)) states that every process prints atmost once,
¬ (r   (w   (w   (w   p)))) says that every request has two wait only atmost
twice before getting printed.
One benchmark for measuring the expressiveness of temporal logic is of course the
classical ﬁrst order logic. By the standard translation of modal logics we can show that,
Proposition 1..1. Every LTL(  ,  ,  ,  ) formula   can be converted to an equiv-
alent FO
2(<, ) formula ˆ  (x), where  ˆ  (x)    O(   ) and qdp(ˆ  (x)) = odp( )g.
Proof. Use the standard translation to obtain ˆ  (x) from  , boolean cases are omitted.
STx(p)  = p(x)
STx(   )  =  y. x   y  STy( )
STx(   )  =  y. x < y  x     y  STy( )
STx(   )  =  y. y   x STy( )
STx(   )  =  y. y < x y     x STy( )
The other direction is the interesting one, along the lines of (Etessami et al. 1997) (we
differ from the original proof only in the last step, however we reproduce the proof here.)
we can show that,
gquantiﬁer depth and operator depth respectively.
23Theorem 1..2. Every formula  (x) in FO
2(<, ) can be converted to an equivalent
LTL(  ,  ,  ,  ) formula   , where        2O(   (qdp( )+1)) and odp(  ) = qdp( ).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of the formulas. When  (x) is atomic,
that is   = p(x),    = pi. When  (x) is composite, that is  (x) = ¬ 1(x) (or  (x) =
 1(x)  2(x)), we recursively compute   
1 (or   
1 and   
2) and output ¬  
1 (or   
1    
2).
The remaining cases are when  (x) is of the form  x. 1(x) or  y. 1(x,y). In the
ﬁrst case   is equivalent to  y. 1(y) (by renaming) and hence reduces to the second case
(considering x as a dummy variable). In the second case we rewrite  1(x,y) in the form
 1(x,y) =   ( 0(x,y),..., r 1(x,y), 0(x),..., s 1(x), 0(y),..., t 1(y))
where   is a boolean formula, each  i is an order formula,  i is an atomic or existential
FO
2 formula with qdp( i) < qdp( ) and  i is an atomic or existential FO
2 formula with
qdp( i) < qdp( ). We next pull out the  i’s from   by doing a case distinction on which
of the sub-formulas  i hold or not. Rewriting the previous expression as,
 
¯   { , }s
  
i<s
( i    i)  y.  ( 0,..., r 1, 0,..., s 1, 0,..., t 1) 
Next we do a case distinction on which order relation, called order type, holds between x
and y. All possible relations which can exist between x and y which satisfy the conditions
for   will be an order type, namely, x = y, x   y, x < y   x     y, y   x, x > y   y     xh.
When we assume that one of these order types is true, each atomic formula evaluates to
either   or   and in particular, each of the  ’s evaluates to either   or  ; which we denote
by   . Finally, we can rewrite   as follows, where   stands for the set of all order types:
 
¯   { , }s
  
i<s
( i    i)   
   
 y(     (  
0,...,  
r 1, 0,..., s 1, 0,..., t 1)) 
If   is an order type and  (y) an FO
2 formula then for  y.     (y), an equivalent LTL
formula      can be obtained in the following way,
  x = y x   y x < y  x     y y   x x > y  y     x
  < >                  
Now, we recursively compute   
i,i < s and   
i,i < t and outputs,
 
¯   { , }s
  
i<s
(  
i    i)   
   
     (  
0,...,  
r 1, 0,..., s 1,  
0,...,  
t 1)  
The respective bounds are easily proved by an induction on the cases.
Corollary. LTL(  ,  ,  ,  ) is expressively complete w.r.t FO
2(<, ).
The next interesting question about the logic is decidability, it turns out that the logic
is decidable.
hThe order types are mutually exclusive.
24Proposition 1..3. FO
2(<, ) is decidable in NEXPTIME.
Proof. (Bojanczyk, et al. 2006) shows that the satisﬁability of FO
2(<, ) is decidable in
NEXPTIME, where   is an equivalence relation, We interpret FO
2(<, ) in FO
2(<, ) by
the following translation,
 a(x)   = a(x)  x = y   = x = y
 x < y   = x < y  x   y   = x < y  x   y
 ¬    = ¬      1   2   =   1    2 
  x.    =  x.   
This completes the proof.
Corollary. Satisﬁability of LTL(  ,  ,  ,  ) is in NEXPTIME.
2. Discussion
Not only that we can get   from   in the presence of a total order <, we can go the other
way as well. We can interpret an equivalence relation   as  x   y   = x = y x   y y   x.
Below, we use this translation to import the relevant theorems to our setting.
Diamonds are not sufﬁcient to specify properties over discrete linear time. We can
enhance the expressiveness of our temporal logic by adding modalities for YESTERDAY
and TOMORROW. We can redo the proofs and show that they translate to FO
2(<, , , ).
The trivial way to get expressive completeness with respect to FO
2(<, , , ) is to add a
modality for each order type deﬁnable, which in turn corresponds to taking the product
of modalities deﬁnable in each oder (for instance, the order types deﬁnable by the vo-
cabulary (<, ) in two variables correspond to the modalities YESTERDAY, TOMORROW,
PAST, FUTURE, DISTANT PAST, DISTANT FUTURE) interpreted in the obvious way. But,
the satisﬁability problem for FO
2(<, , , ) is as hard as reachability in vector addition
systems (Bojanczyk et al. 2006). The situation is worse when we go for binary modalities
like UNTIL, because of the following.
Proposition 2..1 ((Bojanczyk et al. 2006)). Satisﬁability of FO
3(<, ) is undecidable.
We can redo the above proof and show that,
Proposition 2..2. Satisﬁability of FO
3(<, ) is undecidable.
Another extension is to reﬁne the order  , where we see each local process as a col-
lection of threads. That is to say that the order < stands for the global ordering of the
events in each process,   is the collection of orders corresponding to each local process
and yet another order    is the collection of threads in each local process and hence    has
to be compatible with   and again a disjoint union of chains. But, deﬁning a expressively
complete decidable temporal logic is hard, since
Proposition 2..3 ((Bj¨ orklund & Bojanczyk 2007)). Satisﬁability of FO
2(<, ,  ), where
   is compatible with   and is a union of chains, is undecidable.i
iSatisﬁability of FO
2(<, ,  ) is undecidable when    is not compatible with   but still compatible with
<. Since given   we can construct the sentence         xy. x    y   x   y.
25It may be noted that in principle the temporal logic which is introduced here can be
used for model-checking. The histories are of the form (w, ) where w      is a word
and   is as previously described. A collection of such histories can be recognized by
the following automaton. Class memory automaton (Bj¨ orklund & Schwentick 2007) was
introduced in the context of data languages, we use a reformulation of the same here,
the important fact is that here we do not have data elements, instead an order relation  .
Using the interpretation mentioned earlier we can import the relevant theorems here as
well. we denote by   the Hasse covering relation of  . We say that i   [ w ] is  -minimal
if ¬ j   [ w ]. j   i, similarly i is  -maximal if ¬ j   [ w ]. i   jj.
Deﬁnition 2..1. A Class memory automaton A is a six tuple A = (Q, , ,q0,Fl,Fg)
where Q is a ﬁnite set of states, q0 is the initial state, Fl   Q is a set of local accepting
states, Fg   Fl is a set of global accepting states and     Q   (Q { })       Q is the
transition relation.
A run   of the automaton A on a given word w = (w, ), where w = a1a2...an is a
sequence q0q1...qn such that q0 is the initial state and for all i   [n] there is a transition
 i = (p,p ,a,q) such that (i) p = qi 1 and q = qi (ii) a = ai (iii) if i is  -minimal then p 
should be  . Else there is a j   [n] such that j   i, and p  = qj. The run   is said to be
accepting if {qi   i is  -maximal}   Fl and qn   Fg.
Example 2..1. The printer system can be modelled by the automaton in the follow-
ing way. A = (Q, , ,q0,Fl,Fg) where   = {w,p,q,r}. The states of the automa-
ton are Q = {s0,sr,sq,sp}. The accepting states Fl = Fg = {sp} and the initial state
is s0. The transition relation contains the following tuples   = {(s,s ,w,s )   s,s   
Q} {(s,s0,r,sr)   s   Q} {(s,sr,q,sq)   s   Q} {(s,sq,p,sp)   s   Q}.
Class memory automaton is expressively equivalent to EMSO
2(<, , , ) – Existen-
tial Monadic Second Order logic with a ﬁrst order kernel in FO
2 – and its emptiness
checking is decidable (Bojanczyk et al. 2006, Bj¨ orklund & Schwentick 2007). Any
LTL formula can be translated to a CMA in 2-EXPTIME going via the FO
2 transla-
tion(Bojanczyk et al. 2006). The model-checking problem asks the following question:
Given a collection of histories as the runs of an automaton A, do they all satisfy the spec-
iﬁcation  , that is whether A    . Since the logic is closed under complementation, we
can ﬁnd the automaton A¬  which accepts all histories which do not satisfy the formula
 . Since CMA’s are closed under intersection, we can ﬁnd the automaton A  such that
L(A ) = L(A) L(A¬ )k. Now the problem reduces to checking whether the language of
A  is non-empty, which is decidable. But the complexity of emptiness checking of CMA
is as hard as Petri net reachability making it intractable.
3. Data Languages
Our logic and automaton work over structures of the form (w, ), where   is an extra-
linguistic object, in the sense that it lies outside the level of abstraction of the alphabet.
Even though in logic it is viable and convenient to consider such objects, in reality it is
j[n] for n   N stands for the set {1,...n}.
kL(A) is the language accepted by the automaton A.
26common that such information are represented at the level of abstraction of the alphabetl.
Examples are time-stamps in distributed systems, nonce-s in security protocols, process
id-s in schedulers, ID attributes in XML documents etc.
It is clear that since   has to represent unbounded-ly many processes, any alphabet
which is going to code it up, has to be unbounded. It can be done by introducing a
countably inﬁnite alphabet with suitable relations and operations on the alphabetm. Hence
the words, called data-words, are going to be over      , where   is ﬁnite and   is
countably inﬁnite. A collection of data-words is called a data language. For instance the
semantics of our logic can be given in terms of words over     where   has countably
inﬁnitely many arbitrarily long chains (for example   = N   N with the relation (x,y)  
(x ,y )   x = x   y < y ).
If there is one conclusion to draw it will be this that it seems difﬁcult to get decidable
yet sufﬁciently expressive logics to specify unbounded systems. We conclude by pointing
to a comprehensive survey on Data languages (Segouﬁn 2006).
lIt may very well be the case that such information are unavailable outside the realm of language.
mEquality is the most essential, preﬁx relation, arithmetical predicates etc. are other examples, though
these have not yet been studied.
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28ON LANGUAGES THAT CONTAIN THEIR OWN
UNGROUNDEDNESS PREDICATE  
Stefan Wintein
Department of Philosophy, Tilburg University
Abstract. Kripke’s ﬁxed point construction deals with paradoxical sentences such
as the Liar or elements of a Yablo sequence by declaring them neither true nor false.
We say that these sentences receive a third truth value, which we call ungrounded.
Wespecifycircumstancesunderwhichaninterpretedlanguagecan—besidesitstruth
and falsity predicate— contain its ownungroundedness predicate; in such a language
the assertion ‘  is ungrounded’ is true just in case   is in fact ungrounded. Then, our
result is applied to shed light on a dubious claim that has recently been advanced in
the literature with respect the so called Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever.
1. Introduction
The notorious Liar paradox causes serious problems for our intuitive understanding of
truth. The literature’s reactions to the Liar constitute a densely populated inhomoge-
neous area of theories. Formally, a boundary can be drawn between axiomatic and model-
theoretic theory constructions while philosophically such a boundary can be drawn be-
tween theories that study the Liar phenomenon in an ordinary language environment or
in an environment of mathematical language. In the philosophical area, theories of (self-
referential)truth‘rangefromattemptstoexplicateourintuitivenotionoftruthtoassigning
the truth predicate a rˆ ole in the foundations of mathematics’1. The contribution of this pa-
per is a model-theoretic result that is obtained in the attempt to make sense of a particular
phenomenon of self-referentiality occurring in ordinary language and thought.
The model-theoretic result. A very important technique for the construction of theories of
self-referentialtruthisKripke’sﬁxedpointconstruction. Startingwithaclassicalstructure
(called a ground structure) for the truth-free fragment2 of a language LT which contains
a truth predicate ‘T’ the construction generates, upon speciﬁcation of a monotonic valu-
ation scheme V , a partial structure for LT. The associated interpreted language LT
3 has
the so called ﬁxed point property; the truth value—true (t), false (f) or ungrounded (u)—
of a sentence   equals the truth value of the sentence which expresses that   is true;  
and T(   ) are semantically intersubstitutable. When Kripke (1975) writes that ‘Being
a ﬁxed point LT contains its own truth predicate’ it is arguable that his reason for calling
LT a language that contains its own truth predicate is precisely that it has the mentioned
semantic intersubstitutability property.
In fact, Kripke’s construction may also be applied to a ground structure to obtain an lan-
guage LTF which, in the sense in which LT is a language that contains its own truth
predicate, is a language that contains its own truth and falsity predicate. However, the
reason for calling LTF a language that contains its own falsity predicate is obviously not
 I would like to thank Reinhard Muskens for his valuable comments on this work.
1Halbach & Horsten (2006)
2In this paper, we will only consider Kripkean ﬁxed point constructions that are carried out starting with
an empty extension and anti-extension of the truth predicate; we only consider minimal ﬁxed points.
3LT =  LT,M,V  , with V a monotonic valuation scheme and M the partial structure for LT that is
obtained by carrying out the minimal ﬁxed point construction with V .
29the semantic intersubstitutability of   with F(   ). As ‘T’ and ‘F’are both truth value
predicates, used to express that a sentence has truth value t respectively f, one may ask for
a speciﬁcation of general conditions that have to be fulﬁlled for an interpreted language
to contain its own truth value predicate(s) in the sense alluded to by Kripke. I take it that
a necessary condition for a language to contain its own truth value predicate with respect
to a certain truth value is that the language is Truth Value Correct (TV C) with respect
to that value. A language is TV C with respect to truth value v just in case whenever a
sentence   has truth value v, the sentence which expresses that   has truth value v is true.
As LTF is TV C with respect to t and f, the question arises whether a language can also
be truth value correct with respect to the truth value ungrounded.
This paper’s model-theoretic result, called the paradoxical TV C theorem (partially) an-
swers this question. The theorem states any  -neutral ground structure can be expanded
to a structure for a language LTFU—containing a truth, falsity and Ungroundedness
predicate— such that the associated interpreted language LTFU is truth value correct
with respect to t, f and u. In a  -neutral structure, we have the ability to form Liar
sentences, Yablo sequences (Yablo (1993)) and, in fact, to form any self-referential con-
struction4 whatsoever using the predicates ‘T’ and ‘F’. However,  -neutrality excludes
the formation of self-referential constructions which use the ungroundedness predicate
‘U’. Sentences like ‘this sentence is ungrounded’ or ‘this sentence is ungrounded or it is
false’ have no formal counterpart in a  -neutral structure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up notation and Section 3 is used to
review two theorems, one due to Gupta and one due to Kripke, in light of our notion of
truth value correctness. Section 4 is devoted to the proof of the paradoxical TV C the-
orem, which involves a combination of Kripkean ﬁxed point techniques with revisionist
techniques and which is inspired by Gupta’s proof of a theorem which can be found in
Section 3 (Theorem 1) of this paper. In Section 5 we sketch an application of our theorem;
we show how the theorem sheds light on the status on interesting—though obscure—
argument involving self-referentiality that has recently been advanced in the literature
(Rabern & Rabern (2008)) with respect to the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever.
2. Preliminaries
We identify a ﬁrst order language L with its set of non-logical constants and we assume
that ‘=’ is a logical constant, expressing the identity relation. With n   1, Con(L),
Predn(L) and Funn(L) are used to denote the set of all constant symbols, n-ary pred-
icate symbols and n-ary function symbols of L respectively. Pred(L) and Fun(L)
denote the set of all predicate respectively function symbols so that L = Con(L)  
Pred(L)   Fun(L). The set of sentences of L (constructed in the usual manner) will
be denoted as Sen(L), its set of closed terms as Cterm(L). A structure for L is a
pair M =  D,I  consisting of a domain D and a function I that interprets L. With
c   Con(L),f   Funn(L) we have I(c)   D and I(f)   DDn. With R   Predn(L),
I(R) = (R+,R )   P(Dn) P(Dn)suchthatR+ R  =  .5 WheneverR  = Dn R+
4Whether or not a Yablo sequence is a genuine manifestation of self-reference is a controversial issue.
5R+ is called the extension, R  the anti-extension of R. Indeed, the deﬁnition of a structure in this
paper is such that the extension and anti-extension are always disjoint.
30for each n   1 and R   Predn(L), we say that M is classical, otherwise M is non-
classical. A valuation scheme V assigns a function VM : Sen(L)   {t,f,u} to each
structure M for L. Here {t,f,u} is the set of truth values;   can be true (t), false (f)
or ungrounded (u). The classical (Tarskian) valuation scheme (C), the Strong Kleene
scheme (SK), the Weak Kleene scheme (WK) and the Supervaluation scheme (SV )
—and only these schemes— we call appropriate (valuation) schemes. Note that C is
only deﬁned for classical structures, whereas the other appropriate schemes are deﬁned
for all structures. Any appropriate scheme V is normal6 meaning that whenever M is
a classical structure for some language L, VM( ) = C( ) for all     Sen(L). We
will use denM   Cterm(L)   D for the denotation relation in structure M =  D,I ;
 t,d    denM just in case t denotes d in M. Whenever we write ‘ t,     denM’, let it
be understood that t denotes a sentence   of the language under consideration.
Deﬁnition 1 Quotational closure
Let L be an arbitrary ﬁrst order language. We set L0 = L and deﬁne:
• Ln+1 = Ln   {[ ] |     Sen(Ln)}, n   0
• ¯ L =
  
i=0 Li
When   is a sentence of Ln, [ ] is a constant symbol of Ln+1. ¯ L is the quotational closure
obtained from L and {Ln}n N is the quotational hierarchy of ¯ L. Note that m   n  
Lm   Ln. Any language ¯ L, obtained as the quotational closure of some language L, is
called a quotational language.  
Deﬁnition 2 Sentence structures
A sentence structure M =  D,I  is a structure for a quotational language ¯ L such that:
1. Sen(¯ L)   D
2. I([ ]) =   for all     Sen(¯ L).
Thus the domain of a sentence structure M =  D,I  for ¯ L consists of the sentences of
¯ L and Other objects. We use OM = D   Sen(¯ L) for the set of non-sentential objects in
M’s domain. 7  
When ¯ L is some quotational language, we use L to range over all triples  ¯ L,M,V  , where
M is a sentence structure for ¯ L and where V is an appropriate scheme that is deﬁned for
M.8 When V = C, we say that L is classical, otherwise, we say that L is non-classical.9
Deﬁnition 3 Ground structures and their expansions
Let ¯ L be a quotational language and let P   Pred(¯ L). We say that ˆ M =  D,I  is a
ground structure for ¯ L   P just in case ˆ M is a classical structure for ¯ L   P such that:
1. Sen(¯ L)   D
6Throughout the paper, ‘appropriate scheme’ is interchangeable with ‘monotonic normal scheme’.
7So the sentences themselves —rather than their (G¨ odel) codes— populate our domain. This approach
is not uncommon in the literature. For instance, see Gupta (1982) or Gupta & Belnap (1993).
8Thus, when M is non-classical, V  = C.
9Note that a non-classical L may have classical M.
312. I([ ]) =   for all     Sen(¯ L).
When ˆ M isagroundstructurefor ¯ L P, M isan ¯ L-expansionof ˆ M whenM isastructure
for ¯ L such that the domains of ˆ M and M, as well as their respective interpretations of
¯ L   P, are identical.  
3. Truth value predicates
A truth value predicate is a predicate that is used to express the assertion that a sentence
has a certain truth value; the unary predicate symbols T, F and U will be used to express
that a sentence is true, false or ungrounded respectively. With v   {t,f,u}, we use Pv to
denote the corresponding truth value predicate, T, F or U respectively.
Deﬁnition 4 Truth value correctness
Let L be a language and let LTFU = L   {T,F,U}. LTFU =  ¯ LTFU,M,V   is said to be
Truth Value Correct with respect to v   {t,f,u} just in case TV Cv holds:
TV Cv : VM( ) = v   VM(Pv(t)) = t, for all  t,     denM
LTFU is truth value correct (TV C) just in case it is truth value correct with respect to
each v   {t,f,u}. When TV Ct ( TV Cf, TV Cu) holds, we say that LTFU contains its
own truth (falsity, ungroundedness) predicate.  
Note that, for classical LTFU, TV Ct is equivalent to (1):
CM(T(t)    ) = t for all  t,     denM (1)
So, for classical LTFU, TV Ct is equivalent to the truth of all instances of the notorious
T-scheme. Not every classical LTFU can contain its own truth predicate. For instance, let
LTFU be such that   ,¬T( )    denM. The sentence ‘¬T( )’, which intuitively says of
itself that it is not true is a (strengthened) Liar sentence. Instantiating (1) with the Liar
sentence gives ‘CM(T( )   ¬T( )) = t’, which is impossible. In order to deﬁne an
interesting class of classical LTFU that do contain their own truth predicate, we need to
deﬁne the notion of X-neutrality. Let M =  D,I  be a sentence structure—for some ¯ L—
and let X   D. With   d =  d1,...,dn    Dn, we say that   d    Dn is an X-swap of   d just
in case for every 1   i   n we have that di    X   d 
i = di and that di   X   d 
i   X .
We use X(  d)   Dn to denote the set of all X-swaps of   d. We are now ready to deﬁne the
notion of X-neutrality.
Deﬁnition 5 X-neutrality
Let ¯ L be a quotational language, let M =  D,I  be a sentence structure for ¯ L and let
X   Sen(¯ L). We say that M is X-neutral just in case, for every f   Fun(¯ L) and every
R   Pred(¯ L) we have that:
1.     X and  t,     denM   t = [ ]
2.   d   R+   X(  d)   R+,   d   R    X(  d)   R 
3. I(f)(  d) = I(f)(  d ) for all   d    X(  d)  
32Gupta (1982) showed that every ground structure ˆ M for ¯ LT   {T} —where LT =
L   {T}— that is Sen(¯ LT)-neutral can be ¯ LT-expanded, using a revision process, to
a classical structure M such that the classical LT associated with M contains its own
truth predicate. However, his results are easily generalizable, delivering the following
theorem.
Theorem 1 Non-paradoxical TV C theorem (Gupta)
Let V be an appropriate scheme and let ˆ M =  D,I  be a ground structure for ¯ LTFU  
{T,F,U} that is Sen(¯ LTFU)-neutral. There exists a classical ¯ LTFU-expansion M of ˆ M
such that LTFU =  ¯ LTFU,M,V   is truth value correct.
Proof: See Gupta (1982) or Gupta & Belnap (1993) for a proof in terms of LT and carry
out the necessary modiﬁcations, interpreting U with ( ,D) to obtain a proof for classical
LTFU. As the expansion of ˆ M is classical and as any appropriate valuation scheme is
normal, it follows that the theorem in fact holds for any LTFU.  
The reason that I baptized this result of Gupta the non-paradoxical TV C theorem is that
the conditions for the theorem (i.e. Sen(¯ LTFU)-neutrality) explicitly forbid the formation
of well-known “paradoxical” sentences such as the Liar or elements of a Yablo sequence
(Yablo (1993)). Kripke (1975) showed that, in the presence of such paradoxical sentences,
a language can still be truth value correct with respect to t and f.
Theorem 2 Paradoxical TV C theorem for {t,f} (Kripke)
Let L be a language, LTF = L   {T,F} and let ˆ M be any ground structure for ¯ LTF  
{T,F}. When V is any non-classical appropriate scheme, there exists a ¯ LTF-expansion
M of ˆ M such that LTF =  ¯ LTF,M,V   is truth value correct with respect to t and f.
Proof: See Kripke (1975).  
A language LTF that is obtained via Theorem 2 declares the Liar sentence to be un-
grounded, just as the sentences that ascribe truth or falsity to the Liar sentence. However,
the languages LTF considered by Kripke do not contain an ungroundedness predicate, so
that an assertion like ‘the Liar sentence is ungrounded’ has no formal representation in
LTF. Thus, the question arises whether a language LTFU can, in the presence of para-
doxical sentences, be truth value correct tout court. In the next section, we will prove a
theorem that speciﬁes conditions under which the answer to this question is ‘yes’. The
proof of this “paradoxical TV C theorem” is inspired by Gupta’s proof of Theorem 1.
4. The paradoxical TV C theorem
Let L be a ﬁrst order language and let ¯ LT and ¯ LTU denote the quotational closure of
L   {T} and L   {T,U} respectively. We let   = Sen(¯ LTU)   Sen(¯ LT) and for each
n   N, we let  n =     Sen(Ln
TU). The paradoxical TV C theorem will be immediate,
once we have proven the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The paradoxical TV C lemma for {t,u}
Let V be a non-classical appropriate valuation scheme and ˆ M a  -neutral ground struc-
turefor ¯ LTU {T,U}. Then, ˆ M canbe ¯ LTU-expandedtoM suchthatLTU =  ¯ LTU,M,V  
is truth value correct with respect to t and u.
33The ¯ LTU-expansion referred to in Lemma 1 will be constructed from the ground structure
ˆ M via a two stage process. The ﬁrst stage, called FP, uses a ﬁxed point construction, the
second stage, called RP, uses revisionist techniques.
FP. Let ˆ M be a  -neutral structure and let V be a non-classical appropriate valuation
scheme. Foranyordinal , letM  = ˆ M(T +
  ,T  
  )denotethe ¯ LTU-expansionof ˆ M thatin-
terprets T as (T +
  ,T  
  ) and that (classically) interprets U as ( ,D). Let M0 = ˆ M( ,O ˆ M)
and, for   > 0, deﬁne M  as follows.
SUC :   =   + 1 :
 
T +
  = {    Sen(¯ LT) | VM ( ) = t}
T  
  = {    Sen(¯ LT) | VM ( ) = f}  O ˆ M
LIM :   is limit :
 
T +
  =
 
 <  T
+
 
T  
  =
 
 <  T
 
 
By well-known arguments, the sequence of structures {M }  On has a ﬁxed point, i.e.
there exists an ordinal after which further applications of SUC and LIM do not change
the resulting structures anymore. We call this ﬁxed point structure M .
RP. For any ordinal  , let M 
  = ˆ M(T +
  ,T  
  ,U+
  ) denote the ¯ LTU-expansion of ˆ M that
interprets T as (T +
  ,T  
  ) and that interprets U (classically) as (U+
  ,D   U+
  ). We set
M 
0 = M  and deﬁne for each   > 0, M 
  as follows.
SUC  :   =   + 1 :
 
 
 
T +
  = {    Sen(¯ LTU) | VM 
 ( ) = t}
T  
  = {    Sen(¯ LTU) | VM 
 ( ) = f}  O ˆ M
U+
  = {    Sen(¯ LTU) | VM 
 ( ) = u}
LIM  :   is limit:
 
             
             
T +
  = {    Sen(¯ LTU) |    :    
 
 < < 
T
+
M 
 )}
T  
  = {    Sen(¯ LTU) |    :    
 
 < < 
T
 
M 
 }
U+
  = {    Sen(¯ LTU) |    :    
 
 < < 
U
+
M 
 }
In order to prove Lemma 1, we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Stabilization lemma
Let V be a non-classical appropriate valuation scheme. Let ˆ M be a  -neutral structure
for ¯ LTU  {T,U} and let {M 
 }  On be the series of structures generated from ˆ M via FP
and RP. Then, for all n   N and     On such that     n + 1
    Sen(L
n
TU)   VM 
n+1( ) = VM 
 ( ) (2)
Proof: Suppose that the lemma is false. Then there has to be a least natural number, say
n  for which it fails and, given n  there has to be a least ordinal   n  + 1, say    such
that M 
n +1 and M 
   disagree about the truth value of     Sen(Ln 
TU). Thus from the
hypothesis that the lemma is false and the minimality of n  and    we get:
34C1 : For all n < n ,    n + 1,    Sen(Ln
TU) : VM 
n+1( ) = VM 
 ( )
C2 : For all   s.t. n  + 1     <   ,    Sen(Ln 
TU) : VM 
n +1( ) = VM 
 ( )
C3 :      Sen(Ln 
TU) : VM 
n +1( )  = VM 
  ( )
We will show that these 3 conditions can not (jointly) hold, contradicting the hypothesis
of the falsity of the lemma. From the deﬁnition of RP it follows that    has to be a
successor ordinal, say    =   + 1. The structures M 
n +1 and M 
 +1 only differ with
respect to the interpretation of the predicate symbols T and U. By deﬁnition of RP, these
interpretations are fully determined by the functions VM 
n (·) and VM 
 (·) respectively. As
these functions valuate  0 different sentences of    n  1 to be true (false)10, there exists
a bijection   :      n  1        n  1 such that —with X = T +,T   or U+:
     (     n  1) :     Xn +1    ( )   X   (3)
We extend   to a bijection11 from D to D, by specifying that   acts as the identity func-
tion on objects in D   (     n  1). We will show that   is an isomorphism between the
structures M 
n +1 and M 
n +   in the language Ln 
TU. From the fact that isomorphic struc-
tures in a language are elementary equivalent w.r.t. the sentences of that language, it then
follows that there cannot be a     Sen(Ln 
TU) such that M 
n +1 and M 
n +   disagree about
the truth value of  . Hence, we establish a contradiction with C3 and, consequently, with
the hypothesis that the lemma is false. By deﬁnition of an isomorphism between struc-
tures, in order to show that   is an isomorphism between M 
n +1 and M 
   in the language
Ln 
TU, we need to establish that, for every n   N and  d1,...,dn    Dn:
1. For every R   Predn(Ln 
TU):
 d1,...,dn    R
+
n +1 iff   (d1),..., (dn)    R
+
  
 d1,...,dn    R
 
n +1 iff   (d1),..., (dn)    R
 
  
2. For every f   Funn(Ln 
TU):
 (I(f)(d1,...,dn)) = I(f)( (d1),..., (dn))
3. For every c   Con(Ln 
TU):  (I(c)) = I(c)
ad 1. When R    {T,U}, the claim readily follows from the fact that   acts as the identity
function on D     and that ˆ M is  -neutral structure. So let R   {T,U}. Observe that
d   D implies that d is either an element of O ˆ M,  n 1,      n  1 or Sen(¯ LT). When
d   O ˆ M, the claim follows from the fact that d   T
 
n +1 T
 
   and that   acts as the identity
function on O ˆ M. When d    n  1 the claim follows from C1 and the deﬁnition of RP.
When d        n  1 the claim follows from (3). Finally, let d   Sen(¯ LT). Observe
that, as M  results from FP, M  is a ﬁxed point structure “with respect to the sentences
of ¯ LT”, i.e.:
VM ( ) = VM 
 ( ) for all     On,    Sen(¯ LT) (4)
10Let   1 =  
11Note that the existence of this bijection depends only on the fact that M 
0 valuates  0 sentences as t
and  0 sentences as f, which make VM 
n (·) and VM 
 (·) do so too. M 
0 either valuates  0 or 0 sentences as
u and so VM 
n (·) and VM 
 (·) respectively valuate either  0 or 0 sentences as u. In both cases, cardinality
considerations show that the function   satisfying (3) can be found and so the sought for bijection exists.
35From (4) and the deﬁnition of RP it follows, —with X = T +,T   or U+— that:
    XM 
1       XM 
1+  for all     On,    Sen(¯ LT) (5)
Now the claim follows from (5) and the fact that   acts as the identity function on
Sen(¯ LT).
ad 2. The claim follows from the fact that M is an  -neutral structure and that   only
permutes elements of  .
ad 3. When c denotes an element d     , the claim follows from the fact that  (d) = d.
Whenever c   Con(Ln 
TU) denotes an element of  ,  -neutrality of ˆ M guarantees that it
denotes an element of  n  1, on which   also acts as the identity function.  
Lemma 1 and, in fact, the paradoxical TV C theorem now follow easily.
Theorem 3 The paradoxical TV C theorem
Let L be a ﬁrst order language, LTFU = L   {T,F,U} and LTF = L   {T,F}. Let
¯   = Sen(¯ LTFU)   Sen(¯ LTF). Let V be a non-classical appropriate valuation scheme
and let ˆ M be a ¯  -neutral ground structure for ¯ LTFU  {T,F,U}. Then, ˆ M can be ¯ LTFU-
expanded to a structure M such that LTFU =  ¯ LTFU,M,V   is truth value correct.
Proof: Apply FP and RP, modiﬁed in the obvious way, to expand ˆ M by ﬁlling the
extensions and anti-extensions of T,F and U. From the (modiﬁed) Stabilization Lemma
it follows that the generated series of structures {M 
 }  On has a ﬁxed point at  , i.e.
M 
  = M 
 +1. From the deﬁnition of (modiﬁed) RP, it now immediately follows that
LTFU =  ¯ LTFU,M 
 ,V   is truth value correct.  
5. The Tempered Liar Lemma and the paradoxical TV C theorem
In this section, the paradoxical TV C theorem will be applied to shed light on the status
of a proof which appeared in Rabern & Rabern (2008). The background of their proof is
the so called Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever (HLPE). See Boolos (1996), Roberts (2001) or
Rabern & Rabern (2008) for a discussion of this puzzle. We will only discuss the “sub
puzzle” of HLPE that Rabern and Rabern (R&R) claim to solve with their proof.
The puzzle. Suppose that there is an object, o, that is either black all over, yellow all over
or red all over. You do not know o’s color but there is a god, True, who knows o’s color
and who answers all and only yes-no questions truthfully. What is the minimum number
n of yes-no questions that you have to ask to True in order to determine o’s color with
certainty? One may reason as follows. First asking whether o is black and then whether o
is yellow shows that n   2 and as obviously, n  = 1 we have n = 2. However, R&R give
a proof, in natural language, that claims to show that this appeal to our “n  = 1-intuitions”
is unjustiﬁed; they claim to prove that n = 1. The statement that n = 1 will be called the
Tempered Liar Lemma (TLL) and the question by which R&R claim to establish TLL is
Q, in which ‘this’ refers to the question as a whole.12
Q : Is it the case that (your answer to this question is ‘no’ and o is black) or o is yellow?
12I will be sloppy in not distinguishing between a yes-no question and its associated declarative sentence;
for instance I will speak of the truth-value of a yes-no question.
36The essential idea involved is that on Liar like questions such as ‘your answer to this
question is ‘no’?’, True cannot answer with either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ without lying and shows a
different reaction accordingly, say that True explodes. R&R, argue that if Q is answered
with a) ‘yes’ then o is yellow, b) ‘no’ then o is red while c) an explosion indicates that o
is black.
The proof. The three material implications a), b) and c), are established via reductio ad
absurdum as follows.
a) Assume that True answers ‘yes’ and that o is not yellow. Then True says ‘yes’ to the
left disjunct of Q and so in particular to ‘your answer to this question is ‘no”. This is
impossible as True tells the truth.
b) Assume that True answers ‘no’ and that o is not red. Then, as True answered ‘no’ to
Q, he denies the left and the right disjunct of  , from which it respectively follows that o
is not black and that o is not yellow and so o is red. Contradiction.
c) Assume that True explodes and o is not black. Then o is not yellow either, for other-
wise True would answer ‘yes’. Hence, as o is neither black nor yellow, True denies both
disjuncts of Q and hence answers Q with ‘no’. Contradiction.
The paradox. This argument of R&R is—though interesting—obscure, for nowhere in
Rabern & Rabern (2008) are the principles by which True reasons speciﬁed. At ﬁrst
sight—at least to me—the proof looks ﬁne. But consider the following argument to the
conclusion that True does not explode on Q which is, so it seems, obtained by the same
principles as those implicit in R&R’s proof. Suppose that o is black and that True ex-
plodes on Q. Then, the left disjunct of Q is false (as True does not answer ‘no’), and so
Q is false (as o is black the second disjunct is also false) and hence True should answer
Q with ‘no’! Also, what would happen if we asked True: ‘is the case that your answer
to this question is ‘no’ or that you explode on this question?’ Such strengthened Liar
objections show that R&R’s proof is suspect, to say the least, and that an explanation of
the assumptions involved is needed.
The truth value-answer link. A possible defense against such strengthened Liar objec-
tions is that they are based on a wrong conception of “how True works”. For instance,
True may answer with ‘yes’or ‘no’ iff answering ‘yes’ or ‘no’ is truthful and if True can
do so without contradicting himself and otherwise, True explodes. Such an ‘inferential
conception’ of True may be combined with the thought that if o is black, True explodes
on Q and that this explosion renders Q false; the inferential conception of True then gives
up the link between the truth value of a sentence and True’s answer to it.13 In contrast, the
paradoxical TV C theorem can be seen as a speciﬁcation of the conditions under which
one can make sense of the argument of R&R when the answer of True to   is understood
as a reaction to the truth value of  . We give two distinct ways to do so, called the meta-
language approach and the object-language approach respectively.
13In personal communication Brain Rabern suggested, as a reaction to my strengthened Liar objections,
an inferential conception of True which gives up the link between the truth value of   and True’s answer to
it. In Wintein (2009) I develop a formal approach to capture such an inferential conception of True. There
an answer of True to a sentence   is determined by the outcome of an inferential process of True which
takes   as input. In this formalization of an ‘inferential True’ one can, due to the assumption that True
reacts differently to Truthtellers than to Liar sentences, also determine the color of an object which has 1
out of 4 possible colors by asking a single question to True.
37The meta-language approach. Assuming a link between the truth value of   and True’s
answer to it, the interpretation of ‘F(x)’ as ‘x is false’ is extensionally equivalent to its
interpretation as ‘True’s answer to x is ‘no”. Modulo this shift of interpretation, question
Q can be represented via a constant   and an interpretation function I as follows.
I( ) = (F( )   B(o))   Y (o) (6)
Let LTFU be a language that contains, besides the three truth value predicates (equiva-
lently, “answering predicates”) the color predicates B, Y and R and the constants   and
o. Let your ignorance about the color of the object be represented by K   Sen(LTFU):
K := (B(o)   ¬Y (o)   ¬R(o))   (¬B(o)   Y (o)   ¬R(o))   (¬B(o)   ¬Y (o)   R(o))
Any  -neutral ground structure for LTFU  {T,F,U} which interprets   as (6), which in-
terprets o with a non-sentential object and which interprets the color predicates such that
K is valuated as t we call a K-ground structure and the LTFU-expansion of a K-ground
structure via the Strong Kleene version of the paradoxical TV C theorem construction, we
call a possible world. Note that, corresponding to the three possible colors of the object,
the class of possible worlds M allows for a tripartition. A possible way to give a valid
reconstruction of R&R’s argument is to understand them as reasoning in a classical meta-
language about M. We deﬁne |=M  P(Sen(LTFU))   Sen(LTFU) by stipulating that
  |=M   just in case in every M   M in which all members of   are valuated as t,  
is also valuated as t. Neglecting parenthesis for singleton sets, the three claims of R&R
may be translated as follows:
a ) T( ) |=M Y (o) b ) F( ) |=M R(o) c ) U( ) |=M B(o)
As the reader may verify, a ), b ) and c ) are true, while the associated object-language
counterparts of, a ) and b ) in terms of material implication do not hold. For instance, we
do not have that |=M T( )   Y (o); in a world in which the object is black, ‘T( )’ is
valuated as u, ‘Y (o)’ as f and hence the material implication as u.
The object-language approach. If we slightly alter R &R’s natural language claims, we
can have a correct object language representation of those claims. For observe that the
fact that the ungroundedness predicate is a classical predicate gives us:
a  ) |=M (¬U( )   T( ))   Y (o)
b  ) |=M (¬U( )   F( ))   R(o)
c  ) |=M U( )    B(o)
Conclusion. We used the paradoxical TV C theorem to give a rough sketch of two pos-
sible reconstructions of the reasoning of R&R. Although a lot more can be said about the
details of both reconstructions, I do not think that either of them can be fruitfully con-
verted into a genuine proof of TLL, the reason being that the condition of  -neutrality
is too restrictive. We would like to know the principles by which True answers questions
as ‘do you explode on this question?’ and the like, which are excluded by  -neutrality.
Be that as it may, the paradoxical TV C theorem itself is a nice little result which can be
added to our ever growing stock of truths about truth.
38References
G. Boolos (1996). ‘The hardest logic puzzle ever’. The Harvard Review of Philosophy
6:62–65.
A. Gupta (1982). ‘Truth and Paradox’. Journal of Philosophical Logic 11:1–60.
A. Gupta & N. Belnap (1993). The Revision Theory of Truth. MIT Press, Cambridge.
V. Halbach & L. Horsten (2006). ‘Axiomatizing Kripke’s theory of truth’. Journal of
Symbolic Logic 71:677–712.
S. Kripke (1975). ‘Outline of a Theory of Truth’. Journal of Philosophical Logic 72:690–
716.
B. Rabern & L. Rabern (2008). ‘A simple solution to the hardest logic puzzle ever’.
Analysis 68:105–112.
T. Roberts (2001). ‘Some thoughts about the hardest logic puzzle ever’. Journal of
Philosophical Logic 30:609–612.
S. Wintein (2009). ‘The computational power of self-referential truth’. Submitted .
S. Yablo (1993). ‘Paradox without self-reference’. Analysis 53:251–252.
39CHARACTERIZATION OF CONVERSATIONAL ACTIVITIES
IN A CORPUS OF ASSISTANCE REQUESTS
François Bouchet
LIMSI-CNRS, Université Paris-Sud XI
Abstract. Modeling linguistic interaction is a crucial point to provide assistance to
ordinary users interacting with computer-based systems and services. A ﬁrst issue
is more particularly the characterization of the linguistic phenomena associated with
the Function of Assistance, in order to deﬁne an assisting rational agent capable of
pertinent reactions to users’ requests. In this paper, we present a corpus based on
users’ requests registered in actual assisting experimentations. First we compare it
to similar task-oriented dialogical corpora through a method based on interactional
proﬁles (speech acts oriented analysis) that assesses its speciﬁcity. Then we show
through an annotation of conversational activities that the collected corpus is het-
erogeneous (40% of its requests are actually not task-oriented), and use again the
interactional proﬁles approach to go towards an automatic identiﬁcation of those ac-
tivities.
1. Introduction
1.1. Assisting Ordinary Users
The number of novice (or ordinary) users1 of computer applications and services has been
quickly increasing for the past decades and is likely to keep growing for some time. An
example of such users could be the average Net surfer swapping between websites in or-
der to use sporadically web-services (buying an airplane ticket...) or producing personal
web-content (sharing photos, videos...). Because of the complex nature of the new web-
sites and commercial applications, these users will inevitably face difﬁculties to achieve
their objectives. That situation can lead users into a cognitive distress, with a signiﬁcant
negative impact for the application providers.
Natural language (NL) has been shown to be an ideal way to provide assistance to novice
usersinteractingwithcomputerapplicationsorservices. First, itappearsthatitisamodal-
ity spontaneously used when a problem arises, particularly (but not exclusively) in the
case of novice users, and which closely reﬂects the cognitive processes of the user (Er-
icsson & Simon 1993), but the use of multimodality for assistance also allows a clear
cognitive separation between the application and the help system (with graphical (Mor-
rell & Park 1993) or dialogical (Amalberti 1996) modalities). But since these situations
arise mainly because of the lack of knowledge about the software, it leads to many linguis-
tic difﬁculties such as: user-speciﬁc vocabulary, degraded spelling (for typed requests) or
degraded prosody (for oral requests), bad categorizations, etc. It thus makes this type of
requests really difﬁcult to process and to interpret.
1.2. Characterizing the Function of Assistance
In order to bring an answer to this need of assistance, the DAFT project2 from LIMSI-
CNRS(Sansonnet, etal. 2005)intendsto developAssistantConversational Agents(ACA)
1By ordinary user, we mean a non expert person using a software application.
2http://www.limsi.fr/~jps/research/daft/
40able to analyze Natural Language requests expressed without constraints by ordinary
users during their use of applications of increasing complexity (applets, webpages, ac-
tive websites, text processor...). This choice is also motivated by the additional beneﬁts
brought by the use of an embodiment for dialogue system in terms of trust and believabil-
ity, a phenomenon known as the ‘Persona Effect’ (Lester, et al. 1997).
The objectives of the data processing sequence of DAFT assistance system is to char-
acterize generic components of the Function of Assistance, and to propose a rational agent
engine able to assist ordinary users in the most frequent cases. The global architecture of
the system is classically made of:
• a semantic analysis module of NL requests to build formal requests,
• a module of reasoning on the application model that returns a formal request,
• a production module aiming to express the agent’s answer in a multimodal way
(spoken or written way, action on the application, gestures from an animated virtual
character...).
As a preliminary step towards the creation of this NL processing chain, we have cho-
sen a corpus-based approach to study the phenomena we had to model, leading to three
questions: is our corpus original (i.e. different from existing ones) and how to prove it?
What kind of conversational activities does it actually contain? And how is it possible to
distinguish them automatically?
In a ﬁrst part of this article, we describe how that corpus has been built up and give
an excerpt of collected requests. In a second part, we introduce the concept of interac-
tional proﬁles to compare, in terms of speech acts, our corpus to similar ones. Finally, we
show in section 4 that our corpus actually contains requests representing different con-
versational activities and apply again the interactional proﬁle method to compare those
subcorpora.
2. Corpus collection and building
2.1. Methodology
Currently, very few public data is actually available concerning Human-Computer dia-
logue. Moreover, our scope is rather different from classical dialogue systems and ac-
tually closer from Natural Languages Interfaces (Androutsopoulos & Aretoulaki 2003),
since we’re dealing with isolated requests rather than with dialogic sessions. On top of
this, it was crucial for us to control precisely the experimental conditions for the collec-
tion of requests which had to deal speciﬁcally with the assistance. For all those reasons3,
we have chosen to collect our own speciﬁc corpus, which we’ll refer to as the Daft corpus
in this article.
It has been built up from three different sources (each providing roughly a third of the
total corpus):
1. During two years, about 100 human subjects have been faced with several applica-
tions assisted by the Daft system (in its 1.0 version): three Java applets (modal and
3The validity of that difference hypothesis will be further investigated in section 3.
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Figure 1: The conversational agent interface into which were embedded different kind of
applications (Java applets or dynamic websites)
unmodal, i.e. with threads), two websites (one was active, i.e. could be dynamically
edited by users – cf. ﬁgure 1 for an example of interface);
2. From two thesauri (Molinsky & Bliss 1994, Atkins & Lewis 1996), we have man-
ually constructed some requests in order to provide a wider linguistic coverage of
the assistance vocabulary and idioms;
3. Recently, we have added to the corpus some FAQ extracted from integrated help
systems and websites concerning two widely used document creation softwares
(L ATEX and Microsoft Word).
2.2. General view of the Daft corpus
Table 1 shows excerpts from the Daft corpus (currently made of 11.000 requests), empha-
sizing some characteristics:
• more than half of the users’ sentences are not well-formed (spoken expressions,
spelling/syntactic/grammaticalmistakes, acronymsfromSMSandinternetslang...),
and some mistakes are not that easy to detect and correct with classical NLP tools;
• requests are not stored as part of a dialogue but as isolated sentences. As mentioned
previously, it appeared as suggested by (Capobianco & Carbonell 2002) that in the
domain of assistance, dialogic interactions are almost always limited to a single
conversational turn and hence can be dealt with as isolated requests.
42No Original request Translated request
1 appuies sur le bouton quitter clicks on the quit button
2 clickersur le bouton back clickon the back button
3 bon, reviens à l apage d’accueil ok, come back to th ehomepage
4 a quoi sert cette fenêtre, what is this window for,
5 c quoi le GT ACA WDYM by GT ACA
6 le bouton "fermer" et le bouton "quitter" do the "close" button and the "quit" button
ont exactement le même fonctionnement? work exactly the same way?
7 je ne vosi aucune page de demso !! I cna’t see any demso page!!
8 j’ai été surpris qu’il manque une fonction I was really surprised to see a global
d’annulation globale cancel function is missing
9 ça serait mieux si on pouvait aller it’d be better to be able to go
directement au début directly at the beginning
10 auf viedersen auf viedersen
11 bon à rien ! you good-for-nothing!
12 Quel genre de musique tu aimes ? What kind of music do you like?
13 ca marche :-) works for me :-)
14 j’aime tes cheveux Léa I like your hair Lea
Table 1: Original and translated examples from the Daft corpus – mistakes, in bold, have
been translated as closely as possible from the original French version
3. Corpora comparison
We have seen in 2.1. that our initial hypothesis for the corpus collection was that our do-
main of study was speciﬁc enough to prevent us from using requests from similar existing
corpora. We thus focus in this section on the validation of that hypothesis through an
analysis of speech acts in different corpora annotated with different taxonomy.
3.1. Data: corpora to compare
We have chosen for this comparative study three reference corpora of annotated task-
oriented dialogues:
• Switchboard (Jurafsky, et al. 1998): 200.000 manually annotated utterances from
task-oriented phone talks;
• MapTask(Carletta, etal.1996): 128dialoguesinwhichonepersonhastoreproduce
a route on a map, following instructions from another person with a similar map;
• Bugzilla (Ripoche 2006): 1.200.000 comments from 128.000 bug reports created
during the development of the Mozilla Foundation’s suite.
Switchboard and MapTask are coming from oral interactions and hence are naturally
richer in words than written corpora (Kelly & Chapanis 1977), but the closeness of ac-
tivities appeared more important for our comparison than this origin difference. As for
the language difference (those corpora being in English whereas ours is in French), it is
probably not signiﬁcant in terms of speech acts. Besides, although some French (oral as
well) corpora could also be relevant for this comparison, like Air France (Morel 1989),
43Ozkan (Ozkan 1994) or even a small French MapTask corpus (Post 2000), they aren’t
provided with a speech act taxonomy and annotations as it is the case the three ones
aforementioned.
3.2. Methodology: interactional proﬁles and taxonomy mapping
Interactional proﬁle is deﬁned in (Ripoche 2006) as “the distribution of speech acts ap-
pearing in a given interactional unit”. The interactional unit itself is nothing but a coherent
set of speech acts chosen according to the analysis objective: a single utterance, a dia-
logue, a corpus, etc. Once the interactional unit has been chosen, the ratio of each speech
act in this unit is calculated, and the proﬁle itself is generally displayed as an histogram in
order to have a synthetic view associated with the class of interaction. The main interest
of interactional proﬁles is not as much their intrinsic value as the possibility they offer to
allow comparison between two different classes of interactions.
This approach is fundamentally close from the model developed in (Twitchell, et al. 2004)
but has some noticeable differences though:
• since for more accuracy we prefer to manually annotate the speech acts, our ap-
proach is discrete rather than probabilist (Twitchell et al. (2004) allowing elements
of an unit to belong to many speech acts with a probability function);
• our approach is conceptually more collective (to study a global behaviour) than
individual (study of one person’s interactions), although both methods can certainly
be used in both contexts;
• we consider the interactional proﬁles deﬁned as having an absolute value, whereas
Twitchell et al. (2004) subtract to it a global average proﬁle of interactions supposed
to have a normative value.
Here, the interactional unit chosen is the corpus as a whole, and the speech acts set
for the shared taxonomy is made of the ﬁve classical searlian speech acts (Searle 1969),
which are generic enough to allow comparison. We thus had to map the existing tax-
onomies used to annotate those corpora into that common one.
In the case of Switchboard, although the original annotation was done along four dimen-
sions, it has appeared that combinations between those dimensions were rather limited,
allowing to distinguish a total of 42 main categories in the DAMSL taxonomy (Jurafsky
et al. 1998), which are the ones we have been using here. Some speech acts being very
speciﬁc (for instance Switchboard’s “self-talk”) are however not trivial to convert even
into a very general taxonomy as the one chosen. Similarly, although annotated at dif-
ferent levels, the speech acts from MapTask can be considered in a ﬂatten way for this
mapping, as displayed in table 2.
3.3. Results
The interactional proﬁles of those four corpora are diplayed on ﬁgure 2. Because of the
impossiblity to have a perfect mapping explained in the previous section, their interpreta-
tion needs to be done cautiously. Nevertheless, some very distinct characteristics seem to
distinguish the Daft corpus from the three others, namely:
44Searle Assertive Commissive Directive Expressive Declarative Unknown
clarify - align acknowledge - uncodable
explain check ready
MapTask reply-w instruct reply-n
query-w reply-y
query-yn
Table 2: Speech acts mapping for the MapTask taxonomy
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Figure 2: Interactional proﬁles comparison of four task-oriented dialogue corpora
• a majority of directives (57%), explained by the high number of orders or questions
to the agent. Although other corpora are also task-oriented, interactions were only
between humans, and it seems likely that talking to a computer (even through an
ECA) make requests more direct, as users generally don’t expect the agent to be
able to make complex inferences.
• the number of assertives is rather low (13%), users prefering to express their feel-
ings and states of mind (29%) concerning the situation rather than those same facts
in a neutral and “objective” way as they do for example in the Bugzilla corpus, since
not knowing how to do something is considered as a rather stressing situation.
• very few commissives (1%) are observed, which can be easily explained by the
relationship user-agent: if the agent is in essence subordinate to the user, the latter
rarely feel commited to do whatever the agent can suggest to him (even when the
answer is perfectly relevant).
The use of conversational proﬁles for this comparison clearly helped to demonstrate
the differences existing between those corpora. More particularly, it conﬁrmed that the
linguistic domain covered by the Function of Assistance to novice users required a dedi-
cated corpus.
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Figure 3: Requests activity classiﬁcation protocol
4. Conversational activities analysis
During the corpus collection phase, human subjects were informed that they had to do
some tasks for which they could ask help (if needed) from an artiﬁcial assistant agent
embedded in the program to assist them. Nevertheless, subjects were completely free to
act and particularly they could type what they want without any constraint, and various
behaviours were observed, users having sometimes completely abandoned their original
task. Eventually, it appeared that many of the collected sentences were not really linked
to the assistance domain (cf. table 1). Hence we got interested in trying to identify and
categorize those other conversational activities that were appearing in the corpus.
4.1. Methodology: conversational activity annotation protocol
For this purpose, we have randomly extracted from the actually collected part of the Daft
corpus (i.e. not the manually built up parts mentioned in 2.1.) two subsets of sentences,
each subset having a size equal to the tenth of the total corpus size. The two subsets
have been manually annotated by a single annotator, one after another in time. The ﬁrst
annotation process was used to reﬁne the protocol (described below and summarized on
ﬁgure 3), whereas the second one was strictly following it. Keeping in mind our objective
is to study assistance, the ﬁrst step was to know if the user was seeking help to accomplish
tasks through its request, thus deﬁning a ﬁrst high level granularity distinction between:
1. task-oriented activities (ex: sentences4 1 – 9): where the user is working on the
application to go towards the goal he has been given (independantly from knowing
if he actually succeeds in getting closer from that goal).
4Sentence numbers always refer to the request examples given in table 1
462. chat-oriented activities (ex: sentences 10 – 14): where the user is interacting with
the system for a reason that is not directly relevant to accomplish the task.
In the case of task-oriented requests, the user is either working directly on accom-
plishing its task or trying to get help from the system in order to do so. And in that former
case, his request for help appears more or less obvious, thus leading us to distinguish three
distinct activities:
1. control(sentences1–3): directcontrols, tomaketheagentinteracthimselfdirectly
with the application software in which it is embedded.
2. direct assistance (sentences 4 – 6): help requests explicitly made by the user.
3. indirect assistance (sentences 7 – 9): user’s judgements concerning the application
that would lead a human being to interpret them as a need for assistance; it certainly
requires the system to use pragmatics to detect the implicit meaning.
For chat-oriented requests, although they are less relevant to our objective, we have
been categorizing them according to the element of focus of the user’s in its requests,
distinguishing, in the cases where it is focused on the agent itself, replies to a previous
agent utterance from a chat interaction started by the user. That makes a total of ﬁve
different subactivities:
1. reactions to an agent’s answer: a set of ways to agree or disagree to the agent’s
answer, marks of incredulity (“I don’t think so”), lack of understanding (“You lost
me”) or insistence (“please answer to me”).
2. communicative functions: this set is made of forms to start or end the communi-
cation with the agent (“hello”, “bye”, “I don’t need your help anymore”...) as well
as some phatic acts (“are you there?”).
3. dialogue with the agent: sentences where the agent becomes user’s focus, from
orders (“Shut up!”) to questions (“do you have a soul?”) and from threats (“don’t
force me to kill you”) to compliments (“you look cute”).
4. comments about the application: comments without any assistance value (“This
page looks nice”).
5. others: a mix of the rest of the chat requests, not easy to classify with more details
(“I’m an ordinary user”, “I want to do a cognitive gift”...).
4.2. Results
No signiﬁcant differences have been observed between both subsets annotated, allowing
us to generalize the results obtained to the rest of the collected corpus : the ﬁgures 4
and 5 show the average distribution of requests from both subsets. Focusing on assis-
tance, we can consider our collected corpus can be divided into four “subcorpora”, each
corresponding to a particular activity: control, direct and indirect assistance and chat.
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Figure 4: Daft corpus requests distribution
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Figure 5: Chat subcorpus detailed distribu-
tion of conversational activities
The existence of the control subcorpus demonstrates that the user not only expects
the agent to be able to assist him to use the application, but he also wants him to be able
to act on this very application. The same way, the relative importance of chat-oriented
requests, certainly related to the use of an embodied agent (cf. ﬁgure 1), shows that the
user wants as well an agent able to react to comments not related to the task he is trying to
carry out. Nonetheless, to really be able to deal properly with chat requests would require
much more advanced dialogue skills: a wide range of vocabulary, personal life facts, an
opinion about virtually anything, etc. We would thus be losing the methodological cut
in complexity intended by focusing on a subdomain of natural language in the case of
assistance. Finally, for the conception of our assisting agent, we take only into account
control, (direct and indirect) assistance and reactions to an agent’s answer activities, since
that latter doesn’t call into question the choice of dealing with isolated requests as it can
easily be treated by only keeping in memory the previous assistance request.
4.3. Subcorpora comparison
In a similar way to what we have done in section 3., we can compare the four differ-
ent subcorpora identiﬁed in section 4. within the Daft corpus by using interactional pro-
ﬁles methodology introduced in 3.2. (without any need for preliminary mapping though).
Finding objective difference criteria like different speech acts distribution could indeed
be useful for a potential automatic identiﬁcation of a request activity, which would allow
the agent to deal differently with control orders, assistance requests and chat utterances.
The results of that comparison are displayed on ﬁgure 6. Not only this analysis con-
ﬁrms the non-homogeneity of the Daft corpus (which average interactional proﬁle is re-
minded in white), but it reveals a very clear difference, in terms of speech acts, between
direct (mainly directives and some expressives) and indirect assistance (mainly assertives
and expressives) requests. This result is particularly interesting because classical methods
based on vocabulary or linguistic parameters (as described in details in (Bouchet 2007))
failtodiscriminateefﬁcientlythosetwokindofassistance: interactionalproﬁlesarehence
perfectly complementary.
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Figure 6: Interactional proﬁles comparison of Daft corpus’ conversational activities
5. Conclusion and outlook
Using interactional proﬁles, we have shown that the Daft corpus was different from simi-
lar corpora in terms of speech acts distribution, certainly linked to the fact it is not human-
human but human-computer interaction, thus conﬁrming its necessity to study the Func-
tion of Assistance. Through a manual annotation of conversational activities within the
Daft corpus, we have identiﬁed three assistance-related activities (control, direct and in-
direct assistance) representing 60% of the requests, the rest of them being chat-oriented.
Finally, using again interactional proﬁles to compare the subcorpora deﬁned by those
activities, we managed to distinguish direct from indirect assistance requests.
Logical follow-up of this work shall focus on one side on getting a more accurate
automatic identiﬁcation of conversational activity (as a valuable ﬁrst step analysis for the
assisting agent), and on the other side on the formal modeling of those requests, particu-
larly by taking into account the need for pragmatics in the case of indirect assistance.
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Abstract. Heim (2001) notes an empirical generalization stating that quantiﬁers may
not intervene scopally between a comparative operator and its trace. I show that the
constraint holds with some but not all quantiﬁiers, and that the limitations and their
exceptions match quite closely the distribution of interveners in weak islands. I ar-
gue that the semantic theory of weak islands in Szabolcsi & Zwarts (1993) predicts
the facts about comparatives as well. Finally, I discuss brieﬂy the relationship be-
tween this proposal and that of Fox & Hackl (2006), suggesting that the theories are
compatible but basically independent.
Several recent discussions of comparatives (Hackl 2000, Heim 2001, Bhatt & Pancheva
2004, Takahashi 2006) note an unexplained restriction on the scope of the comparative
operator which has been dubbed the “Heim-Kennedy constraint”:
(1) Heim-Kennedy Constraint (HK):
A quantiﬁcational DP may not intervene between a degree operator and its trace.
Suppose, following Hackl (2000) and Heim (2001), that gradable adjectives are functions
from individuals to sets of degrees, and that the comparative morphemes -er and less
are scope-taking elements which compare the maxima of two sets of degrees. These
otherwise plausible assumptions create a puzzle: certain quantiﬁers do not interact with
degree-denoting expressions in the expected way.
(2) Every girl is less tall than Jim is.
a. Direct scope: every girl > less >d -tall
 x[girl(x)   [max( d.tall(x)(d))] < max( d.tall(Jim)(d))]
“For every girl x, Jim’s max height is greater than x’s max height.”
b. Scope-splitting: less > every girl > d-tall
max( d. x[girl(x)   tall(x)(d)]) < max( d.tall(Jim)(d)))
“Jim’s max height is greater than the max degree to which every girl is tall
(i.e., he is taller than the shortest girl).”
If (2) had the“scope-splitting” reading in (2b), it would be true (on this reading) if the
shortest girl is less tall than Jim. However, (2) is clearly false if any girl is taller than Jim.
The Heim-Kennedy constraint (1) attempts to account for this restriction (and similar
facts with different quantiﬁers) by stipulating that the quantiﬁcational DP every girl may
not intervene between the degree operator less and its trace d-tall. The puzzle is what
syntactic or semantic principles explain the constraint HK given that structures such as
(1b) are semantically unexceptionable according to standard assumptions.
My purpose here is to show that HK follows from the theory of weak islands proposed
by Szabolcsi & Zwarts (1993), henceforth S&Z. “Scope-splitting” readings of compara-
tives with certain quantiﬁcational DPs are semantically deviant for the same reason that
how many/much questions are weak island-sensitive. One of S&Z’s core claims is that
amounts are weak island-sensitive because they have a more complex algebraic structure
51than normally assumed, and that the operations intersection and complement are not de-
ﬁned on this structure. As a result, the scope-splitting reading in (2b) is not available
because computing it would require intersecting the heights of all the girls, and this oper-
ation is not available for purely semantic reasons.
1. Similarities between weak islands and comparative scope
As Hackl (2000) and Szabolcsi (2006) mention, there are considerable similarities be-
tween the limitations on degree operator scope summarized in HK and the core facts of
weak islands disussed by Kroch (1989) and Rizzi (1990), among many others. Rullmann
(1995) notes the following patterns:
(3) a. I wonder how tall Marcus is.
b. I wonder how tall this player is.
c. I wonder how tall every player is.
d. I wonder how tall most players are.
e. I wonder how tall many players are.
(4) a. *I wonder how tall Marcus isn’t.
b. *I wonder how tall no player is.
c. *I wonder how tall few players are.
d. *I wonder how tall fewer than ten players are.
e. *I wonder how tall at most ten players are.
(5) a. Marcus is taller than Lou is.
b. Marcus is taller than this player is.
c. Marcus is taller than every player is.
d. Marcus is taller than most players are.
e. Marcus is taller than many players are.
(6) a. *Marcus is taller than Lou isn’t.
b. *Marcus is taller than no player is.
c. *Marcus is taller than few players are.
d. *Marcus is taller than fewer than ﬁve players are.
e. *Marcus is taller than at most ﬁve players are.
These similarities are impressive enough to suggest that a theory of the weak island facts
in (4) should also account for the limitations on comparatives in (6). Rullmann suggests
that, in the case of how tall and taller, that the unavailability of the examples in (4) and
(6) is due to semantic, rather than syntactic, facts. Speciﬁcally, both wh-questions and
comparatives make use of a maximality operation, roughly as in (7):
(7) a. I wonder how tall Marcus is.
I wonder: what is the degree d such that d = max( d.Marcus is d-tall)?
b. Marcus is taller than Lou is.
( d.d = max( d.Marcus is d-tall)) > ( d.d = max( d.Lou is d-tall))
52With these interpretations of comparatives and questions, we predict that the sentences
in (8) should be semantically ill-formed because each contains a deﬁnite description that
is undeﬁned:
(8) a. *I wonder how tall Marcus isn’t.
I wonder: what is the degree d such that d = max( d . Marcus is not
d-tall)?
b. *Marcus is taller than Lou isn’t.
( d.d = max( d.Marcus is d-tall)) > ( d.d = max( d. Lou is not d-tall))
If degrees of height are arranged on a scale from zero to inﬁnity, there can be no maximal
degree d such that Marcus or Lou is not d-tall, and so (8a) and (8b) are undeﬁned.
Rullmann claims that similar reasoning will explain the unacceptability of the other
downward entailing expressions in (4) and (6). However, the similarities between compar-
atives and weak island-sensitive expressions such as how tall go deeper than Rullmann’s
discussion would indicate. S&Z point out that several of the acceptable examples in (3)
do not have all the readings predicted by the logically possible orderings of every player
and how tall. As it turns out, the same scopal orders are also missing in the corresponding
comparatives when we substitute -er for how tall. For example,
(9) I wonder how tall every player is.
a. every player > how tall >d -tall
“For every player x, I wonder: what is the max degree d s.t. x is d-tall)?”
b. how tall > every player >d -tall
“I wonder: what is the degreed such that d = Max( d. every player isd-tall)?”
To satisfy the speaker’s curiosity under the ﬁrst reading in (9), we would have list all the
players and their heights. In contrast, an appropriate response to the second reading (9b)
would be to intersect the heights of all the players and give the maximum of this set, i.e. to
give the height of the shortest player. This second reading is clearly not available. Similar
facts hold for the corresponding comparative:
(10) Marcus is taller than every player is.
a. every player > -er >d -tall
“For every player, Marcus is taller than he is.”
b. -er > every player >d -tall
“Marcus’ max height is greater than the max height s.t. every player is that
tall, i.e. he is taller than the shortest player.”
The amount question in (9) and the amount comparative expression in (10) allow sim-
ilar scopal orderings. Furthermore, Rullmann’s explanation does not exclude the unac-
ceptable readings. Unlike comparatives with an intervening negation, there is a maximal
degree d s.t. every player is d-tall on Rullmann’s assumptions, namely the height of the
shortest player.
Note in addition that (10) is identical in terms of scope possibilities to our original
comparative scope-splitting example in (2), although its syntax is considerably differ-
ent. Like (2), (10) falls under HK, which correctly predicts the unavailability of (10b).
However, HK does not address negation or wh-questions, and so leaves unexplained the
53systematic correspondences between comparatives and weak island-sensitive expressions.
Rullmann addresses these correspondences, but cannot explain the missing readings in (9)
and (10).
I will argue that S&Z’s account of weak islands, which is designed to handle data
such as those in (4), also explains the unavailability of the shortest-player’ reading of the
comparative in (10) as well as the corresponding gap in our original example (2). The
essential insight is that the similarities between amount comparatives and amount wh-
expressions are not due to monotonicity or to restrictions on movement of the the degree
operator, but to the nature of amounts: speciﬁcally, their algebraic structure.
2. Comparative scope and the algebraic structure of amounts
In section 1 we saw that amount comparatives and amount wh-questions seem to have
the same scope-taking abilities, despite their quite different syntax and overt word order.
I will argue that the semantic theory of weak islands in S&Z extends to comparatives
in a straightforward way that predicts that HK should hold. This theory leads to a clear
notion of how amount comparatives and amount questions are “the same” in the relevant
respects.
Like Rullmann (1995), S&Z argue that no syntactic generalization can account for
the full range of weak islands, and propose to account for them in semantic terms. They
formulate their basic claim as follows:
(11) Weak island violations come about when an extracted phrase should take scope
over some intervener but is unable to.
S&Z explicate this claim in algebraic terms, arguing that weak islands can be understood
if we pay attention to the operations that particular quantiﬁcational elements are associ-
ated with. For instance,
(12) Universal quantiﬁcation corresponds to taking intersections (technically, meets).
Existential quantiﬁcation corresponds to taking unions (technically, joins).
Negation corresponds to taking complements.
(12) becomes important once we assign particular algebraic structures as denotations to
types of objects, since these operations are not deﬁned for all structures. The prediction is
that a sentence will be semantically unacceptable, even if it can be derived syntactically,
if computing or verifying it requires performing an operation on a structure for which this
operation is not deﬁned. S&Z illustrate this claim with the verb behave, which induces
weak islands:
(13) a. How did John behave?
b. *How didn’t John behave?
c. How did everyone behave?
i. For each person, tell me: how did he behave?
ii. *What was the behavior exhibited by everyone?
Behave requires a complement that denotes a manner. S&Z argue that manners denote in
a free join semilattice, the same structure which Landman (1991) suggests for masses.
54(14) Free join semilattice
        [a b c] 
                        
               [a b]          [a c]          [b c] 
        
      [a]             [b]               [c] 
 
A noteworthy property of (14) is that it is closed under union, but not under complement
or intersection. For instance, the union (technically, join) of [a] with [b c] is [a b c],
but the intersection (meet) of [a] with [b   c] is not deﬁned. The linguistic relevance of
this observation is that it corresponds to our intuitions of appropriate answers to questions
about behavior. In S&Z’s example, suppose that three people displayed the following
behaviors:
(15) John behaved kindly and stupidly.
Mary behaved rudely and stupidly.
Jim behaved loudly and stupidly.
If someone were to ask: “How did everyone behave?”, interpreted with how taking wide
scope as in (13c-ii), it would not be sufﬁcient to answer “stupidly”. The explanation for
this, according to S&Z, is that computing the answer to this question on the relevant read-
ing would require intersecting the manners in which John, Mary and Jim behaved, but
intersection is not deﬁned on (10). This, then, is a speciﬁc example of when“an extracted
phrase should take scope over some intervener but is unable to”. Similarly, (13b) is unac-
ceptable because complement is not deﬁned on (14). Extending this account to amounts
is slightly trickier, since amounts seem to come in two forms. In the ﬁrst, which S&Z
label counting-conscious’, wh-expressions are able to take scope over universal quanti-
ﬁers. S&Z imagine a situation in which a swimming team is allowed to take a break when
everyone has swum 50 laps. In this situation it would be possible to ask:
(16) [At least] How many laps has every swimmer covered by now?
In this case it seems (on the how many-wide interpretation) that the correct answer is the
number of laps covered by the slowest swimmer. Counting-conscious amount expres-
sions, then, had better denote in a lattice in which intersection is deﬁned. The number
line in (17) seems to be an appropriate choice.
(17) Lattice          
    
 
            7                  6                  5                4                  3                2                  1                  0 
Intersection and union are deﬁned in this structure, though complement is not. This fact
predicts that how many/much should be able to take scope over existential quantiﬁcation
but not negation:1
1Note that this example from S&Z constitutes a counter-example to HK stated as an LF-constraint as
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[Answer: the number of laps covered by the fastest swimmer.]
b. *How many laps hasn’t John covered by now?
So far, then, (17) seems to be appropriate for amounts.
Many authors have assumed that the amounts that are compared in comparative con-
structions always denote in (17). Indeed, the problem we began this essay with — why
can’tEverygirlislesstallthanJohnmean“TheshortestgirlisshorterthanJohn”? —was
motivated by the assumption that it should be possible to intersect sets of degrees. The
fact that intersection is deﬁned on (17), and yet universal intervention is not available in
(2), has led authors to various levels of stipulation (HK, in (Heim (2001)) or abandoning
degrees in the analysis of comparatives (Schwarzchild & Wilkinson 2002).
I would like to suggest an alternative: heights and similar amounts do not denote
in (17), but in a poorer structure for which intersection is not deﬁned, as S&Z claim
for island-sensitive amount wh-expressions. As S&Z note, such a structure is motivated
already by the existence of non-counting-conscious amount wh-expressions which are
sensitive to a wider variety of interveners than how many was in the examples in (16) and
(18). This is clear for heights, for example:
(19) How tall is every student in your class?
a. For every student in your class, how tall is he/she?’
b. * “What is the maximum height shared by all of your students, i.e. how tall is
the shortest student?”
The unacceptability of (19b) is surprising given that the degree expression was able to
take wide scope in the overtly similar (16). S&Z account for this difference by arguing
that, unless counting is involved, amount expressions denote in a join semilattice:
(20) Join semilattice [a + b + c + d] (= 4)
[a + b + c] (= 3)
[a + b] (= 2)
[a] (= 1) [b]
[c]
[d]
(20) should be seen as a structure collecting arbitrary unit-sized bits of stuff, abstracting
away from their real-world identity, like adding cups of milk to a recipe (S&Z pp.247-8).
An important formal property of (20) is that “if p is a proper part of q, there is some part
of q (the witness) that does not overlap with p” (p.247). As a result, intersection is not
deﬁned unless the objects intersected are identical. S&Z claim that this fact is sufﬁcient
to explain the unavailability of (19b), since the heights of the various students, being
elements of (20), cannot be intersected.
in (1): the degree operator how many intervenes between the quantiﬁcational DP every swimmer and its
trace. This constitutes further evidence for the algebraic approach advocated here, since the details of
the expressions’ denotations are relevant to the acceptable scopal relations, and not merely their structural
conﬁguration. It is unclear why this example is not as readily available with comparatives, however; see
(Lassiter 2009) for more detailed discussion.
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amounts. As a result, it predicts that amount-denoting expressions should show simi-
lar behavior wherever they appear in natural language, and not only in wh-expressions.
The similarities between amount-denoting wh-expressions and comparatives, then, are
explained in a most straightforward way: certain operations are not deﬁned on amount-
denoting expressions because of the algebraic structure of their denotations, regardless of
the other details of the expressions they are embedded in. So, returning to (2),
(21) Every girl is less tall than Jim is.
Scope-splitting: less > every girl > d-tall
max( d.tall(Jim)(d)) > max( d. x[girl(x)   tall(x)(d)])
“The max degree to which Jim is tall is greater than the max degree to which
every girl is tall.”
This interpretation is not available because the term max( d. x[girl(x)   tall(x)(d)])
is undeﬁned: on S&Z’s theory, there can be no such degree. I conclude that the puzzle
described by the Heim-Kennedy constraint was not a problem about the scope of a par-
ticular type of operator, but was generated by incorrect assumptions about the nature of
amounts. Amounts are not simply points on a scale, but rather elements of (20). This
proposal is independently motivated in S&Z, and it explains the restrictions captured in
HK as well as other similarities between comparatives and weak islands.
At this point there are several important gaps in the account. The ﬁrst is that S&Z
do not work out their account compositionally, and this needs to be done. The second
problem is that it remains unexplained (as it did in the original formulation of HK) why
certain modals and intensional verbs are able to intervene between a degree operator and
its trace both in amount comparatives and amount questions, as discussed at length in
Heim (2001): (22) and (23) illustrate.
(22) (This draft is 10 pages.) The paper is required to be exactly 5 pages longer than
that.
(Heim 2001, p.224)
a. required > exactly 5 pages -er > that-long
 w   Acc : max( d : longw(p,d)) = 15pp
“In every world, the paper is exactly 15 pages long”
b. exactly 5 pages -er > required > that-long
max( d[ w   Acc : longw(p,d)) = 15pp
“The max common length of the paper in all accessible worlds, i.e. its length
in the world in which it is shortest, is 15 pages”
(23) How long is the paper required to be?
a. required > how long > that-long
“What is the length s.t. in every world, the paper is exactly that long?”
b. how long > required > that-long
“What is the max common length of the paper in all accessible worlds, i.e. its
length in the world in which it is shortest?”
These data support the present theory in that comparatives and weak island-sensitive
wh-expressions pattern similarly in yet another way. However, on the assumption that
57require involves universal quantiﬁcation over accessible worlds, the (b) readings of these
examples are problematic. S&Z suggest that these operators are acceptable interveners
because they do not involve algebraic operations. This is perhaps too drastic a step, but
detailed investigation is needed to account for the complicated and subtle data involved,
including the fact that some modals and intensional verbs involving universal quantiﬁca-
tion (must, require) can intervene while others (should, be supposed to) cannot (cf. Heim
(2001)).
3. Some notes on density and informativity
In this section I discuss very brieﬂy the relationship between the present analysis and an
inﬂuential proposal by Fox & Hackl (2006). I show that the algebraic account is not in
direct competition with Fox and Hackl’s theory, but that there are some complications in
integrating the two approaches.
Fox and Hackl argue that amount-denoting expressions always denote on a dense
scale, effectively (17) with the added stipulation that, for any two degrees, there is always
a degree that falls between them. The most interesting data from the current perspective
are in (24) and (25):
(24) a. How fast are we not allowed to drive?
b. *How fast are we allowed not to drive?
(25) a. How fast are we required not to drive?
b. *How fast are we not required to drive?
The contrasts in (24) and (25) are surprising from S&Z’s perspective: on their assump-
tions, there is no maximal degree d such that you are not allowed to drive d-fast, and yet
(23a) is fully acceptable. In addition, (24a) and (25a) do not ask for maxima but for min-
ima (the least degree which is unacceptably fast, i.e. the speed limit). Fox and Hackl show
that the minimality readings of (24a) and (25a), and the ungrammaticality of (24b) and
(25b) follow if we assume (following Dayal (1996) and Beck & Rullmann (1999)) that
wh-questions do not ask for a maximal answer but for a maximally informative answer,
deﬁned as follows:
(26) The maximally informative answer to a question is the true answer which entails
all other true answers to the question.
Fox and Hackl show that, on this deﬁnition, upward monotonic degree questions ask for a
maximum, since if John’s maximum height is 6 feet, this entails that he is 5 feet tall, and
so on for all other true answers. However, downward entailing degree questions ask for
a minimum, since if we are not allowed to drive 70 mph, we are not allowed to drive 71
mph, etc. 2
2A problem which Fox and Hackl do not note is that (i) below should be unacceptable, since their
account of modal intervention assumes that a 70 mph speed limit denotes a closed interval from 70 to
inﬁnity.
(i) How fast are we allowed to drive? —70 mph.
(ii) How fast are we not allowed to drive? —70 mph.
But (i) is at least as good as (ii), and probably even more natural. This poses a problem for Fox and Hackl’s
explanation of modal intervention: on their account, if (ii) is accepable then (i) should be ruled out, and
vice versa.
58This is not as deep a problem for the present theory as it may appear. S&Z assume
that wh-questions look for a maximal answer, but it is unproblematic simply to modify
their theory so that wh-questions look for a maximally informative answer. Likewise, we
can just as easily stipulate that a join semilattice (20) is dense as we can stipulate that a
number line (17) is dense; this maneuver would replicate Fox and Hackl’s result about
minima in downward entailing contexts. In this way it is possible simply to combine
S&Z’s theory with Fox and Hackl’s. In fact, this is probably independently necessary
for Fox and Hackl, since their assumption that amounts always denote in (17) fails to
predict the core data of the present paper: the fact that How tall is every girl? and Every
girl is less tall than John lack a “shortest-girl” reading. The only real barrier to a simple
marriage of these theories is the fact, already noted in the previous section, that S&Z do
not have an explanation for the occasional acceptability of universal modal interveners
with non-counting amount questions.
I conclude that neither theory is complete: Fox and Hackl’s theory lacks an account
of the unacceptability of non-modal universal interveners (i.e., HK), and of the difference
between counting and non-counting amount questions; but S&Z lack an account of uni-
versal modal intervention. Nevertheless, the two theories are broadly compatible. Note
that this is not an endorsement of Fox and Hackl’s central thesis — it merely shows that
if their theory is correct, this fact does not constitute a reason to abandon the current
approach to the HK phenomena.
Finally, note that the maximal informativity hypothesis in (26), whatever its merit in
wh-questions and other environments discussed by Fox and Hackl, is not appropriate for
comparatives: here it appears that we need simple maximality.3
(27) a. How fast are you not allowed to drive?
b. *You’re driving faster than you’re not allowed to.
A simple extension of the maximal informativity hypothesis to comparatives would pre-
dictthat(27b)shouldmean“Youareexceedingthespeedlimit”. Incontrast, themaximality-
based account predicts that (27b) is unacceptable, since there is no maximal speed which
is not allowed. This appears to be the correct prediction.
4. Conclusion
To sum up, the traditional approach on which amounts are arranged on a scale of degrees
fails to explain why the constraint HK in (1) should hold. However, S&Z’s semantic
account of weak islands predicts the existence of this constraint and the numerous simi-
larities between amount comparatives and amount-denoting wh-expressions. To be sure,
important puzzles remain.4 Nevertheless, the algebraic approach to comparative scope
offers a promising explanation for a range of phenomena that have not been previously
treated in a uniﬁed fashion.
Furthermore, if S&Z’s theory turns out to be wrong, all is not lost. The most important
lesson of the present paper, I believe, is not that S&Z’s speciﬁc theory of weak islands is
3Thanks to a reviewer for bringing the contrast in (27) to my attention.
4An additional important question which I have not discussed for space reasons is the relationship be-
tween the algebraic theory and interval-based theories such as (Abrus´ an 2007) and (Schwarzchild & Wilkin-
son 2002). The relation between these approaches is discussed in (Lassiter 2009), along with arguments in
favor of the current theory.
59correct — as we have seen, there are certainly empirical and technical challenges — but
rather that weak island phenomena are not speciﬁc to wh-questions. In fact, we should
probably think of the phenomena summarized by the Heim-Kennedy constraint as com-
parative weak islands. However the theory of weak islands progresses, evidence from
comparatives will need to play a crucial role in its development.
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61FRAME-ANNOTATED CORPUS FOR EXTRACTION OF THE
Argument-Predicate RELATIONS
Ekaterina Ovchinnikova
Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabr¨ uck
Abstract. Argument-predicate semantic relations are shown to have many applica-
tions in natural language processing. However, at present there exist no correspond-
ing lexical semantic knowledge bases. This paper presents an approach to automatic
acquisition of the argument-predicate relations. The relations have been extracted
from SALSA, a German corpus manually annotated with FrameNet frames. The rel-
atively small size of SALSA does not allow to estimate the semantic relatedness in
the extracted argument-predicate pairs. Therefore we use a larger corpus for rank-
ing. Since the evaluation process is still in progress, the paper describes only the
evaluation strategy based on human judgments obtained experimentally.
1. Introduction
Thefactthatpredicatesommitedinadiscoursebecauseofredundancycanbepredictedon
the basis of the semantics of nouns was ﬁrst theoretically grasped by Pustejovsky’s Gen-
erative Lexicon theory, (Pustejovsky 1991). For example, the sentence John ﬁnished the
cigarette can be most plausibly interpreted as John ﬁnished smoking the cigarette because
the meaning of the noun cigarette is strongly associated with the smoking activity. It has
been claimed that information about predicates associated with nouns can be helpful for a
variety of tasks in natural language processing (NLP), see for example (Pustejovsky, et al.
1993, Voorhees 1994). However, currently there exist no corresponding lexical knowl-
edge bases. The NLP practice has shown that freely available lexical resources containing
semantic relations, such as WordNet (Fellbaum 1998) or FrameNet (Ruppenhofer, et al.
2006), are of great importance and have been constantly reused by different NLP systems.
Therefore several approaches have been presented that aim at creating a knowledge base
containing information about predicates associated with nouns. At present, there exist
two main research paradigms for developing such knowledge bases. The ﬁrst paradigm
concerns manual development of the resource (Pustejovsky, et al. 2006), while the sec-
ond one relies on automatic acquisition methods, see for example (Cimiano & Wenderoth
2007). Section 3 contains a more detailed description of the existing approaches.
Inthispaperweproposeaprocedureforautomaticextractionoftheargument-predicate
relations from a semantically annotated corpus. We exploit SALSA (Burchardt, et al.
2006), a German newspaper corpus manually annotated with FrameNet frames based
on frame semantics. Thus, the extracted argument-predicate relations are represented in
terms of frames. The main contribution of the paper lies in demonstrating a possibility
of learning semantic relations from annotated corpora. Using a manually annotated cor-
pus for relation extraction has one particular advantage compared to extraction from plain
text: the type of an argument-predicate relation is already annotated; there is no need to
determine it by automatic means which are usually error-prone. However, the relatively
small size of SALSA does not allow to make relevant predictions about the degree of se-
mantic relatedness in the extracted argument-predicate pairs, see section 4. Therefore we
use a larger corpus for estimating argument-predicate relatedness. Since the evaluation
process has not been ﬁnished yet, we present only the evaluation strategy. The results
62will be evaluated quantitatively against human judgments obtained experimentally, see
section 6. The proposed evaluation procedure is similar to that presented in (Cimiano &
Wenderoth 2007). First, we create a gold standard for 30 words from the argument list
and evaluate our approach with respect to this gold standard. Second, we ask the test sub-
jects to rate extracted argument-predicate relations using a four-point scale and calculate
correlation between automatic ranking and human rating.
2. Implicit Predicates
Example 1
(a) Als ich mit diesem Buch angefangen habe...
’When I have started this book...’
(b) eine komplizierte Frage
’a complicated question’
(c) Studentenfutter
’student food’
(d) Nachrichtenagentur X ¨ uber Beziehungen beider Seiten der Taiwan-Strasse
’News agency X about relations of both sides of the Taiwan Strait’
(e) Hans ist beredt
’Hans is eloquent’
Oneofthemoststudiedphenomenathat(Pustejovsky1991)hascalledlogicalmetonymy
is illustrated by the examples (1a) and (1b). In the case of logical metonymy an implicit
predicate is inferable from particular verb-noun and adjective-noun pairs in a system-
atic way. The verb anfangen ’to start’ and the adjective kompliziert ’complicated’ in the
mentioned examples semantically select for an event, while the nouns (Buch ’book’ and
Frage ’question’ respectively) have a different semantic type. However, the set of the
most probable implicit predicates is predictable from the semantics of the nouns. Thus,
(1a) plausibly means Als ich angefangen habe dieses Buch zu lesen/schreiben... ’When I
have started to read/write this book...’ and (2a) plausibly meanseine Frage die kompliziert
zu beantworten ist ’a question which is complicated to answer’.
Besides logical metonymy there are other linguistic phenomena requiring knowledge
about predicates associated with an argument for their resolution. Example (1c) contains
a noun compound which can be interpreted on basis of the meaning of the noun Futter
’food’. In general, noun compounds can be interpreted in many different ways depending
on the semantics of the constituencies: morning coffee is a coffee which is drunk in the
morning, brick house is a house which is made of bricks etc. In case of (1c) the relation
via the predicate essen ’to eat’ taking Studenten ’students’ as a subject and Futter ’food’
as an object seems to be the most plausible one.
The phrase (1d) is a title of a newspaper article. As in the previous examples, a pred-
icate is left out in (1d). The meaning of the preposition ¨ uber ’about’ can help to narrow
the set of possible predicates, but still allows an inadequately large range of interpreta-
tions. However, the semantics of the noun Nachrichtenagentur ’news agency’ clearly
supports such interpretations as berichten ’to report’, melden ’to message’ or informieren
’to inform’.
Most of the literature discusses predicates inferable from nouns. However, other parts
of speech can support similar inferences. In example (1e) a predicate is predictable on the
63basis of the meaning of the adjective beredt ’eloquent’. The sentence (1e) most plausibly
means that Hans speaks eloquently.
The cases when a predictable predicate is left out are not rare in natural language. For
example, for logical metonymy a corpus study has shown that the constructions like begin
V NP are rare if the verb V corresponds to a highly plausible interpretation of begin NP
(Briscoe, et al. 1990).
Inferring implicit predicates can be useful for a variety of NLP tasks such as lan-
guage generation, information extraction, question answering or machine translation, see
(Lapata & Lascarides 2003). Many NLP applications employing semantic relations are
connected to paraphrasing or query expansion, see for example (Voorhees 1994). Sup-
pose that an NLP system receives the query schnelle Bombe ’quick bomb’. Probably, in
this case the user is interested in ﬁnding information about bombs that explode quickly
rather then about bombs in general. Knowledge about predicates associated with the
noun Bombe ’bomb’ could be used for predicting a set of probable implicit predicates.
However, for generation of the semantically and syntactically correct paraphrases it is
sometimes not enough to guess the most probable argument-predicate pairs. Information
about types of an argument-predicate relation could be helpful, i.e. which semantic and
syntactic position does the argument ﬁll in the argument structure of the predicate. For
example, compare eine Bombe explodiert schnell ’a bomb explodes quickly’ for schnelle
Bombe and ein Buch schnell lesen/schreiben ’to read/write a book quickly’ for schnelles
Buch ’quick book’. In the ﬁrst case the argument Bombe ﬁlls the subject position, while
in the second case Buch ﬁlls the object position.
3. Related Work
At present Pustejovsky’s theory of the Generative Lexicon, GL (Pustejovsky 1991), pro-
vides the most inﬂuential account of implicit predicates. According to Pustejovsky the
meaning of a noun includes a qualia structure consisting of four roles: constitutive, agen-
tive, formal and telic. The telic role describes purpose and function of the object denoted
by the noun and the agentive role describes factors involved in the origin of the object.
Thus, the lexical meaning of the noun book includes read as a telic role and write as an
agentive role. In the framework of GL Pustejovsky et al. (2006) are manually devel-
oping the Brandeis Semantic Ontology which is a large generative lexicon ontology and
dictionary.
There are several approaches to automatic acquisition of qualia structures from text
corpora which aim at supporting the time-consuming manual work. For example, Puste-
jovskyetal. (1993)usegeneralizedsyntacticpatternsforextractingqualiastructuresfrom
a partially parsed corpus. Cimiano and Wenderoth (2007) suggest a pattern based method
for automatic extraction of qualia structures from the Web. There also exist approaches to
learning qualia structures from corpora using machine learning techniques. (Claveau &
S´ ebillot 2004) for example suggests a symbolic machine learning method which allows
to infer morpho-syntactic and semantic patterns of semantic relations between verbs and
nouns. Using this method the system introduced in (Claveau & S´ ebillot 2004) can learn
whether a given verb is a qualia element for a given noun. However, it can not distinguish
between different qualia roles, i.e. it does not account for types of noun-verb relations.
The results of the human judgment experiment reported in (Cimiano & Wenderoth 2007)
64suggest that the automatic acquisition of qualia structures is a difﬁcult task. Human test
subjects have shown a very low agreement (11,8% average agreement) in providing qualia
structures for given nouns.
Another line of research on inferring implicit predicates concerns using information
about collocations derived from corpora. For example, Lapata and Lascarides (2003)
resolve logical metonymy on the basis of the distribution of paraphrases like ﬁnish the
cigarette – ﬁnish smoking the cigarette and easy problem – problem which is easy to
solve in a corpus. This approach shows promising results, but it is limited to logical
metonymy. Similarly, Nastase et al. (2006) use grammatical collocations for deﬁning
semantic relations between constituents in noun compounds.
Incontrasttopreviousapproaches, inourstudyweaimatextractingargument-predicate
relations from a semantically annotated corpus. Using an annotated corpus we avoid
problems of deﬁning types of these relations by automatic means which are usually error-
prone. Moreover, we represent argument-predicate relations in terms of FrameNet frames
which allow for a ﬁne-grained and grounded representation supporting paraphrasing, see
next sections. The proposed approach is not restricted to nouns. We also concern relations
where argument positions are ﬁlled by adjectives, adverbs or even verbs.
4. Resources
For relation extraction we use the SALSA corpus (Burchardt et al. 2006) developed at
Saarland University. SALSA is a German newspaper corpus manually annotated with
role-semantic information. The 2006 SALSA release contains about 20 000 predicate
instances annotated with the set of FrameNet frames (Ruppenhofer et al. 2006). The
FrameNet (FN) lexical resource is based on frame semantics (Fillmore 1976). The lexical
meaning of predicates in FN is expressed in terms of frames (approx. 800 frames) which
are supposed to describe prototypical situations spoken about in natural language. Every
frame contains a set of roles (or frame elements, FEs) corresponding to the participants of
the described situation. Predicates with similar semantics evoke the same frame, e.g. to
giveandtohandover evokethe GIVING frame. ConsideraFNannotationforthesentence
(a) below. In this annotation DONOR, RECIPIENT and THEME are roles in the frame
GIVING and John, Mary and a book are ﬁllers of these roles. FN annotation generalizes
across near meaning-preserving transformations, see (b).
Example 2
(a) [John]DONOR [gave]GIVING [Mary]RECIPIENT [a book]THEME.
(b) [John]DONOR [gave]GIVING [a book]THEME [to Mary]RECIPIENT.
In FN information about syntactic realization patterns of frame elements as well as
information about frequency of occurrences of these patterns in corpora is provided. For
example, the role DONOR in the frame GIVING is most frequently ﬁlled by a noun phrase
in the subject position or by a prepositional phrase with the preposition by as the head in
the complement position.
FrameNetprojectoriginallyaimedatdevelopingaframe-semanticlexicaldatabasefor
English. Later on FN frames turned out to be to large extent language independent, see
(Burchardt et al. 2006). In most cases German predicates could be successfully described
by the FN frames. However, some of the frames required adaptation to the German data,
65e.g. new FEs were introduced. Since FN does not cover all possible word senses, new
frames needed to be introduced for some of the predicates.
We have chosen the SALSA corpus for our experiments because to our knowledge
it is the only freely available corpus which contains both syntactic and role-semantic
annotation. However, we are aware of the fact that SALSA (approx. 700 000 tokens) is
too small to compute a reliable co-occurrence model, though it is relatively large for a
manually annotated corpus. As it was shown in (Bullinaria & Levy 2007), co-occurrence-
based approaches need very large training corpora in order to reliably compute semantic
relatedness. The SALSA corpus comprising less than 1 million tokens is too small for
this purpose. Moreover, a considerable number of predicates in SALSA appeared to be
unannotated. We have tried to overcome the size problems by using a larger unannotated
corpus for recomputing the weights of the extracted argument-predicate relations.
5. Our Approach
As already stated above, we aim at extracting argument-predicate relations using a role-
semantic annotation. Our goal is to extract from SALSA tuples of the form  Argument,
ROLE, FRAME, Predicate  such that the Argument plausibly ﬁlls the ROLE in the FRAME
evoked by thePredicate. Since FrameNet contains information about syntactic realization
patterns for frame elements, representation of argument-predicate relations in terms of
frames directly supports generation of semantically and syntactically correct paraphrases,
cf. schnelle Bombe and schnelles Buch example in section 2.
The proposed relation extraction procedure works as follows. First, we extract from
the corpus all annotated frames. Then, arguments of every frame are extracted and a re-
lation between arguments and the frame evoking predicate is deﬁned in terms of the roles
which these arguments ﬁll in the frame. Finally, the semantic relatedness in the extracted
argument-predicate pairs is estimated. In example 3 two different tuples representing
argument-predicate relations have been extracted from the given sentence annotated with
the frame ARREST.
Example 3
[F¨ unf Oppositionelle]SUSPECT sind in Ebebiyin [von der Polizei]AUTHORITIES
[festgenommen]ARREST worden.
’Five members of the opposition have been arrested by the police in Ebebiyin.’
Extracted tuples:
Argument Role Frame Predicate
Oppositionell SUSPECT ARREST festnehmen
Polizei AUTHORITIES ARREST festnehmen
Since SALSA is also annotated syntactically, every frame role is ﬁlled by some syn-
tactic constituent. Therefore, in order to ﬁnd proper semantic arguments one needs to
extract a content head from every constituent ﬁlling a frame role. If a role ﬁller is repre-
sented by an anaphoric expression it should be resolved. The task of ﬁnding role ﬁllers
proved to be relatively easy.1 On the contrary, anaphora resolution is well-known to be
1For verb phrases with auxiliary or modal verbs as heads the main verb was taken as a corresponding
role ﬁller.
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we treat only pronominal anaphora using a straightforward resolution algorithm: given a
pronoun, the ﬁrst noun which agrees in number and gender with the pronoun is supposed
to be its antecedent. In order to evaluate this resolution procedure we have inspected
100 anaphoric cases. In approximately three fourths of the cases anaphora was resolved
correctly. Therefore, we have assigned the conﬁdence rate of 0,75 to the tuples resulting
from a resolved anaphora. In non-anaphoric cases the conﬁdence rate of 1 was assigned.
For every tuple we have summed up the corresponding conﬁdence rates. Only lex-
emes which belong to an open word class, i.e. nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs,
have been considered. Finally, we have obtained around 30 000 tuples with conﬁdence
rates ranging from 0,75 to 88. It is not surprising that most of the arguments appear to
be nouns, while most of the predicates are expressed by verbs. Since SALSA has been
annotated manually, there are almost no mistakes in deﬁning types of the semantic rela-
tions between arguments and predicates.2 However, as mentioned in section 4 the size of
SALSA does not allow to make relevant predictions about the distribution of frames and
role ﬁllers. In order to overcome this problem we have developed a measure of semantic
relatedness between the extracted arguments and predicates which takes into account their
co-occurrence in a larger and more representative corpus.
For computing semantic relatedness we have used a lemmatized newspaper corpus
(S¨ uddeutsche Zeitung, SZ) of 145 million words. Given a tuple t with a conﬁdence rate c
containing an argumenta and a predicate p, the relatedness measure rm of t was computed
as follows:
rm(t) = lsa(a,p) + c/max(c),
wherethelsa(a,p)isbasedonLatentSemanticAnalysis(LSA),(Deerwester, etal.1990).
LSA is a vector-based technique that has been shown to give reliable estimates on seman-
tic relatedness. It makes use of distributional similarities of words in text and constructs a
semantic space (or word space) in which every word of a given vocabulary is represented
as a vector. Such vectors can then be compared to one another by the usual vector similar-
itymeasures(e.g. cosine). WecalculatedtheLSAwordspaceusingtheInfomaptoolkit10
v. 0.8.6 (http://infomap-nlp.sourceforge.net). The co-occurrence matrix (window size: 5
words) comprised 80 000 3 000 terms and was reduced by SVD to 300 dimensions. For
the vector comparisons the cosine measure was applied. To those cue arguments which
did not occur in the analyzed SZ corpus (approx. 3500 words) a lsa measure of 0 was
assigned. To provide a comparable contribution to rm, the conﬁdence rates c extracted
from SALSA are divided by the maximal conﬁdence rate.
Table 1 contains the 5 most semantically related predicates for three example argu-
ment.3 The table shows that more than one relation can exist between arguments and
predicates. For example, the pair (Haft, sitzen) ’imprisonment’, ’to sit’ was annotated
in SALSA both with the BEING LOCATED and with the POSTURE frames. In this case
ambiguity is due to the annotation disagreements. In some other cases, ambiguity of the
semantic relation between an argument and a predicate adequately reﬂects variety of roles
which the argument can ﬁll. For example, two different tuples have been extracted for the
2Mistakes can arise only because of the annotation errors and errors in the anaphora resolution proce-
dure.
3The complete list of the extracted tuples can be found online at http://www.ikw.uni-
osnabrueck.de/ eovchinn/APrels/.
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Argument Role Frame Predicate rm
Haft FINDING VERDICT verurteilen ’to sentence’ 0,939
’imprisonment’ LOCATION BEING LOCATED sitzen ’to sit’ 0,237
LOCATION POSTURE sitzen ’to sit’ 0,226
MESSAGE REQUEST fordern ’to ask’ 0,153
BAD OUTCOME RUN RISK-FNSALSA drohen ’to threaten’ 0,144
Polizei AUTHORITIES ARREST festnehmen ’to arrest’ 0,782
’police’ AUTHORITIES ARREST verhaften ’to arrest’ 0,386
INVESTIGATOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION ermitteln ’to detect’ 0,291
PHENOMENON PERCEPTION ACTIVE beobachten ’to observe’ 0,24
COGNIZER AGENT SEEKING suchen ’to seek’ 0,227
Demonstrant AGENT PROTESTIEREN1-SALSA protestieren ’to protest’ 0,739
’demonstrator’ ADDRESSEE REQUEST aufrufen ’to call up’ 0,359
SPEAKER REQUEST fordern ’to ask’ 0,215
VICTIM KILLING t¨ oten ’to kill’ 0,079
INTERLOCUTOR 2 DISCUSSION sprechen ’to speak’ 0,045
pair (Buch, schreiben) ’book, ’to write’:  Buch, TEXT, TEXT CREATION, schreiben  and
 Buch, MEDIUM, STATEMENT, schreiben . The ﬁrst tuple corresponds to phrases like ein
Buch schreiben ’to write a book’, while the second one abstracts from the expressions like
in einem Buch schreiben ’to write in a book’.
As one could expect, being a newspaper corpus SALSA appeared to be thematically
unbalanced. The most top-ranked argument-predicate relations occurring in SALSA re-
ﬂect common topics discussed in newspapers: economics (e.g. (Prozent, steigen), ’per-
cent’, ’to increase’), criminality (e.g. (Haft, verurteilen) ’imprisonment’, ’to sentence’),
catastrophes (e.g. (Mensch, t¨ oten) ’human’, ’to kill’) etc.
6. Evaluation Strategy
Since the evaluation process is still in progress, in this section we describe only the eval-
uation strategy that we apply. The extracted argument-predicate relations are intended to
be used for inferring intuitively obvious predicates, therefore we aim at checking to which
extent they correspond to human intuition. Similar to (Cimiano & Wenderoth 2007) we
provide a gold standard for 30 arguments occurring in the SALSA corpus. The test ar-
guments are selected randomly from the set of those arguments that have more than one
predicate associated with them such that a value of argument-predicate relatedness ex-
ceeds the average one. These words are nearly uniformly distributed among 30 partici-
pants of the experiment, who are all non-linguists, making sure that each word is treated
by three different subjects. We ask our subjects to write phrases that contain a predicate
taking the given word as an argument, e.g. book – to read a book. Beside the task descrip-
tion and an informal introduction of the notion of predicate the participants are shown the
following examples:
(a) Aktie ’stock’ : Kauf der Aktien ’buying of stocks’, Aktien kaufen ’to buy stocks’,
Aktien an der B¨ orse ’stocks on the bourse’ (is inappropriate because the word “bourse”
describes a place and not an event)
(b) beredt ’eloquent’: beredt sprechen ’to speak eloquently’, ein beredter Sprecher
’an eloquent speaker’ (is inappropriate because the word “speaker” describes a person
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For each of the given arguments the subjects are asked to provide between 5 and 10
phrases. After the test will be completed, we will manually annotate obtained phrases
with frames. Tuples of the form  Argument, ROLE, FRAME, Predicate  extracted from
annotated phrases will constitute the gold standard. For every test word only those tu-
ples which follow from phrases provided by all three subjects treating this word will be
included into the gold standard. We will evaluate our results with respect to the gold
standard using the precision/recall characteristics, cf. (Cimiano & Wenderoth 2007). The
precision characterizes the procedure exactness, i.e. how many redundant tuples not con-
tained in the gold standard are retrieved by our procedure. The recall measures the com-
pleteness, i.e. how many tuples of the gold standard are extracted automatically. In order
to check whether the developed relatedness measure gives advantaged in selecting the
most plausible argument-predicate associations, we perform another experiment. On this
second step of evaluation we generate phrases from tuples extracted by our procedure and
ask the participants to rate these phrases with respect to their naturalness using a four-
point scale. Then we will calculate the correlation between human judgments and the
ranking obtained automatically.
7. Conclusion and Discussion
Inthispaperwehavepresentedanapproachtoautomaticextractionofargument-predicate
relationsfromasemanticallyannotatedcorpus. Wehavecombinedtheadvantagesoffered
by annotated and unannotated corpora. Besides extracting argument-predicate pairs the
proposed method allows us to deﬁne types of semantic relations in terms of FrameNet
frames. Such representation of the relations is promising with respect to the paraphrasing
task, because it supports generation of syntactically and semantically correct phrases. The
proposed procedure is not restricted to arguments expressed by nouns and treats also other
content parts of speech.
Since the evaluation process has not been ﬁnished yet, we have presented only the
evaluation strategy which we are using. It consists in comparing automatically obtained
results with human judgments obtained experimentally. The participants of the experi-
ment are asked to provide short phrases containing given cue words and predicates as-
sociated with these words as well as to rate phrases generated from the automatically
extracted tuples. The evaluation results will be available in the nearest future. The com-
plete list of the extracted relations as well as the results of the experiment will be available
online at http://www.ikw.uni-osnabrueck.de/ eovchinn/APrels/.
This study presents only ﬁrst steps towards using semantically annotated corpora for
automatic relation extraction. There are several ways to improve the proposed proce-
dure. First, an implementation of a more advanced anaphora resolution algorithm treating
pronominal as well as nominal anaphora should signiﬁcantly raise the performance of the
procedure. Concerning relatedness measure, additional corpus-based measures such as
pointwise mutual information (Church & Hanks 1991), measures based on syntactic re-
lations (Claveau & S´ ebillot 2004) or Web-based measures (Cimiano & Wenderoth 2007)
could appear to be useful for improving the ranking of the extracted relations.
An obvious limitation of the presented approach is that it is bounded to manual an-
notations which are hard to obtain. However, since semantic annotations are useful for
69many different goals in linguistics and NLP, the number of reliable annotated corpora con-
stantly grows.4 Moreover, recently several tools have been developed which perform role
annotation automatically, for example see (Erk & Pado 2006). Therefore we believe that
approaches using semantic annotation are valid and promising. In the future we plan to
experiment with large role-annotated corpora for English such as PropBank (approx. 300
000 words, (Palmer, et al. 2005)) and the FrameNet-annotated corpus provided by the FN
project (more than 135 000 annotated sentences, (Ruppenhofer et al. 2006)). Since these
corpora do not contain syntactic annotation, for extracting argument-predicate relations
we will need to parse annotated sentences.
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Abstract. Inspired by the model-theoretic treatment of phonology in Potts & Pul-
lum (2002) and Kracht (2003), we develop an extendable modal logic for the
investigation of string-based phonology. In contrast to previous research in this
vein (Russell 1993, Kaplan & Kay 1994, Mohri & Sproat 1996), we ultimately
strive to study the entire class of such theories rather than merely one particu-
lar incarnation thereof. To this end, we ﬁrst provide a formalization of classic
Government Phonology in a restricted variant of temporal logic, whose genera-
tive capacity is then subsequently increased by the addition of further operators,
moving us along the subregular hierarchy until we reach the regular stringsets.
We then identify several other axes along which Government Phonology might
be generalized, moving us towards a parametric metatheory of phonology.
Like any other subﬁeld of linguistics, phonology is home to a multitude of competing
theories that differ vastly in their conceptual and technical assumptions. Contentious
issues are, among others, the relation between phonology and phonetics (and if it
is an interesting research question to begin with), if features are privative, binary or
attribute valued, if phonological structures are strings or trees, if features can move
from one position to another (i.e. if they are autosegments), and what role optimal-
ity requirements play in determining well-formedness. Meticulous empirical com-
parisons carried out by linguists have so far failed to yield conclusive results; it seems
that for every phenomenon that lends support to certain assumptions, there is another
one that refutes them. We do not think that this constitutes a problem to phonolog-
ical research. Unless we assume that scientiﬁc theories can indeed reﬂect reality as
it is rather than merely approximate it, it is to be expected that one theory may fail
where another one succeeds and vice versa. A similar situation arises in physics, where
depending on the circumstances light is thought to exhibit particle-like or wave-like
properties.
But given this apparent indeterminacy of theory choice, it is only natural to ask if
we can identify classes of interchangeable theories, i.e. proposals which look different
superﬁcially but are the same in any other respect. On a bigger scale, this requires
developing a metatheory of phonology that uses a ﬁnite set of parameters to conclu-
sively determine the equivalence class to which a given phonological theory belongs.
This paper aims to lay the basis for such a metatheory using techniques originating
in model-theoretic syntax (Blackburn & Meyer-Viol 1994, Kracht 1995, Rogers 2003).
We feel obliged to point out in advance that we doubt that a linguistically adequate
formal theory of phonology is attainable. However, we also think that in attempting to
construct such a metatheory, one gains crucial insights into the core claims about lan-
guage that are embodied by different phonological assumptions (e.g. computational
complexity and memory usage) and how one may translate those claims from one
theory into another. Moreover, the explicit logical formalization of linguistic theories
allows us to investigate various problems in an algorithmic way using techniques from
proof theory and model checking. These insights are relevant to linguists and com-
puter scientists alike. Linguists get a better understanding of how their claims relate
to the psychological reality of language, how the different modules of a given theory
72interact to yield generalizations and how they increase the expressivity of a theory
(see Potts & Pullum (2002) for such results on optimality theory). To a limited de-
gree, they also get the freedom to switch to a different theory for speciﬁc phenomena
without jeopardizing the validity of their framework of choice. Computer scientists,
on the other hand, will ﬁnd that the model-theoretic perspective on phonology eases
the computational implementation of linguistic proposals and allows them to gauge
their runtime-behavior in advance. Furthermore, they may use the connection be-
tween ﬁnite model theory and formal language theory to increase the efﬁciency of
their programs by picking the weakest phonological theory that is expressive enough
for the task at hand.
This paper is divided into two parts as follows. First, we introduce Government
Phonology as an example of a weak theory of phonology and show how it can be
axiomatized as a theory of richly annotated string structures using modal logic. In the
second part, we analyze several parameters that might have an effect on the gener-
ative capacity of our formalization of GP. We show that increasing the power of the
spreading operation moves us along the subregular hierarchy and that different types
of feature systems have no effect on expressivity in general. We close with a short dis-
cussion of two important areas of future research, the impact of the syllable template
on generative capacity and the relation between derivational and representational
theories.
The reader is expected to have some basic familiarity with formal language theory,
non-classical logics and model-theoretic syntax. There is an abundance of introduc-
tory material for the former two, while the latter is cogently summarized in Rogers
(1996) and Pullum (2007).
1. A Weak Theory of Phonology — Government Phonology
1.1. Informal Overview
Due to space restrictions, we offer but a sketch of the main ideas of Government
Phonology (GP), and the reader is advised to check the exposition against the ex-
amples in ﬁgure 1 on the following page. First, though, a note on our sources is in
order. Just like Government-and-Binding theory, GP has changed a lot since its incep-
tion and practitioners hardly ever fully specify the details of the version of GP they
use. However, there seems to be a consensus that a GP-variant is considered canoni-
cal if it incorporates the following modules: government, the syllable template, coda
licensing and the ECP from Kaye, et al. (1990), magic licensing from Kaye (1992),
and licensing constraints and the revised theory of elements from Kaye (2000). Our
general strategy is to follow the deﬁnitions in Kaye (2000) as closely as possible and
ﬁll in any gaps using the relevant literature. The interested reader might also want to
consult Graf (2009) for an in-depth discussion of GP.
In GP, the carrier of all phonological structure is the skeleton, a ﬁnite, linearly
ordered sequence of nodes to which phonological expressions (PEs) can be attached
in order to form the melody of the structure. A PE is built from a set E of privative
features called elements, yielding a pair  O,H , O   E a set of operators, H   E  { }
the head, and H /   O. It is an open empirical question how many features are needed
for an adequate account of phonological behavior (Jensen 1994, Harris & Lindsey
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Figure 1: Some phonological structures in GP (with IPA notation)
1995) — Kaye (2000) ﬁxes E := {A,I,U,H,L,P}, but for our axiomatization the only
requirement is for E to be ﬁnite. The set of licit PEs is further restricted by language-
speciﬁc licensing constraints, i.e. restrictions on the coocurrence of features and their
position in the PE. Some examples of PEs are [s] =  {A,H},  , [n] =  {L,P},A , [1] =
  ,  , [I] =  {I},  , [i] =   ,I , and [j] =   ,I .
As the last two examples show, every PE is inherently underspeciﬁed; whether it
is realized as a consonant or a vowel depends on its position in the structure, which
is annotated with constituency information. An expression is realized as a vowel if it
is associated to a node contained by a nucleus (N), but as a consonant if the node is
contained by an onset (O) or a coda (C). Every N constitutes a rhyme (R), with C an
optional subconstituent of R. All O, N and R may branch, that is be associated to up to
two nodes (by transitivity of containment, a branching R cannot contain a branching
N). Furthermore, word initial O can be ﬂoated, i.e. be associated to no node at all.
The number of PEs per node is limited to one, with the exception of unary branching
N, where the limit is two (to model light diphthongs).
All phonological structures are obtained from concatenating  O,R  pairs accord-
ing to constraints imposed by two government relations. Constituent government re-
stricts the distribution of elements within a constituent, requiring that the leftmost
PE licenses all other constituent-internal PEs. Transconstituent government enforces
dependencies between the constituents themselves. In particular, every branching O
has to be licensed by the N immediately following it, and every C has to be licensed by
the PE contained in the immediately following O. Even though the precise licensing
conditions are not fully worked out for either government relation, the general hy-
pothesis is that PEi licenses PEj iff PEi is leftmost and contained by N, or leftmost and
composed from at most as many elements as PEj and licenses no PEk  = PEj (hence
any C has to be followed by a non-branching O, but a branching O might be followed
by a branching N or R).
GP also features empty categories: a non-coda segment associated solely to the
PE   ,   can optionally remain unpronounced. For O, this is lexically speciﬁed. For
N, on the other hand, it is determined by the phonological ECP , which allows only
non-branching p-licensed N to be mapped to the empty string. N is licensed if it is
followed by a coda containing a sibilant (magic licensing), or in certain languages if
it is the rightmost segment of the string (ﬁnal empty nucleus, abbreviated FEN), or if
it is properly governed (Kaye 1990). N is properly governed if the ﬁrst N following it
is not p-licensed and no government relations hold between or within any Cs or Os
in-between the two Ns.
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smith 1976). All elements, though, are assumed to share a single tier, and association
lines are allowed to cross. The properties of spreading have not been explicitly spelled
out in the literature, but it is safe to assume that it can proceed in either direction and
might be optional or obligatory, depending on the element, its position in the string
and the language in question. While there seem to be restrictions on the set of vi-
able targets given a speciﬁc source, the only canonical one is a ban against spreading
within a branching O.
1.2. Formalization in Modal Logic
For our formalization, we use a very weak modal logic that can be thought of as the
result of removing the “sometime in the future” and “sometime in the past” modalities
from restricted temporal logic (Cohen, et al. 1993, Etessami, et al. 1997).
Let E be some non-empty ﬁnite set of basic elements different from the neutral
element v, which represents the empty set of GP’s feature calculus. We deﬁne the
set of elements   := (E   {1,2}   {head,onset}  
 
local,spread
 
)   ({v}   {1,2}  
{head,onset}   {local}). The set of melodic features   :=    
 
µ,fake, 
 
will be
our set of propositional variables. We employ µ (mnemonic for mute) and   to mark
unpronounced and licensed segments, respectively, and fake for unassociated onsets.
For the sake of increased readability, the set of propositional variables is “sorted” such
that x     is represented by m, m     by e, heads by h, operators by o. The variable
en is taken to stand for any element such that  2(e) = n, where  i(x) returns the ith
projection of x. In rare occasions, we will write e and e for a speciﬁc element e in
head and operator position, respectively.
We furthermore use three nullary modalities1, N, O, C, the set of which we desig-
nate by   , read skeleton. In addition, we have two unary diamond operators   and
 , whose respective duals are denoted by   and  . The set of well-formed formulas
is built up in the usual way from  ,   ,  ,  ,   and  .
Our models M :=  F,V  are built over bidirectional frames F :=
 
D,Ri,R 
 
i   ,
where D    , and Ri   D for each i     , and R  is the successor function over  .
The valuation function V :      (D) maps propositional variables to subsets of D.
The deﬁnition of satisfaction is standard.
M,w |=   never
M,w |= p iff w   V(p)
M,w |= ¬  iff M,w    
M,w |=      iff M,w |=   and M,w |=  
M,w |= N iff w   RN
M,w |= O iff w   RO
M,w |= C iff w   RC
M,w |=    iff M,w +1 |=  
M,w |=    iff M,w  1 |=  
The formalization of the skeleton is straightforward if we model binary branching
constituents as two adjacent unary branching ones and view rhymes as mere nota-
1We follow the terminology of Blackburn, et al. (2002) here. Nullary modalities correspond to
unary relations and can hence be thought of as propositional constants.
75tional devices. Observe that we implement Ns containing diphthongs as single N with
both e1 and e2 elements associated to it.
S1
 
i   (i  
 
i =j   ¬j) Unique constituency
S2 (      O) (      N) Word edges
S3 R   (N   C) Deﬁnition of rhyme
S4 N    O    N Nucleus placement
S5 O   ¬   O  ¬   O Binary branching onsets
S6 R   ¬   R ¬   R Binary branching rhymes
S7 C    N    O Coda placement
GP’s feature calculus is also easy to capture. A propositional formula   over a set
of variables x1,..., xk is called exhaustive iff   :=
 
1 i k  i, where for every i,  i
is either xi or ¬xi. A PE   is an exhaustive propositional formula over   such that
   
 
F1,F2,F3,F4,
 
h
 
is consistent.
F1
 
(hn  
 
hn =h 
n ¬h 
n) Exactly one head
F2 ¬v  
 
(hn  
 
 1(h)= 1(o)¬on) No basic element (except v) twice
F3 v  
 
o =v ¬o v excludes other operators
F4
 
(e2  
 
h1  
 
o1) Pseudo branching implies ﬁrst branch
Let PH be the least set containing all such  , and let lic : PH    (PH) map every   to
its set of melodic licensors. By S   PH we designate the set of PEs occurring in magic
licensing conﬁgurations (the letter S is mnemonic for “sibilants”). The following ﬁve
axioms, then, sufﬁciently restrict the melody.
M1
 
i  
 
i  
  
h1  
 
o1
 
 µ fake
 
Universal annotation
M2 ((O    N    N)  
 
¬e2) No pseudo branching for O, C & branching N
M3 O    O  
 
  PH(   
 
  lic( )    ) Licensing within branching onsets
M4 C  
 
i S ¬i    ¬µ 
 
  PH(   
 
  lic( )    ) Melodic coda licensing
M5 fake   O  
 
m =fake¬m Fake onsets
Remember that GP allows languages to impose further restrictions on the melody
by recourse to licensing constraints. It is easy to see that licensing constraints operat-
ing on single PEs can be captured by propositional formulas. The licensing constraint
“A must be head”, for instance, corresponds to the propositional formula ¬A. Licens-
ing constraints that extend beyond a single segment can be modeled using   and  ,
provided their domain of application is ﬁnitely bounded. See Graf (2009) and the
discussion on spreading below for further details.
As mentioned above, we use µ to mark “mute” segments that will be realized as the
empty string. The distribution of µ is simple for O and C — the former always allows
76it, the latter never does. For N, we ﬁrst need to distribute   in a principled manner
across the string to mark the licensed nuclei, which may remain unpronounced. Note
that v   v by itself does not designate unpronounced segments (remember the PE for
[@]), and that unpronounced segments may not contain any other elements (which
would affect spreading).
L1 µ   ¬C  (N    )  v   v Empty categories
L2 N    N   (µ    µ) Licensing of branching nuclei
L3 O    O   ¬   µ ¬µ ¬   µ Licensing of branching onsets
L4 N        (C  
 
i S i)
      
Magic Licensing
 (¬   N     )       
FEN
  P-licensing
((¬   N    (  N     )) (¬   N     (N  ¬µ)))       
Proper Government
Axiom L4 looks daunting at ﬁrst, but it is easy to unravel. The magic licensing condi-
tions tells us that N is licensed if it is followed by a sibilant in coda position.2 The FEN
condition ensures that wordﬁnal N are licensed if they are non-branching. The proper
government condition is the most complex one, though it is actually simpler than the
original GP deﬁnition. Remember that N is properly governed if the ﬁrst N following
it is pronounced and neither of the two licenses a branching onset. Also keep in mind
that we treat a binary branching constituent as two adjacent unary branching con-
stituents. The proper government condition then enforces a structural requirement
such that N (or the ﬁrst N is we are talking about two adjacent N) may not be pre-
ceded by two constituents that are not N and (the second N) may not be followed by
two constituents that are not N or not pronounced. Given axioms S1–S7, this gives
the same results as the original constraint.
The last module, spreading, is also the most difﬁcult to accommodate. Most prop-
erties of spreading are language speciﬁc — only the set of spreadable features and
the ban against onset internal spreading are universal. To capture this variability, we
deﬁne a general spreading scheme   with six parameters i, j,  ,
  , min and max.
  :=
 
 1(i)= 1(j)(i     
 
min n max  n(j  
  ) (O   O  
 
min+1 n max  n(j  
  )))
The variables i, j    , coupled with judicious use of the formulas   and
  regulate
the optionality of spreading. If spreading is optional, i is a spread element and  ,
  are formulas describing, respectively, the structural conﬁguration of the target of
spreading and the set of licit sources for spreading operations to said target. If spread-
ing is mandatory, then i is a local element and  ,
  describe the source and the set
of targets. If we want spreading to be mandatory in only those cases where a target is
actually available,   has to contain the subformula
 
min n max  n
  . Observe more-
over that we need to make sure that every structural conﬁguration is covered by some
 , so that unwanted spreading can be blocked by making
  not satisﬁable. As fur-
ther parameters, the ﬁnite values min,max > 0 encode the minimum and maximum
2Note that we can easily restrict the context, if this appears to be necessary for empirical reasons.
Strengthening the condition to   (C  
 
i S i)      , for example, restricts magic licensing to the N
occupying the second position in the string.
77distance of spreading, respectively. Finally, the operator     { , } ﬁxes the direction
of spreading for the entire formula ( n is the n-fold iteration of  ). With optional
spreading, the direction of the operator is opposite to the direction of spreading, oth-
erwise they are identical.
As the astute reader has probably noticed by now, nothing in our logic prevents us
from deﬁning alternative versions of GP. Whether this is a welcome state of affairs is
a matter of perspective. On the one hand, the ﬂexibility of our logic ensures its appli-
cability to a wide range of different variants of GP, e.g. to versions where spreading
is allowed within onsets or where the details of proper government and the restric-
tions on branching vary. On the other hand, it begs the question if there isn’t an even
weaker modal logic that is still expressive enough to formalize GP. The basic feature
calculus of GP already requires the logical symbols ¬ and  , giving us the complete
set of logical connectives, and we need   and   to move us along the phonological
string. Hence, imposing any further syntactic restrictions on formulas requires ad-
vanced technical concepts such as the number of quantiﬁer alternations. However,
we doubt that such a move would have interesting ramiﬁcations given our goals;
we do not strive to ﬁnd the logic that provides the best ﬁt for a speciﬁc theory but
to study entire classes of string-based phonological theories from a model-theoretic
perspective. In the next section, we try to get closer to this goal.
2. The Parameters of Phonological Theories
2.1. Elaborate Spreading — Increasing the Generative Capacity
It is easy to see that our logic is powerful enough to account for all ﬁnitely bounded
phonological phenomena (note that this does not imply that GP itself can account
for all of them, since certain phenomena might be ruled out by, say, the syllable
template or the ECP). In fact, it is even possible to accommodate many long-distance
phenomena in a straight-forward way, provided that they can be reinterpreted as
arising from iterated application of ﬁnitely bounded processes or conditions. Consider
for example a stress rule for language L that assigns primary stress to the last syllable
that is preceded by an even number of syllables. Assume furthermore that secondary
stress in L is trochaic, that is to say it falls on every odd syllable but the last one. Let
1 and 2 stand for primary and secondary stress, respectively. Unstressed syllables are
assigned the feature 0. Then the following formula will ensure the correct assignment
of primary stress (for the sake of simplicity, we assume that every node in the string
represents a syllable; it is an easy but unenlightening exercise to rewrite the formula
for our GP syllable template).
 
i {0,1,2}
i  
 
i =j {0,1,2}
(i   ¬j) (      1 2) (2    0) 
(0    (1 2)     ) (1   ¬   1 (         ))
Other seemingly unbounded phenomena arising from iteration of local processes,
most importantly vowel harmony (see Charette & Göksel (1996) for a GP analysis),
can be captured in a similar way. However, there are several unbounded phonolog-
ical phenomena that require increased expressivity (see Graf (2009) for details). As
78we are only concerned with string structures, it is a natural move to try to enhance
our language with operators from more powerful string logics, in particular, linear
temporal logic.
The ﬁrst step is the addition of two operators  + and  + with the corresponding
relation R+
 , the transitive closure of R . This new logic is exactly as powerful as re-
stricted temporal logic (Cohen et al. 1993), which in turn has been shown in Etessami
et al. (1997) to exactly match the expressivity of the two-variable fragment of ﬁrst-
order logic (see Weil (2004) for further equivalence results). Among other things,
OCP effects (Leben 1973, Goldsmith 1976) can now be captured in an elegant way.
The formula O A  L P   + ¬(O A P), for example, disallows alveolar nasals to
be followed by another alveolar stop, no matter how far the two are apart.
But  + and  + are too coarse for faithful renditions of unbounded spreading.
For example, it is not possible to deﬁne all intervals of arbitrary size within which a
certain condition has to hold (e.g. no b may appear between a and c). As a remedy,
we add the until and since operators U and S familiar from linear temporal logic,
granting us the power of full ﬁrst-order logic. This enables us to deﬁne all star-free
languages (McNaughton & Pappert 1971, Thomas 1979, Cohen 1991, Cohen et al.
1993). These feature a plethora of properties that make them very attractive for
purposes of natural language processing. Moreover, the only phenomenon known
to the author that exceeds their conﬁnes is stress assignment in Cairene Arabic and
Creek, which basically works like the stress assignment system outlined above — with
the one exception that secondary stress is not marked overtly (Mitchell 1960, Haas
1977). Under these conditions, assigning primary stress involves counting modulo
2, which is undeﬁnable in ﬁrst-order logic, whence a more powerful logic is needed.
The next step up from the star-free stringsets are the regular languages, which can
count modulo n. From previous research, we know that the regular stringsets are
identical to the set of ﬁnite strings deﬁnable in monadic second order logic (MSO)
(Büchi 1960), linear temporal logic with modal ﬁxed point operators (Vardi 1988)
or regular linear temporal logic (Leucker & Sánchez 2005). In linguistic terms, this
corresponds to spreading being capable of picking its target based on more elaborate
patterns.
A caveat is in order, though. Thatcher (1967) proved that every recognizable set
is a projection of some local set. Thus the hierarchy outlined above collapses if we
grant ourselves an arbitrary number of additional features to encode all the structural
propertiesour logic cannot express. In the case of primary stress in Cairene Arabic and
Creek, for instance, we could just use the feature for secondary stress assignment even
though secondary stress seems to be absent in these languages. Generally speaking,
we can reinterpret any unbounded dependency as a result of iterated local processes
by using “invisible” features. Therefore, all claims about generative capacity hold only
under the proviso that all such spurious coding-features are being eschewed.
We have just seen that the power of GP can be extended along the subregular
hierarchy, up to the power of regular languages, and that there seems to be empir-
ical motivation to do so. Interestingly, it has been observed that SPE yields regular
languages, too (Johnson 1972, Kaplan & Kay 1994). But even the most powerful ren-
dition of GP deﬁnes only a proper subset of the stringsets derivable in SPE, apparently
due to its restrictions on the feature system, the syllable template and its government
79requirements. The question we face, then, is whether we can generalize GP in these
regards, too, to push it to the full power of SPE and obtain a multidimensional vector
space of phonological theories.
2.2. Feature Systems
The restriction to privative features is immaterial. A set of PEs is denoted by some
propositional formula over  , and the boolean closure of   is isomorphic to  ( ).
But Keenan (2008, 81–109) shows that a binary feature system using a set of fea-
tures   can be modeled by the powerset algebra  ( ), too. So if | | = | |, then
 ( )   =  ( ), whence the two feature systems are isomorphic. The same result holds
for systems using more than two feature values, provided their number is ﬁnitely
bounded, since multivalued features can be replaced by a collection of binary valued
features given sufﬁcient co-occurrencerestrictions on feature values (which can easily
be formalized in propositional logic).
One might argue, though, that the core restriction of privative feature systems
does not arise from the feature system itself but from the methodological principle
that absent features, i.e. negative feature values, behave like constituency informa-
tion and cannot spread. In general, though, this is not a substantial restriction either,
as for every privative feature system   we can easily design a privative feature sys-
tem   :=
 
e+,e  | e    
 
such that M,w |= e+ iff M,w |= e and M,w |= e  iff
M,w |= ¬e. Crucially, though, this does not entail that the methodological principle
described above has no impact on expressivity when the set of features is ﬁxed across
all theories, which is an interesting issue for future research.
2.3. Syllable Template
While GP’s syllable template could in principle be generalized to arbitrary numbers
and sizes of constituents, a look at competing theories such as SPE and Strict CV
(Lowenstamm 1996, Scheer 2004) shows that the number of different constituents is
already more than sufﬁcient. This is hardly surprising, because GP’s syllable template
is modeled after the canonical syllable template, which in general is thought not to be
in need of further reﬁnement. Consequently, we only need to lift the restriction on the
branching factor and allow theories not to use all three constituent types. SPE then
operates with a single N constituent of unbounded size, whereas Strict CV uses N and
O constituents of size 1. Regarding the government relations, the idea is to let every
theory ﬁx the branching factor b for each constituent and the maximum number l of
licensees per head. Every node within some constituent has to be constituent licensed
by the head, i.e. the leftmost node of said constituent. Similarly, all nodes in a coda or
non-head position have to be transconstituent licensed by the head of the following
constituent. For every head the number of constituent licensees and transconstituent
licensees, taken together, may not exceed l.
Even from this basic sketch it should already be clear that the syllable template
can have a negative impact on expressivity, but only under the right conditions. For
instance, if our feature system is set up in a way such that every symbol of our alpha-
bet is to be represented by a PE in N (as happens to be the case for SPE), restrictions
on b and l are without effect. Thus one of the next stages in this project will revolve
80around determining under which conditions the syllable template has a monotonic
effect on generative capacity.
2.4. Representations versus Derivations
One of the most striking differences between phonological theories is the distinction
between representational and derivational ones, which begs the question how we can
ensure comparability between these two classes. Representational theories are nat-
urally captured by our declarative, model-theoretic approach, whereas derivational
theories are usually formalized as regular relations (Kaplan & Kay 1994, Mohri &
Sproat 1996), which resist being recast in logical terms due to their closure prop-
erties. For SPE, one can use a coding trick from two-level phonology (Koskenniemi
1983) and use an unpronounced feature like µ to ensure that all derivationally re-
lated strings have the same length. SPE can be then be interpreted as language over
pairs and hence cast in MSO terms, which was successfully done by Vaillette (2003).
Unfortunately, it is unclear how this method could be extended to subregular gram-
mars. At the same time, no other open issue is of greater importance to the success of
this project.
3. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to lay the foundation for a general framework in which
string-based phonological theories can be matched against each other. We started
with a modal logic which despite its restrictions was still perfectly capable of deﬁning
a rather advanced and intricate phonological theory. We then tried to generalize
the theory along several axes, some of which readily lent themselves to conclusive
results while others didn’t. We saw that the power of spreading, by virtue of being an
indicator of the necessary power of the description language, has an immediate and
monotonic effect on generative capacity. Feature systems, on the other hand, were
shown to be a negligible factor in theory comparisons; it remains an open question if
the privativity assumption might affect generative capacity when the set of features is
ﬁxed. A detailled study of the effects of the syllable template also had to be deferred
to later work. The most pressing issue in our opinion, though, is the translation from
representational to derivational theories. Not only will it enable us to reconcile two
supposedly orthogonal perspectives on phonology, but it also allows us to harvest
results on ﬁnite-state OT (Frank & Satta 1998) to extend the framework to optimality
theory. Even though a lot of work remains to be done and not all of our goals may
turn out be achievable, we are conﬁdent that a model-theoretic approach provides an
interesting new perspective on long-standing issues in phonology.
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Abstract. In this paper, we address the problem of selecting the ‘optimal’ variable
subset in a logistic regression model for a medium-sized data set. As a case study, we
take the British English dative alternation, where speakers and writers can choose be-
tween two (equally grammatical) syntactic constructions to express the same mean-
ing. With the help of 29 explanatory variables taken from the literature, we build two
types of models: (1) with the verb sense included as a random effect (verb senses
often have a bias towards one of the two variants), and (2) without a random effect.
For each type, we build three different models by including all variables and keep-
ing the signiﬁcant ones, by sequentially adding the most predictive variable (forward
regression), and by sequentially removing the least predictive variable (backward re-
gression). Seeing that the six approaches lead to ﬁve different models, we advise
researchers to be careful to base their conclusions solely on the one ‘optimal’ model
they found.
1. Introduction
There are many linguistic phenomena that researchers have tried to explain on the basis
of different partially explanatory features. Probabilistic modelling techniques can help in
combining these explanatory features and testing the combination on corpus data. A pop-
ular – and rather successful – technique for this purpose is logistic regression modelling.
However, how exactly the technique is best employed for this type of research remains an
open question.
Statistical models built using corpus data do precisely what they are designed to do:
ﬁnd the ‘best possible’ model for a speciﬁc data set given a speciﬁc set of explanatory
features. The issue that probabilistic techniques model data (while one would actually
want to model underlying processes) is only aggravated by the fact that the variables are
usually not mutually independent. As a consequence, one set of data and explanatory
features can result in different models, depending on the details of the model building
process.
Building a regression model consists of three main steps: (1) deciding which of the
explanatory features should actually be included as variables in the model formula, (2)
establishing the coefﬁcients (weights) for the variables, and (3) evaluating the model. The
ﬁrst step is generally referred to as variable selection and is the topic of the current paper.
Researchers have employed at least three different approaches to variable selection:
(1) ﬁrst building a model on all available explanatory features and then keeping/reporting
those that have a signiﬁcant contribution (e.g. Bresnan, et al. (2007)), (2) sequentially
adding the most explanatory feature (forward), until no signiﬁcant gain is obtained any-
more (e.g. Grondelaers & Speelman (2007)), and (3) starting with a model containing
all available features, and (backward) sequentially removing those that yield the lowest
contribution (e.g. Blackwell (2005)). In general, researchers report on only one (optimal)
model without giving clear motivations for their choices.
In this paper, we compare the three approaches in a case study: we apply them to
a set of 915 instances of the British English dative alternation, taken from the British
85component of the ICE Corpus. In the dative alternation, speakers choose between the
double object (1) and the prepositional dative variant (2).
1. She handed the student the book.
2. She handed the book to the student.
The variables (explanations suggested in the literature) are taken from Bresnan et al’s
work on the dative alternation in American English.
Previous research (for example, Gries & Stefanowitsch (2004)) has indicated that the
verb sense often predicts a preference for one of the two constructions. However, contrary
to the fourteen explanatory features suggested by Bresnan et al, which can be treated as
ﬁxed variables because of their small number of values (often only two), verb sense has
so many different values that it cannot be treated as a variable in a regression model.
Recently developed logistic regression models can handle these lexical biases by treating
verb sense as a random effect (e.g. Bresnan et al. (2007)). In order to examine the effect
of building such mixed models, we create models with and without a random effect in
each of the three approaches. This leads to a total of six different models.
Our goal is to investigate the role of a random effect in a model of syntactic variation
built with a medium-sized set of observations. In addition, we want to investigate whether
it is justiﬁed to report only one ‘optimal’ regression model, if models can be built in three
different ways. The case of the British English dative alternation is used to illustrate the
issues and results.
The structure of this paper is as follows: A short overview of the related work can
be found in Section 2. The data is described in 3. In Section 4, we explain the method
applied. The results are shown and discussed in Section 5. In the ﬁnal Section 6, we
present our conclusions.
2. Related work
2.1. The dative alternation
Bresnan et al. (2007) built various logistic regression models for the dative alternation
based on 2360 instances they extracted from the three-million word Switchboard Corpus
of transcribed American English telephone dialogues (Godfrey, et al. 1992). With the
help of a logistic mixed-effect regression model with verb as a random effect, they were
able to explain 95% of the variation. To test how well the model generalizes to previously
unseen data, they built a model on 2000 instances randomly selected from the total set,
and tested on the remaining 360 cases. Repeating this 100 times, 94% of the test cases on
average were predicted correctly.
Many of the variables in the model concern the two objects in the construction (the
student and the book in example 1 and 2). In prepositional dative constructions, the
object ﬁrst mentioned is the theme (the book), and the second object the recipient (the
student). In double object constructions, the recipient precedes the theme. Bresnan et al.
found that the ﬁrst object is typically (headed by) a pronoun, mentioned previously in the
discourse (given), animate, deﬁnite and longer than the second object. The characteristics
of the second object are generally the opposite: nongiven, nonpronominal, inanimate and
indeﬁnite.
86According to Haspelmath (2007), there is a slight difference between the dative alter-
nation as it occurs in British English and in American English. When the theme is a
pronoun, speakers of American English tend to allow only the prepositional dative con-
struction. In British English, clauses such as She gave me it and even She gave it me are
also acceptable.
Gries (2003) performed analyses with multiple variables that are similar to those in
Bresnan et al. (2007), but applying a different technique (linear discriminant analysis or
LDA) on a notably smaller data set consisting of only 117 instances from the British
National Corpus (Burnard 2007). The LDA model is trained on all instances, and is able
to predict 88.9% of these cases correctly (with a majority baseline of 51.3%). There is no
information on how the model performs on previously unseen data.
Gries & Stefanowitsch (2004) investigated the effect of verb biases in 1772 instances
from the ICE-GB Corpus (Greenbaum 1996). When predicting the preferred dative con-
struction for each verb, 82.2% of the constructions could be predicted correctly. It thus
outperforms the majority baseline of 65.0% (always choosing the overall most frequent
variant).
2.2. Variable selection in logistic regression
A recent and extensive textbook on modern statistical techniques is that by Izenman
(2008). In chapter 5, he explains that variable selection is often needed to arrive at an
interpretable model that reaches an acceptable prediction accuracy. Keeping too many
variables may lead to overﬁtting, while a simpler model may suffer from underﬁtting.
The risk of applying variable selection is that it optimizes the model for a particular data
set. Using a slightly different data set may result in a completely different variable subset.
An approach to variable selection that is commonly used in linguistics is stepwise
adding the most predictive variables to an empty model (e.g. Grondelaers & Speel-
man (2007)) or stepwise removing the least predictive variables from the full model (e.g.
Blackwell (2005)). The main criticisms on these methods are (1) that the results are difﬁ-
cult to interpret when the variables are highly correlated, (2) that deciding which variable
to remove or add is not trivial, (3) that both methods may result in two different models
that may not even be optimal, and (4) that each provides a single model, while there may
be more than one optimal subset (Izenman 2008).
Another approach Izenman mentiones in the same section is to build all models with
each possible subset and select those with the best results. An important objection to this
approach is that it is computationally expensive to carry out. For this reason, we do not
employ this method.
Instead, we follow Sheather (2009), who builds a model containing all variables that
he expects to contribute to the model, and removes the insigniﬁcant ones (chapter 8).
These expectations are based on plots of the variables that he made beforehand. Where
desirable, he transformed the variables to give them more predictive power (e.g. by taking
their log). As indicated by Izenman (2008), variable selection on the basis of a data set
may lead to a model that is speciﬁc for that particular set. Since we also want to be able
to compare our models to those found by Bresnan et al. (2007), we refrain from such
preprocessing and use all variables they used in the variable selection process.
873. Data
Since we study a syntactic phenomenon, it is convenient to employ a corpus with detailed
(manually checked) syntactic annotations. We selected the one-million-word British com-
ponent of the ICE Corpus, the ICE-GB, containing both written and (transcribed) spoken
language (Greenbaum 1996).
We used a Perl script to automatically extract potentially relevant clauses from the
ICE-GB. These were clauses with an indirect and a direct object (double object) and
clauses with a direct object and a prepositional phrase with the preposition to (prepo-
sitional dative). Next, we manually checked the extracted sets of clauses and removed
irrelevant clauses such as those where the preposition to had a locative function (e.g. Fold
the short edges to the centre.).
Following Bresnan et al. (2007), we ignored constructions with a preposition other
than to, with a clausal object, with passive voice and with reversed constructions. To
further limit the inﬂuence of the syntactic environment of the construction, we decided
to exclude variants in imperative and interrogative clauses, as well as those with phrasal
verbs (e.g. to hand over). Coordinated verbs or verb phrases were also removed. The
characteristics of the resulting data sets can be found in Table 1.
Table 1: Characteristics of the data sets
nr of instances
Type Corpus d.obj. pr.dat. Total
Spoken British English ICE-GB 399 151 550
Written British English ICE-GB 263 102 365
Total ICE-GB 662 253 915
4. Method
4.1. Explanatory features
We adapt the explanatory features and their deﬁnitions from Bresnan et al. (2007) (Table
2), and manually annotate our data set following an annotation manual based on these
deﬁnitions1.
The table includes one new variable: medium. This tells us whether the construction
was found in written or spoken text. It may well be that certain variables only play a role
in one of the two mediums. In order to test this, we include the 14 (two-way) interactions
between the variables taken from Bresnan et al. and the medium2. This leads to a total
number of 29 features.
As mentioned in the Introduction, we will build models with and without including
verb sense as a random effect. The verb sense is the lemma of the verb together with its
semantic class, e.g. pay a for pay with an abstract meaning and pay t when pay is used
to describe a transfer of possession. In total, our data set contains 94 different verb senses
1The annotation manual is available online: http://lands.let.ru.nl/ daphne/downloads.html.
2We are aware of the fact that there are other ways to incorporate the medium in the regression models,
for instance by building separate models for the written and the spoken data. Since the focus of this paper
is on the three approaches in combination with the presence or absence of a random effect, we will limit
ourselves to the method described.
88Table 2: Features and their values (th=theme, rec=recipient). All nominal variables are trans-
formed into binary variables with values 0 and 1. As a result, semantic verb class (communi-
cation, abstract or transfer of possession) is split into two effects: verb=abstract (0 or 1) and
verb=communication (0 or 1). Cases with semantic verb class transfer of possession have value 0
for both variables.
Feature Values Description
rec = animate 1, 0 human or animal, or not
th = concrete 1, 0 with ﬁxed form and/or space, or not
rec,th = deﬁnite 1, 0 deﬁnite pronoun, proper name or noun preceded
by a deﬁnite determiner, or not
rec,th = given 1, 0 mentioned or evoked  20 clauses before, or not
length difference -3.4-4.2 ln(#words in th)   ln(#words in rec)
rec,th = plural 1, 0 plural in number, or not (singular)
rec = local 1, 0 ﬁrst or second person (I, you), or not
rec,th = pronominal 1, 0 headed by a pronoun, or not
verb = abstract 1, 0 give it some thought is abstract, tell him a story is
verb = communication 1, 0 communication, give him the book is transfer
structural parallellism = present 1, 0 same variant used previously, or not
medium = written 1, 0 type of data is written, or not (spoken)
(derived from 65 different verbs). The distribution of the verb senses with 5 or more
occurrences can be found in Table 3. As predicted by Gries & Stefanowitsch (2004),
many verb senses show a bias towards one of the two constructions. The verb pay shows
a clear bias towards the prepositional dative construction when it has an abstract meaning,
but no bias when the literal transfer of possession is meant.
Table 3: Distribution of verb senses with 5 or more occurrences in the data set. The verb senses
in the right-most list have a clear bias towards the double object (d.obj.) construction, those in the
left-most for the prepositional dative (p.dat.) construction, and those in the middle show no clear
preference. The a represents abstract, c communication and t transfer of possession.
# d.obj. > # p.dat. # d.obj.   # p.dat. # d.obj. < # p.dat.
verb sense d.obj. p.dat. verb sense d.obj. p.dat. verb sense d.obj. p.dat.
give a 252 30 do a 8 9 pay a 2 12
give c 65 10 send c 9 7 cause a 5 8
give t 53 21 lend t 8 7 sell t 0 10
tell c 67 1 pay t 6 5 owe a 2 6
send t 41 15 leave a 5 4 explain c 0 6
show c 37 9 write c 4 5 present c 0 6
offer a 23 9 read c 1 4
show a 6 1
offer t 6 0
tell a 6 0
wish c 6 0
bring a 4 1
bring t 3 2
hand t 3 2
4.2. Variable selection
Using the values of the variables (and the random effect), we establish a regression func-
tion that determines the log of the odds that the construction C in clause i (with verb sense
j) is a prepositional dative. The prepositional dative is regarded a success (with value 1),
while the double object construction is a failure (0). The regression function is deﬁned as
follows:
89lnodds(Cij = 1) =   +
29  
k=1
( kVijk) (+rj). (1)
The   is the intercept of the function.  kVijk are the weights   and values Vij of the 29
variables k. The optional random effect rj is normally distributed with mean zero (rj  
N(0, )). The optimal values for the function parameters  ,  k and rj are found with
the help of Maximum Likelihood Estimation3. The outcome of the regression enables
us to use the model as a classiﬁer: all cases with lnodds(Cij = 1)   t are classiﬁed as
prepositional dative, all with lnodds(Cij = 1) < t as double object. The letter t is a
threshold, which we set to 0. With this threshold, all instances for which the regression
function outputs a negative log odds are classiﬁed as double object constructions, all other
instances as prepositional dative.
In the ﬁrst approach, we ﬁrst include all 29 features in the model formula. We then
remove all variables that do not have a signiﬁcant effect in the model output, and build a
model with the remaining (signiﬁcant) variables.
For the second approach, being forward sequential regression, we start with an empty
model and sequentially add the variable that is most predictive. As Izenman (2008) warns
us, deciding which variable to keep is not trivial. We decide to keep the variable that
yields the highest area under the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) curve. This
curve is a plot of the correctly classiﬁed positive instances (prepositional dative) and the
incorrectly classiﬁed positive instances. The area under it (AUC) gives the probability
that the regression function, when randomly selecting a positive (prepositional dative)
and a negative (double object) instance, outputs a higher log odds for the positive instance
than for the negative instance. The AUC is thus an evaluation measure for the quality of
a model. It is calculated with:
average rank(xC=1)  
p+1
2
n   p
, (2)
where average rank(xC=1) is the average rank of the instances x that are prepositional
dative (when all instances are ranked numerically according to the log odds), p the number
of prepositional dative instances, and n the total number of instances4. We add the most
predictive variables to the model as long as it gives an improvement over the AUC of the
model without the variable. An interaction of variable A with Medium is only included
when the resulting AUC is higher than that reached after adding the single variable A5.
Two AUC are considered different when the difference is higher than a threshold. We set
the threshold to 0.002.6
For the third approach (backward sequential regression), we use the opposite proce-
dure: we start with the full model, containing all 29 features, and sequentially leave out
the variable A that yields the model with the highest AUC that is not lower than the AUC
for the model with A. When the AUC of a model without variable A does not differ from
3We use the functions glm() and lmer() (Bates 2005) in R (R Development Core Team 2008).
4We use the function somers2() created in R (R Development Core Team 2008) by Frank Harrell.
5When including an interaction but not the main variables in it, the interaction will also partly explain
variation that is caused by the main variables (Rietveld & van Hout 2008).
6The threshold value has been established experimentally.
90the AUC of the model without the interaction of A with Medium, we remove the inter-
action. Again, AUCs are only considered different when the difference is at least the
threshold (again set to 0.002).
We evaluate the models with and without random effects by establishing the model
quality (training and testing on all 915 cases) by calculating the percentage of correctly
classiﬁed instances (accuracy) and the area under the ROC curve (AUC). Also, we deter-
mine the prediction accuracy reached in 10-fold cross-validation (10 sessions of training
on 90% of the data and testing on the remaining 10%) in order to establish how well
the model generalizes to previously unseen data. In the 10-fold cross-validation setting,
we provide the algorithms with the variables selected in the models trained on all 915
cases. The regression coefﬁcients for these subsets of variables are then estimated for
each separate training set.
The coefﬁcients in the regression models help us understand which variables play
what role in the dative alternation. We will therefore compare the coefﬁcients of the
signiﬁcant effects in the models built on all 915 instances.
5. Results
5.1. Mixed models
Table 4 gives the model ﬁt and prediction accuracy for the different regression models we
built, including verb sense as a random effect. The prediction accuracy (the percentage
of correctly classiﬁed cases) is signiﬁcantly higher than the majority baseline (always
selecting NP-NP) in all settings, also when testing on new data (p < 0.001 for the three
models, Wilcoxon paired signed rank test).
Table 4: Model ﬁt and prediction accuracy of the regression models with verb sense as a random
effect
model ﬁt (train=test) 10-fold cv
selection #variables baseline AUC accuracy aver. accuracy
1. signiﬁcant 5 0.723 0.979 0.936 0.825
2. forward 4 0.723 0.980 0.938 0.832
3. backward 4 0.723 0.980 0.938 0.832
When training and testing on all 915 instances, the mixed models reach a considerable
AUC and prediction accuracy (model quality). However, seeing the decrease in accuracy
in a 10-fold cross-validation setting, it seems that the mixed models do not generalize
well to previously unseen data.
The signiﬁcant effects in the models resulting from the three approaches are presented
in Table 5. The directions of the main effects are the same as those for American English
(Bresnan et al. 2007), as presented in Section 2.1.
The forward (2) and backward (3) selection approaches lead to the same regression
model. The differences between this model and the one obtained by keeping the signiﬁ-
cant variables (1) may be caused by the fact that the information contained in the variables
shows considerable overlap. For instance, pronominal objects are also typically discourse
given. A signiﬁcant effect for the one variable may therefore decrease the possibility of
91Table 5: Coefﬁcients of signiﬁcant effects in (mixed) regression models with verb sense as ran-
dom effect, trained on all 915 instances, *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05. The last column
indicates the direction towards the prepositional dative (p.dat.) and double object construction
(d.obj.).
Effect 1. signiﬁcant 2. forward 3. backward
th=pronominal, medium=written -2.01 *
length difference -2.52 *** -2.41 *** -2.41 *** d.obj.
rec=local -2.68 *** -1.86 *** -1.86 ***  
rec=given -1.48 *** -1.48 *** |
th=deﬁnite 1.67 *** |
th=pronominal 2.15 ***  
th=given 2.32 *** 2.32 *** p.dat.
(intercept) 1.27 ** 2.53 *** 2.53 ***
regardingtheotherassigniﬁcant. Thisisexactlywhatwesee: themodelobtainedthrough
the two stepwise approaches contains a variable denoting the givenness of the theme but
none describing its pronominality, while it is the other way around for the model with the
signiﬁcant variables from the full model.
Onlythemodelobtainedbykeepingthesigniﬁcantvariablesinthefullmodelcontains
an interaction, namely that between medium and a pronominal theme. The main effect
(without medium) is also included, but it shows the opposite effect. When the theme is
pronominal, speakers tend to use the prepositional dative construction (coefﬁcient 2.15).
This effect seems much less strong in writing (remaining coefﬁcient 2.15 - 2.01 = 0.14).
Whether there really exists a difference in the effect of the pronominality of the theme in
speech and writing is not clear, since only one model shows this difference.
What also remains unclear, is which of the two models is more suitable for explain-
ing the British English dative alternation. Seeing the differences between the signiﬁcant
effects found in the two models we found, and the relatively low prediction accuracy
in 10-fold cross-validation, it seems that the models are modelling the speciﬁc data set
rather than the phenomenon. A probable cause is that the mixed models are too complex
to model a data set consisting of 915 instances. In the next section, we apply the three
approaches to build simpler models, namely without the random effect.
5.2. Models without a random effect
The model ﬁt and prediction accuracy for the models without a random effect can be
found in Table 6.
Table 6: Model ﬁt and prediction accuracy of the regression models without a random effect
model ﬁt (train=test) 10-fold cv
selection #variables baseline AUC accuracy aver. accuracy
1. signiﬁcant 5 0.723 0.934 0.882 0.882
2. forward 5 0.723 0.941 0.883 0.870
3. backward 8 0.723 0.945 0.882 0.875
92The model ﬁt ﬁgures AUC and accuracy are considerably lower than the ﬁgures reached
with the mixed models. On the other hand, the models without a random effect generalize
well to new data: the prediction accuracy in 10-fold cross-validation is very similar to
the model ﬁt accuracy (training and testing on all instances). The prediction accuracies
reachedin10-foldcross-validationaresigniﬁcantlybetterthanthosereachedwiththebest
mixed model (p < 0.001 for the three regular models compared to the forward/backward
mixed model following the Wilcoxon paired signed rank test). Apparently the simpler
models (those without a random effect) outperform the mixed models when applying
them to previously unseen data.
Table 7 shows the signiﬁcant effects in the models without random effect. Again,
the directions of the coefﬁcients are as expected, but the three models disagree on the
signiﬁcance of the variables. Four variables have signiﬁcant effects in two of the three
models, one (the deﬁniteness of the theme) only has an effect in the stepwise forward
selection model. Only the concreteness of the theme is selected in all three approaches, as
opposed to the mixed-effect approach of the previous section, where it was not selected
at all. According to all three models, speakers tend to use the double object construc-
tion when the theme is longer than the recipient, and when the recipient is pronominal.
The backward selection model (3), however, shows that the effect of length difference is
especially strong in speech, while the effect of the pronominality of the recipient is partic-
ularly strong in writing. As in the previous section, where the one signiﬁcant interaction
(medium with pronominality of theme) was only found in model 1, it is not clear whether
this difference really exists.
Table 7: Coefﬁcients of signiﬁcant effects in regression models (without random effect), trained
on all 915 instances, *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05. The last column indicates the direction
towards the prepositional dative (p.dat.) and double object construction (d.obj.).
Effect 1. signiﬁcant 2. forward 3. backward
length difference, medium=spoken -2.29 ***
rec=pronominal, medium=written -2.07 *** d.obj.
length difference -1.75 *** -1.97 ***  
rec=pronominal, medium=spoken -1.71 *** |
length difference, medium=written -1.49 *** |
rec=deﬁnite -1.18 *** -1.20 *** |
rec=local -1.13 *** -1.20 *** |
rec=pronominal -1.15 *** -1.20 *** |
th=deﬁnite 1.12 *** |
(intercept) 1.37 ***  
th=given 0.95 ** 1.44 *** p.dat.
th=concrete 1.50 *** 1.52 *** 1.27 ***
Surprisingly enough, excluding the verb sense as a random effect has not resulted in a
signiﬁcant effect for semantic verb class in any of the models. Given the high model ﬁt
we found for the models with verb sense as a random effect, and the predictive quality of
verb sense found in previous research (Gries & Stefanowitsch 2004), one would expect
that having information about the semantic verb class would be useful in the models
without this random effect. Apparently, the effect is not strong enough.
936. Conclusion
In this paper, we built regular and mixed (i.e. containing a random effect) logistic regres-
sion modelsin ordertoexplainthe British Englishdativealternation. Weuseda dataset of
915 instances taken from the ICE-GB Corpus, and took the explanatory factors suggested
by Bresnan et al. (2007). The regular and the mixed models were constructed following
three different approaches: (1) providing the algorithms with all 29 variables and keeping
the signiﬁcant ones, (2) starting with an empty model and forwardly sequentially adding
the most predictive variables, and (3) starting with a model with all 29 features and back-
wardly sequentially removing the least predictive variables. In total, we thus have built
six logistic regression models for the same data set.
The six models show some overlap in the variables that are regarded signiﬁcant. These
variables show the same effects as found for American English (Bresnan et al. 2007):
pronominal, relatively short, local, discourse given, deﬁnite and concrete objects typi-
cally precede objects with the opposite characteristics. Contrary to the observations in
Haspelmath (2007), we have no reason to believe that the dative alternation in British
English differs from that in American English. We have found no clear indications of dif-
ferences between the dative alternation in speech and writing either: only three variables
were selected in interaction with medium, and they occurred in only one model.
As opposed to the mixed models, the models without a random effect generalize well
to previously unseen data. This does not necessarily mean that the British English dative
alternation is best modelled with logistic regression models without a random effect. The
models ﬁt the data better when verb sense is included as a random effect. The fact that
the mixed models do not generalize well to new data could be an artefact of lack of data
instances. In the near future, we therefore aim at extending our data set, employing the
British National Corpus (Burnard 2007). Since manually extending the data set in a way
similar to that taken to reach the current data set of 915 instances is too labour-intensive,
we aim at automatically extending the data set (in an approach similar to that taken in
Lapata (1999)), and automatically annotating it for the explanatory features in this paper.
With the larger set, we hope to be able to model the underlying processes of the dative
alternation, rather than modelling the instances that made it into our data set.
One of the drawbacks of variable selection is that different methods can lead to differ-
ent models (Izenman 2008). Unsurprisingly, the six approaches we took have led to ﬁve
different models. How can we decide which is the optimal model for our purpose? Of
course, the approach depends on your goal. For a researcher building a machine transla-
tion system, the goal will probably be to reach the highest prediction accuracy on previ-
ously unseen data. For linguists, however, the goal is more complex. We want to combine
the explanatory features suggested in previous research and test the combination on real
data. We thus have hypotheses about what are the explanatory features and what kind of
effect they show, but it is unclear how they behave in combination with the others. Also,
we want a model that is interpretable and, ideally, reﬂects the processes in our brains. It
is uncertain how (and if) we can evaluate a model in this sense. Still, despite these dif-
ﬁculties, using techniques such as logistic regression is very useful for gaining insight in
the statistical characteristics that play a role in syntactic variability. But contrary to what
is common in linguistics, researchers should be careful in choosing a single approach and
drawing conclusions from one model only.
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95BASE BELIEF REVISION FOR FINITARY MONOTONIC
LOGICS
Pere Pardo
Institut d’Investigaci´ o en Intel.lig` encia Artiﬁcial
Abstract. We slightly improve on characterization results already in the literature
for base revision. We show that in order to axiomatically characterize revision op-
erators in a logic the only conditions this logic is required to satisfy are: ﬁnitarity
and monotony. A characterization of limiting cases of revision operators, full meet
and maxichoice, is also offered. Finally, we distinguish two types of bases naturally
arising in the context of graded fuzzy logics.
1. Introduction
Thispaperisabout(multiple)basebeliefchange, inparticularourresultsaremainlyabout
base revision, which is characterized for a broad class of logics. The original framework
of (Alchourr´ on, et al. 1985) deals with belief change operators on deductively closed the-
ories. This framework was generalized by Hansson (Hansson 1993, Hansson 1999) to
deal with bases, i.e. arbitrary set of formulas, the original requirement of logical closure
being dropped. Hansson characterized revision and contraction operators in, essentially,
monotonic compact logics with the deduction theorem property. These results were im-
proved in (Hansson & Wasserman 2002): while for contraction ((Hansson & Wasserman
2002, Theorem 3.8)) it is shown that ﬁnitarity and monotony of the underlying logic suf-
ﬁce, for revision ((Hansson & Wasserman 2002, Theorem 3.17)) their proof depends on
a further condition, Non-contravention: for all sentences  , if ¬    CnS(T   { }), then
¬    CnS(T).
In this paper we provide a further improvement of Hansson and Wassermann’s results
by proving a characterization theorem for base revision in any ﬁnitary monotonic logic.
Namely, takinginspirationfrom(Booth&Richter2005), weshowthatNon-contravention
can be dropped in the characterization of base revision if we replace the notion of unprov-
ability (of some formula  ) in remainder sets by the stronger notion of consistency (with
¬ ) in the deﬁnition of selection functions and partial meet. This is the main contribution
of the paper, together with its extension to the characterization of the revision operators
corresponding to limiting cases of selection functions, i.e. full meet and maxichoice revi-
sion operators.
In the second part of the paper, as a particular class of ﬁnitary monotonic logics, we
focus on graded fuzzy logics. We introduce there a distinction in basehood and observe
some differences in the behavior of the corresponding base revision operators.
This paper is structured as follows. First we introduce in Section 2. the necessary
background material on logic, with particular attention to fuzzy and graded logics, and on
partial meet base belief change. Then in Section 3. we set out the main characterization
results for base revision, including full meet and maxichoice revision operators. Finally
in Section 4. a natural distinction upon bases in graded logics is considered (wether or not
they are taken to be closed under truth-degrees).
961.0.1. Related Work.
The recent literature belief change contains several approaches to extend the classical
works on (partial meet) revision and contraction (Alchourr´ on et al. 1985), (Hansson
1999). We mentioned a paper about revision in signed fuzzy logics (Booth & Richter
2005), in the framework of (Gerla 2001); fuzzy logics considered there are deﬁned on top
of some underlying logic by replacing its formulas   with truth-constant labeled formulas
( ,r). Graded logics considered here, in contrast, take truth-constants to be propositional
variables (with restricted semantics). Different methods for theory change, other than
partial meet, have also been studied: entrenchment (G¨ ardenfors & Makinson 1998) and
systems of spheres (Grove 1988)). Iterated belief change is another topic of research: see
(Darwiche & Pearl 1997) and Spohn (Spohn 1988). A different change operation is that of
update, where belief change is due to a change in the world; see (Katsuno & Mendelzon
1991) for characterization results. In addition, some partial but promising results have
been obtained from dynamic approaches attempting to deﬁne change operators within dy-
namic logic (as opposed to the usual: on top of some logic); for an overview see (van
Ditmarsch, et al. 2008) or (?). Finally, for fuzzy logics not based upon  ukasiewicz, we
may cite the possibilistic approach to belief change of (Dubois & Prade 1997).
2. Preliminaries on theory and base belief change
We introduce in this section the concepts and results needed later. Following (Font &
Jansana 1996), we deﬁne a logic as a ﬁnitary and structural consequence relation  S 
P(Fm)   Fm, for some algebra of formulas Fm1.
BeliefchangeisthestudyofhowsometheoryT (non-necessarilyclosed, asweusethe
term) in a given language L (containing   and 0) can adapt to new incoming information
    L (inconsistent with T, in the interesting case). The main operations are: revision,
where the new input must follow from the revised theory, which is to be consistent, and
contraction where the input must not follow from the contracted theory. In the classical
paper (Alchourr´ on et al. 1985), by Alchourr´ on, G¨ ardenfors and Makinson, partial meet
revision and contraction operations were characterized for closed theories in, essentially,
monotonic compact logics with the deduction property2. Their work put in solid grounds
this newly established area of research, opening the way for other formal studies involving
new objects of change, operations (see (Peppas 2007) for a comprehensive list) or logics.
We follow (Alchourr´ on et al. 1985) and deﬁne change operators by using partial meet:
Partial meet consists in (i) generating all logically maximal ways to adapt T to the new
sentence (those subtheories of T making further information loss logically unnecessary),
(ii) selecting some of these possibilities, (iii) forming their meet, and, optionally, (iv) per-
forming additional steps (if required by the operation). Then a set of axioms is provided
to capture these partial meet operators, by showing equivalence between satisfaction of
these axioms and being a partial meet operator3.In addition, new axioms may be intro-
1That is, S satisﬁes (1) If       then    S  , (2) If    S   and       then    S  , (3) If    S  
and for every      ,    S   then    S   (consequence relation); (4) If  S  then for some ﬁnite  0    
we have  0  S   (ﬁnitarity); (5) If    S   then e[ ]  S e( ) for all substitutions e   Hom(Fm,Fm)
(structurality). We will use throughout the paper relational  S and functional CnS notation indistinctively,
where CnS is the consequence operator induced by S.
2That is, logics satisfying the Deduction Theorem:     { }  S   iff    S      .
3Other known formal mechanisms deﬁning change operators can be classiﬁed into two broad classes:
97duced to characterize the limiting cases of selection in step (ii), full meet and maxichoice
selection types. Finally, results showing the different operation types can be deﬁned each
other are usually provided too.
A base is an arbitrary set of formulas, the original requirement of logical closure being
dropped. Base belief change, for the same logical framework than AGM, was character-
ized by Hansson (see (Hansson 1993), (Hansson 1999)). The results for contraction and
revision were improved in (Hansson & Wasserman 2002) (by Hansson and Wassermann):
for contraction ((Hansson & Wasserman 2002, Theorem 3.8)) it is shown that ﬁnitarity
and monotony sufﬁce, while for revision (Theorem (Hansson & Wasserman 2002, The-
orem 3.17)) their proof depends on a further condition, Non-contravention: for all sen-
tences  , if ¬    CnS(T   { }), then ¬    CnS(T). Observe this condition holds in
logics having (i) the deduction property and (ii) the structural axiom of Contraction4. We
show Non-contravention can be dropped in the characterization of revision if we replace
unprovability (remainders) by consistency in the deﬁnition of partial meet.
3. Multiple base revision for ﬁnitary monotonic logics.
Deﬁnition1. ((Zhang &Foo 2001), (Booth & Richter2005)) Givensome monotoniclogic
 S (or simply, S), let T0,T1 be theories. We say T0 is consistent if T0  S 0, and deﬁne the
set of subsets of T0 maximally consistent with T1 as follows: X   Con(T0,T1) iff:
(i) X   T0,
(ii) X   T1 is consistent, and
(iii) For any X  such that X   X    T0, we have X    T1 is inconsistent
Now we prove some properties5 of Con(·,·) which will be helpful for the characteri-
zation theorems of base belief change operators for arbitrary ﬁnitary monotonic logics.
Lemma 2. Let S be some ﬁnitary monotonic logic and T0 a theory. For any X   T0, if
X   T1 is consistent, then X can be extended to some Y with Y   Con(T0,T1).
Proof. Let X   T0 with X   T1  S 0. Consider the poset (T  , ), where T   = {Y  
T0 : X   Y and Y   T1  S 0}. Let {Yi}i I be a chain in (T  , ); that is, each Yi is
a subset of T0 and consistent with T1. Hence,
 
i I Yi   T0; since S is ﬁnitary,
 
i I Yi
is also consistent with T1 and hence is an upper bound for the chain. Applying Zorn’s
Lemma, we obtain an element Z in the poset with the next properties: X   Z   T and
Z maximal w.r.t. Z   { }  S 0. Thus X   Z   Con(T, ).
Remark 3. Considering X =   in the preceding lemma, we infer: if T1 is consistent, then
Con(T0,T1)  =  .
selection-based mechanisms include selection functions on remainder sets and incision functions on ker-
nels; ranking-based mechanisms include entrenchments and systems of spheres. For the logical framework
assumed in the original developments (compact -and monotonic- closure operators satisfying the deduc-
tion property), all these methods are equivalent (see (Peppas 2007) for a comparison). These equivalences
between methods need not be preserved in more general class of logics.
4If T   { }  S     0, then by the deduction property T  S     (    0); i.e. T  S ( & )   0.
Finally, by modus ponens from the axiom of contraction, we obtain T  S     0.
5Note that Con(T0,T1) cannot be empty, since if input T1 is consistency, then in the worst case, we will
have     T0 to be consistent with T1.
98For simplicity, we assume that the input base T1 (to revise T0 by) is consistent6.
Deﬁnition 4. Let T0 be a theory. A selection function for T0 is a function
  : P(P(Fm)) \ { }    P(P(Fm)) \ { }
such that for all T1   Fm,  (Con(T0,T1))   Con(T0,T1) and  (Con(T0,T1)) is non-
empty.
Thus, selection functions and revision operators are deﬁned relative to some ﬁxed base
T0. Although, instead of writing  T0T1 we use the traditional inﬁx notation T0   T1 for
the operation of revising base T0 by T1.
3.1. Base belief revision.
The axioms we propose (inspired by (Booth & Richter 2005)) to characterize (multiple)
base revision operators for ﬁnitary monotonic logics S are the following, for arbitrary sets
T0,T1:
(F1) T1   T0   T1 (Success)
(F2) If T1 is consistent, then T0   T1 is also consistent. (Consistency)
(F3) T0   T1   T0   T1 (Inclusion)
(F4) For all     Fm, if     T0   T0   T1 then,
there exists T   with T0   T1   T     T0   T1
and such that T    S 0 but T     { }  S 0) (Relevance)
(F5) If for all T     T0 (T     T1  S 0   T     T2  S 0)
then T0   (T0   T1) = T0   (T0   T2) (Uniformity)
These axioms express natural conditions on the operation of revision; the case of
axiom (F4), which may be less obvious, gives a necessary condition -inconsistency with
some candidate revision- to withdraw some sentence of T0 during revision.
Given some theory T0   Fm and selection function   for T0, we deﬁne partial meet
revision operator    for T0 by T1   Fm as follows:
T0    T1 =
 
 (Con(T0,T1))   T1
Deﬁnition 5. Let S be some ﬁnitary logic, and T0 a theory. Then   : P(Fm)   P(Fm)
is a revision operator for T0 iff for any T1   Fm, T0 T1 = T0   T1 for some selection
function   for T0.
Lemma6. ConditionCon(T0,T1) =Con(T0,T2)isequivalenttotheantecedentofAxiom
(F5)
 T
    T0 (T
    T1  S 0   T
    T2  S 0)
Proof. (If-then) Assume Con(T0,T1) = Con(T0,T2) and let T     T0 with T     T1  S 0.
By Lemma 2, T   can be extended to X   Con(T0,T1). Hence, by assumption we get
T     X   Con(T0,T2) so that T     T2  S 0 follows. The other direction is similar.
(Only if) This direction follows from the deﬁnition of Con(T0,·).
6Observe one could deﬁne for T1 inconsistent: Con(T0,T1) = Con(T0,{1}), so in case T0 was con-
sistent this deﬁnition would make Con(T0,T1) = {T0}, and otherwise it would consist of all consistent
subtheories of T0.
99Theorem 7. Let S be a ﬁnitary monotonic logic. For any T0   Fm and function   :
P(Fm)   P(Fm):
  satisﬁes (F1)   (F5) i    is a revision operator for T0
Proof. (Soundness) Given some partial meet revision operator    for T0, we prove   
satisﬁes (F1)   (F5).
(F1)   (F3) hold by deﬁnition of   . (F4) Let     T0   T0    T1. Hence,   /   T1
and for some X    (Con(T0,T1)),   /   X. Simply put T   = X T1: by deﬁnitions of   
and Con we have (i) T0    T1   T     T0   T1 and (ii) T   is consistent (since T1 is). We
also have (iii) T     { } is inconsistent (otherwise     X would follow from maximality
of X and     T0, hence contradicting our previous step   /   X). (F5) We have to show,
assuming the antecedent of(F5), that T0  (T0    T1) = T0  (T0    T2). We prove the  
direction only since the other is similar. Assume, then, for all T     T0,
T
    T1  S 0   T
    T2  S 0
and let     T0   (T0    T1). This set is just T0   (
 
 (Con(T0,T1))   T1) which can be
transformed into (T0  
 
 (Con(T0,T1)) (T0  T1), i.e.
 
 (Con(T0,T1)) (T0  T1)
(since
 
 (Con(T0,T1))   T0). Case    
 
 (Con(T0,T1)). Then we use Lemma
6 upon the assumption to obtain
 
 (Con(T0,T1)) =
 
 (Con(T0,T2)), since   is a
function. Case     T0   T1. Then     X for all X    (Con(T0,T1)), by maximality
of X. Hence,    
 
 (Con(T0,T1)). Using the same argument than in the former case,
   
 
 (Con(T0,T2)). Since we also assumed     T0, we obtain     T0   (T0    T2).
(Completeness) Let   satisfy (F1)   (F5). We have to show that for some selection
function   and any T1, T0   T1 = T    T1. We deﬁne ﬁrst
 (Con(T0,T1)) = {X   Con(T0,T1) : X   T0   (T0   T1)}
We prove that (1)  is well-deﬁned, (2)   is a selection function and (3) T0 T1 = T  T1.
(1) Assume (i) Con(T0,T1) = Con(T0,T2); we have to prove that  (Con(T0,T1)) =
 (Con(T0,T2)). Applying Lemma 6 to (i) we obtain the antecedent of (F5). Since  
satisﬁes this axiom, we have (ii) T0 (T0 T1) = T0 (T0 T2). By the above deﬁnition
of  ,  (Con(T0,T1)) =  (Con(T0,T2)) follows from (i) and (ii).
(2)SinceT1 isconsistent, byRemark3weobtainCon(T0,T1)isnotempty; wehaveto
show that  (Con(T0,T1)) is not empty either (since the other condition  (Con(T0,T1))  
Con(T0,T1) is met by the above deﬁnition of ). We haveT0 T0 T1   T0 T1; the latter
is consistent and contains T1, by (F2) and (F1), respectively; thus, (T0  T0  T1) T1 is
consistent; from this and T0   T0   T1   T0, we deduce by Lemma 2 that T0   T0   T1
is extensible to some X   Con(T0,T1). Thus, exists some X   Con(T0,T1) such that
X   T0   T0   T1. In consequence, X    (Con(T0,T1))  =  .
For (3), we prove ﬁrst T0   T1   T0    T1. Let     T0   T1. By (F3),     T0   T1.
Case     T1: then trivially     T0    T1 Case     T0. Then     T0   T0   T1.
In consequence, for any X   Con(T0,T1), if X   T0   T0   T1 then     X. This
implies, by deﬁnition of   above, that for all X    (Con(T0,T1)) we have     X, so
that    
 
 (Con(T0,T1))   T0    T1. In both cases, we obtain     T0    T1.
Now, we prove the other direction: T0    T1   T0  T1. Let    
 
 (Con(T0,T1)) 
T1. By (F1), we have T1   T0 T1; then, in case     T1 we are done. So we may assume
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 (Con(T0,T1)). Now, in order to apply (F4), let X be arbitrary with T   T1  
X   T0  T1 and X consistent. Consider X   T0: since T1   T0   T1   X implies
X = X   T1 is consistent, so is (X   T0)   T1. Together with X   T0   T0, by Lemma
2 there is Y   Con(T0,T1) with X   T0   Y . In addition, since T0   T1   X implies
T0   T1   T0   X   T0   Y we obtain Y    (Con(T0,T1)), by the deﬁnition of  
above. Condition X   T0   Y also implies (X   T0)   T1   Y   T1. Observe that from
X   X   T1 and X   T0   T1 we infer that X   (X   T1)  (T0   T1). From the latter
being identical to (X  T0) T1 and the fact that (X  T0)  T1   Y  T1, we obtain that
X   Y   T1. Since     Y   Con(T0,T1), we have Y   T1 is consistent with  , so its
subset X is also consistent with  . Finally, we may apply modus tollens on Axiom (F4)
to obtain that   /   T0  T0  T1, i.e.   /   T0 or     T0  T1. But since the former is false,
the latter must be the case.
3.1.1. Full meet and maxichoice base revision operators.
The previous result can be extended to limiting cases of selection functions formally de-
ﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 8. A revision operator for T0 is full meet if it is generated by the identity
selection function  fm = Id:  fm(Con(T0,T1)) = Con(T0,T1); that is,
T0  fm T1 = (
 
Con(T0,T1))   T1
A revision operator for T0 is maxichoice if it is generated by a selection function of
type  mc(Con(T0,T1)) = {X}, for some X   Con(T0,T1), and in that case T0  mc T1 =
X   T1.
To characterize full meet and maxichoice revision operators for some theory T0 in any
ﬁnitary logic, we deﬁne the next additional axioms:
(FM) For any X   Fm with T1   X   T0   T1
X  S 0 implies X   (T0   T1)  S 0
(MC) For all     Fm with     T0   T0   T1 we have
T0   T1   { }  S 0
Theorem 9. Let T0   Fm and   be a function   : P(Fm)2   P(Fm). Then the
following hold:
(fm)   satisﬁes (F1)   (F5) and (FM) i    =   fm
(mc)   satisﬁes (F1)   (F5) and (MC) i    =   mc
Proof. We prove (fm) ﬁrst. (Soundness): We know   fm satisﬁes (F1)   (F5) so it re-
mains to be proved that (FM) holds. Let X be such that T1   X   T0   T1 and
X  S 0. From the latter and X   T1   (T0   T1)   T1   T0 we infer by Lemma 2
that X   T1   Y   Con(T0,T1), for some Y . Notice X = X    T1 and that for any
X     Con(T0,T1)X     T1 is consistent and
T0   fm T1 = (
 
Con(T0,T1))   T1   X
    X
  
Hence X   X  , so that T0   fm T1   X   X  . Since the latter is consistent, T0  fm
T1   X  S 0. (Completeness) Let   satisfy (F1)   (F5) and (FM). It sufﬁces to prove
101that X    (Con(T0,T1))   X   Con(T0,T1); but we already know that   =   , for
selection function   (for T0) deﬁned by: X    (Con(T0,T1))   T0   T0   T1   X.
It is enough to prove, then, that X   Con(T0,T1) implies X   T0  T0   T1. Let X  
Con(T0,T1) and let     T0   T0   T1. Since     T0 and X   Con(T0,T1), we have
by maximality of X that either X   { }  S 0 or     X. We prove the former case to
be impossible: assuming it we would have T1   X   T1   T0   T1. By (FM), X   T1
 (T0 T1)  S 0. Since     T0 T1, we would obtain X { }  S 0, hence contradicting
the case assumption; since the former case is not possible, we have     X. Since X was
arbitrary, X   Con(T0,T1) implies X   T0   T0   T1 and we are done.
For (mc): (Soundness) We prove (MC), since (F1)   (F5) follow from   mc being a
partial meet revision operator. Let X   Con(T0,T1) be such that T0   mc   = X   T1
and let     T0   T0   mc T1. We have   /   X   T1 = T0   T1. Since     T0
and X   Con(T0,T1), X   { }  S 0. Finally T0   T1  { }  S 0. (Completeness)
Let   satisfy (F1)   (F5) and (MC). We must prove   =   mc, for some maxichoice
selection function  mc. Let X,Y   Con(T0,T1); we have to prove X = Y . In search of a
contradiction, assume the contrary, i.e.     X   Y . We have   /  
 
 (Con(T0,T1)) and
    X   T0. By MC, T0 T1 { }  S 0. Since T0 T1   X, we obtain X { } is also
inconsistent, contradicting previous     X  S 0. Thus X = Y which makes   =   mc,
for some maxichoice selection function  mc.
4. The case of graded fuzzy logics.
The characterization results for base revision operators from the previous section required
weak assumptions (monotony and ﬁnitarity) upon the consequence relation  S. In partic-
ular these results hold for a wide family of systems of (mathematical) fuzzy logic. The
distinctive feature of these logics is that they cope with graded truth in a compositional
manner (see (H´ ajek 1998, Section 3) for an overview). Graded truth may be dealt implic-
itly, by means of comparative statements, or explicitly, by introducing truth-degrees in the
language . Here we will focus on a particular kind of fuzzy logical languages allowing for
explicit representation of truth-degrees, that will be referred as graded fuzzy logics, and
which are expansions of t-norm logics with countable sets of truth-constants. These log-
ics allow for occurrences of truth-degrees, represented as new propositional atoms r (one
for each r   C) in any part of a formula. These truth-constants and propositional vari-
ables can be combined arbitrarily using connectives to obtain new formulas. The graded
language obtained in this way will be denoted as Fm(C). These expansions also require
additional axioms for truth-constants, e.g. (r   s)   r   s, called book-keeping ax-
ioms. A prominent example of a logic over a graded language is H´ ajek’s Rational Pavelka
Logic RPL (H´ ajek 1998), an extension of  ukasiewicz logic with rational truth-constants
in [0,1]; for other graded extensions of t-norm based fuzzy logics see e.g. (Esteva, et al.
2007). In t-norm based fuzzy logics, due to the fact that the implication is residuated, a
formula r     gets value 1 under a given interpretation e iff r   e( ). In what follows,
we will also use the signed language notation ( ,r) to denote the formula r    .
If S denotes a given t-norm logic, let us denote by S(C) the corresponding expansion
with truth-constants from a suitable countable set C such that {0,1}   C   [0,1]. For
instance if  S is  ukasiewicz logic and C = Q   [0,1], then  S(C) would refer to RPL.
For these graded fuzzy logics, besides the original deﬁnition of a base as simply a set
102of formulas, it makes sense to consider another natural notion of basehood, where bases
are closed by lower bounds of truth-degrees. We call them C-closed. bases.
Deﬁnition 10. (Adapted from (Hansson 1993)) Given some (monotonic) t-norm fuzzy
logic S with language Fm and a countable set C   [0,1] of truth-constants, let T  
Fm(C) be a base in S(C). We deﬁne CnC(T) = {( ,r ) : ( ,r)   T, for r,r   
C with r   r }. A base T   Fm(C) is called C-closed when T = CnC(T).
Notice that in some sense, using Gerla’s framework of abstract fuzzy logic (Gerla
2001), the approach by Booth and Ricther (Booth & Richter 2005) deﬁnes revision oper-
ators for bases which are closed with respect to some complete lattice W of truth-values.
The following results prove    operators preserve C-closure, thus making C-closed
revision a particular case of base revision under Theorem 7.
Proposition 11. If T0,T1 are C-closed graded bases, for any partial meet revision opera-
tor   , T0    T1 is also a C-closed graded base.
Proof. Since T0 is C-closed, by maximality of X    (Con(T0,T1)) we have X is also
C-closed, for any such X. Let ( ,s)  
 
 (Con(T0,T1)) and s  <C s for some s    C.
Then ( ,s)   X for any X    (Con(T0,T1)) implies ( ,s )   X for any such X. Hence  
 (Con(T0,T1))isC-closed. Finally, sinceT1 isC-closed, wededuce
 
 (Con(T0,T1)) 
T1 is also C-closed.
Let PC(Fm) be the set of C-closed sets of Fm sentences. We introduce an additional
axiom (F0) for revision of C-closed bases by C-closed inputs:
(F0) T0   T1 is C-closed, if T0,T1 are
Corollary 12. Assume S and C are as before and let   : PC(Fm)   P(Fm). Then,
  satisﬁes (F0)   (F5) iff for some selection function  ,T0   T1 = T0    T1 for every
T1   PC(Fm).
For the case of RPL, where the negation operator ¬ is interpreted by the negation
functionon[0,1]deﬁendasn(x) = 1 x, bothapproaches(non-C-closed, C-closed)differ
in the revision output. Hence, this distinction in basehood has important consequences.
Example 13. (In RPL) Let C = Q   [0,1] and deﬁne T0 = {( ,0.5),( ,0.7)}.In each
case, there in only a possible selection function, call them  0 and  1; revision results in:
T0   0 (¬ ,0.4) = {( ,0.5),(¬ ,0.4)}, while
CnC(T0)   1 CnC({(¬ ,0.4)}) = CnC({( ,0.6),(¬ ,0.4)})
Observe this distinction in basehood makes sense only for logics whose negation is
involutive, i.e. where ¬¬      is valid; otherwise, the distinction collapses. For G¨ odel
and Product logics (with non-involutive G¨ odel negation ¬Gx = 0 for x > 0 and ¬G0 = 1)
we have that any C-closed base revision operator outputs the same result than the deduc-
tive closure of its non-C-closed counterpart.
1035. Conclusions and future work
We improved Hansson and Wasserman characterization of the revision operator by drop-
ping one of their conditions, implicitly characterizing revision operators for the class log-
ics with the deduction property. Apart from the general theorem, standard results for full
meet and maxichoice revision operators are also provided. Then we moved to the ﬁeld of
graded fuzzy logics, in contradistinction to the approach by Booth and Richter in (Booth
& Richter 2005); their work inspired us to prove similar results for a more general logical
framework, including t-norm based fuzzy logics from H´ ajek. Finally, we observed the
differences between bases if they are assumed to be closed under truth-degrees.
Several problems are left open for future research: mainly, wether the present (consis-
tency-based) results can be used to characterize contraction as well. Presumably, the
standpoint adopted in this paper would lead to a deﬁnition of contraction with slightly
different properties than that proposed by Hansson and Wasserman.
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Abstract. In an attempt to deal with quantiﬁer scope ambiguities in categorial type
logics (CTL), Moortgat (1992) proposed a type constructor that allows abstraction
over the syntactic context of an expression. Here, we describe its application to
extraction. We extend this result to a syntactic analysis of the latter phenomenon
for the Lambek–Grishin calculus, an instance of CTL that derives Moortgat’s type
constructor by extending the logical vocabulary with the mirror images of the usual
connectives for subcategorization. Semantically, we complete the analysis by using
a  –calculus with constants for existential quantiﬁcation and equality, pulling off
a trick similar to Montague’s PTQ take on to be in order to identify the extracted
argument with its associated gap.
Categorial type logics (Moortgat 1997, CTL) meet with serious difﬁculties when con-
fronted with extraction phenomena: as logics about strings (Lambek 1958, L) or trees
(Lambek 1961, NL), they fail to explain the full range of discontinuous dependencies en-
countered in natural languages. In order to overcome the expressive limitations of these
basic systems, Moortgat (1992) proposed a connective that allows one to abstract within a
type over (the type of) the syntactic domain containing its occurrence. Though originally
intended for the analysis of quantiﬁer scope ambiguities, we here describe its application
to extraction. We consider a proposal by Bernardi & Moortgat (2007) for decompos-
ing Moortgat’s type constructor in the Lambek–Grishin calculus (LG), an instance of
CTL that conversatively extends upon NL by augmenting it with its own mirror–image
in the derivability relation. We exploit Bernardi and Moortgat’s results in extending our
syntactic analysis of extraction to LG, and complete the picture by associating it with a
compositional semantics.
We proceed as follows. In §1, we brieﬂy review the application of CTL to linguis-
tic analysis. §2 describes our usage of Moortgat’s connective in ﬁnding a type schema
for predicates ﬁguring in extraction environments, its instantiations being meant to co-
exist with the usual types for cases of non–extraction. §3 turns to the decomposition of
Moortgat’s type constructor in LG, showing it to reduce the lexical ambiguity posited in
§2. Finally, §4 reviews the continuation semantics for LG (Bernardi & Moortgat 2007),
describing in terms of it the Montagovian semantics associated with our type schema for
extraction.
1. Categorial analyses
We adopt a logical perspective on natural language syntax: syntactic categories are logical
formulas, or (syntactic) types (written A..E), as we shall call them. Deﬁned inductively:
A,B   = n   np   s   (B A)   (A B)
Here, n (the type of common nouns), np (noun phrases) and s (sentences) are atomic
syntactic types. For the interpretations of complex types (derived using the slashes, or
implications   and  ), we turn to the proof-theoretical meanings of logical connectives (or
type constructors). In syntax, we understand proofs to derive sequents     A, establishing
  to be a well-formed binary-branching syntactic tree of category A:
106 ,    = A   (   )
An expression of type A B (B A) we then understand to combine directly with an ex-
pression of type B to its right (left) into an expression of type A. Made explicit in a
Natural Deduction presentation:
A   A Ax
    A B     B
      A  E
    B     B A
      A  E   B   A
    A B
 I B      A
    B A
 I
Here, introductionrules( I),( I)allowtheinferenceofatype, whereaseliminationrules
( E),( E) allow the use of a type in an inference. Axioms (Ax) capture the intuition that
each structure corresponding to a single leaf is a well–formed structure of the type found
at that leaf.
As an example of these deﬁnitions, consider the following type assignments to the
lexical items in John offered the lady a drink:1
John offered the lady a drink
npsu ((npsu s) npdo) npio npio n n npdo n n
As it is, the resulting calculus (NL, the Non–Associative Lambek Calculus) is no stronger
than context–free formalisms, making it unsuitable for analyzing such unbounded depen-
dencies as featured in various instances of extraction.
2. Types for extraction
In order to reach beyond the context–free boundaries of standard CTL, Moortgat (1992)
introduces type constructors that allow abstraction over the type of the syntactic context
of an expression. By the latter we understand trees  [] with a hole []. Substituting for []
some   yields the tree  [ ], the notation emphasizing the (distinguished) occurrence of
  in  . Deﬁned inductively:
 [], []   = []    []        []
Any given tree   may be (uniquely) rewritten into a form  [ ] for each of its subtrees  .
From the perspective of type assignment to trees (derivations), nothing exciting happens:
if   was found to be a well–formed constituent of type B, looking at   from the perspec-
tive of one of its subtrees   isn’t going to change this. This observation is captured by
the admissibility of the Cut rule:2
    A  [A]   B
 [ ]   B Cut
1Subscripts are added to occurrences of np to facilitate matching with the corresponding grammatical
roles: su, do and io abbreviate subject, direct object and indirect object respectively.
2In our substitution metaphor, A in  [A] may be seen as a type-assignment to the hole in  [] (necessar-
ily coinciding with the type assigned to  ).
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embedded constituent to manipulate the embedding context. Such is achieved by a ternary
type constructor, deriving types A  C
B   with local syntactic distribution characterized by
A, but when embedded within an expression of type B resets the latter’s type to C:3
    A  C
B    [A]   B
 [ ]   C
[ ]E
Moortgat (1992) considered as an application the assignment of the type np  s
s   to quan-
tiﬁed noun phrases, containing an abstraction over the sentential domain deﬁning their
scope (the type of the resulting constituent being again s). Here, we consider its applica-
tion to extraction: for a predicate an argument of which is extracted, we assign the type
A  B ÷  C
B   that parameterizes over: its local syntactic distributionA, the type of the
extracted argument C (instantiating B ÷   C by B   C if it occurs in a right branch,
and     C B otherwise), and the type of the extraction domain B. For instance, in the
complex noun phrase lady whom John offered   a drink, the object noun phrase (C = np)
of offered is extracted (from a right branch) at the level of the embedded sentence (B = s),
read itself locally selecting for a subject and direct object (A = (np s) np):
whom John offered a drink
(n n) (s   npio) npsu ((npsu s) npdo)  s   npio s   npdo n n
Use of ([ ]E) allows the assignment of s   np to the gapped embedded sentence John
offered   a drink, establishing it as a proper argument for whom. The   and   are unary
type-forming operators, held subject to:
  A   A     A
thereby preventing overgeneration: expressions of type np do not directly combine with
gapped clauses, seeing as they do not derive   np. We make the following observations:
1. Given that ([ ]E) may operate at an arbitrarily deep level within a context, our type
schema for extraction places no constraints on the location of the gap.4
2. Ourproposalreliesonalimitedamountoflexicalambiguity: typesA  B ÷  C
B  
are lexically assigned to predicates in addition to the usual types for non–extraction
environments. Although the amount of ambiguity is well under control (it being
ﬁnite), we show in the next section for several speciﬁc cases that both types are
derivable from a common ancestor.
3This is essentially the type constructor proposed by Moortgat (1992), although he used the notation
q(A,B,C) and described its proof-theory in sequent calculus. Our notation is borrowed from Shan (2002),
where it was used as an abbreviation for the lifted types (A   B)   C in the continuation semantics of
Barker (2002). The analogy is made on purpose: under the decomposition of types A  C
B   in LG in the
next section, they obtain a proof-theoretic behavior close to what we ﬁnd in Barker’s work.
4Compare this to the situation in L, where only peripheral extraction is possible, at least as long as one
does not wish to resort to the use of types that are highly specialized to their syntactic environments.
1083. Our analysis is, of course, not limited to the case where the extraction domain is a
sentence. For example, with wh-extraction in English the gap shows up at the level
of a yes–no question (Vermaat 2005, Chapter 3):
Whom did John offer a drink?
wh (q   np) q sinf np ((np sinf) np)  q   np
q   np n n
Here q, wh are the types of yes–no and wh–questions respectively.
3. The Lambek-Grishin Calculus
Various extensions of (N)L have been proposed in the literature that sought to decompose
types A  C
B   in terms of more primitive type constructors. Here, we consider in particu-
lar the efforts of Bernardi & Moortgat (2007) in the Lambek–Grishin calculus (Moortgat
2007). The latter work sought to establish an extension of NL exhibiting an involutive
operation (  ) on types and sequents, manifesting itself at the level of derivations as an
arrow–reversing duality:
    A is derivable   A       is derivable
More accurately, once we admit of some notion of costructure   naturally occurring on
the righthand side of the turnstile, we wish to establish:
      is derivable           is derivable
Formally, we start by adding coslashes, or subtractions, to the basic repertoire of type-
forming operations:
A..E   = n   np   s   (B A)   (A B)
  (A B)   (B  A)
Realizing (  ) as:
(B A)  =def (A   B ) (B  A)  =def (A  B )
(A B)  =def (B   A ) (A B)  =def (B  A )
And A  =def A if A is atomic. That (  ) is involutive (A   = A) is easily checked. At
the level of sequents, we require a notion of costructure:
 ,    = A   (   )  
(   )  =def (      )
(   )  =def (      )  
where, for the extension of (  ), we rely on its deﬁnition at the level of types for the
base cases (where   or   is A). Cocontexts  [] are deﬁned similarly to contexts  [].
Derivations are now deﬁned through the following inference rules:
109A   A Ax
A      [B]
     [(A B)]
 I
  A    [B]
     [(B A)]
 I
     [A]  [A]    
 [ ]    [ ] Cut
 [B]     A
 [(B  A)]    
 I
 [B]   A  
 [(A B)]    
 I
    B     (B A)
      A
 E
    (A B)     B
      A
 E
(A B)     B    
A        E
B     (B  A)    
A        E
where, for Cut, either  [] = [] or  [] = []. Note that the latter rule is not eliminable, as
with usual Natural Deduction. We establish (  ) to be an arrow–reversing duality through
a straightforward extension of (  ) to the level of derivations. For instance:
 
    (A B)     B
      A
 E  
 
=def
B       (B   A )     
A            E
The calculus thus derived is essentially the Lambek-Grishin calculus, though here pre-
sented in a format more Natural Deduction-esque. Compared to NL, its expressivity is
enhanced through the introduction rules: the inferred (co–)slash may occur arbitrarily
deep inside the right–hand side (left–hand side) of the sequent. This property is exploited
by Bernardi & Moortgat (2007) through the decomposition of types A  C
B   from §2 as
(C  B) A. Indeed, ([ ]E) then becomes derivable in LG:
    ((B  C) A)
 [A]   B
(B  C)   B  C Ax C   C Ax
B   (B  C) C
 E
 [A]   (B  C) C Cut
 [((B  C) A)]   C
 I
 [ ]   C Cut
thereby establishing our analysis of extraction to be applicable to LG. However, the par-
ticularuseoftypes(B C) Aallowsforfurtherimprovements. Recallfromtheprevious
examples our use of two separate types for offered, depending on whether or not it was
used in an extraction environment. In LG, we can ﬁnd a type D from which both may be
derived:
D   ((npsu s) npdo) npio (No extraction)
D   ((npsu s) npdo)  s   npio s   (Extraction)
whereas D     (npsu (s npio)) npdo and D     ((npsu s) npio) npdo, preventing overgen-
eration. Abbreviating ((npsu s) npdo) npio as dtv, we have the following solution for
D:5
  (s s)  dtv
s   s  s   npio s       npio
5Here, (   ) is the counterpart of the structural connective (   ) at the level of types:
    A B  [A B]   C
 [ ]   C
 E     A     B
      A B  I
110s s   s s  Ax
s s s    s
 E 
s s s  s   npio s     s   np 
io
[ ]E 
(s s   s  s   npio s  )   npio   s
 E 
((s s)  dtv
s   s  s   npio s  )   npio   dtv
[ ]E 
s s   s s  Ax
s s   s   s
 E 
(s s)  dtv
s   s   dtv
  [ ]E 
((s s)  dtv
s   s)   npio   (npsu s) np 
do
 E 
((s s)  dtv
s   s )   npio   s (s   npio) ((npsu s) npdo)  s   npio s  
 E 
((s s)  dtv
s   s  s   npio s  )   npio   ((npsu s) npdo)  s   npio s  
 I
Figure 1: Explaining the intuition behind D. Active formulas are explicitly marked with
a sufﬁx   in order to faciliate understanding.
thus at least partially eliminating the need for (lexically) ambiguous type assignment.
Before moving on to the more general case, we explain the intuition behind D in Figure 1,
using the following derived rules in order to abstract away from all unnecessary details:
 [A]   B
 [A  C
B  ]   C
[ ]E      A B (C   {B,  B})
  C   A  E      B
    C  C  B  E 
In the more general case, we can ﬁnd such a D for types A B and A  C   B
C  
provided C = head(A) (e.g., if A = (np s) np, then C = s), the solution for D then
being:6
  (C C)  A B
C   C   C   B
C       B
For the reader familiar with Barker and Shan’s work on continuation semantics, we con-
clude this section with the following observation. We may understand our analysis of
extraction, when translated to LG, to involve an application of continuations by the fol-
lowing reasoning: types (B   C)   A behave like the computations (A   B)   C of
Barker (2002), in that the following lifted elimination rules become LG–derivable (and
similarly for  ), provided that we allow costructures to be associative:
    (A B)  E
D       B  D
C  
      A  E
C  
    (A B)  D
C       B  E
D  
      A  E
C  
6The case of extraction from a left branch is similar.
111In this sense, our analysis of extraction may be perceived of as an alternative to the type-
logical treatment of continuations found in Barker & Shan (2006).
4. Formal Semantics
In coupling CTL with a Montagovian semantics, we ﬁrst deﬁne the semantic counterparts
of syntactic types (referred to as (semantic) types when no confusion arises) in a suitable
fragment of intuitionistic logic. The latter we shall ﬁx to the { , ,e, }-fragment of
minimal logic, with types  ,  given by e (for entities),   (for truth–values), function
types (     ) and product types (    ). For NL, this gives the familiar mapping
 A÷B  =def  B     A    A  =def  A    A  =def  A 
 s  =def    np  =def e  n  =def e 
Here, A÷B may be either A B or B A, and       abbreviates    (writing     for (  ) ).
For LG, we shall adopt the continuation-passing style translation of Bernardi & Moortgat
(2007), coupling each syntactic type A with its continuation  A K. For atomic types, the
latter may be seen as an abstraction from   (typing the sentence denotation) over the NL
denotation (of type)  A :
 s K =def     np K =def e   n K =def e  
In particular, we aim to adorn lexical entries of syntactic type A with denotations of type
 A  
K (referred to as an A computation), carrying abstractions over their own continua-
tions. For derived type (A÷B) (÷   { , }), we wish such lifted denotations to be of type
 A ÷ B  
K =  B  
K    A  
K.7 Realizing that, by (de)currying, the latter is isomorphic to
( B  
K   A K)  and ( A K   B  ) , this means we can deﬁne:
 A B K =def  B  
K   A K  B A K =def  A K   B  
K
To ﬁnish, continuations associated with the types (A B) and (B  A) are dual to those
carrying a slash as principal sign in the following sense:
 A B K =def  A B  
K  B  A K =def  B A  
K
= ( B K   A  
K)  = ( A  
K   B K) 
And, as before, we identify   A K and   A K with  A K. In illustrating the applica-
tion of these deﬁnitions to our analysis of extraction, we return to one of our previous
examples:8
lady whom John offered a drink
n (n n) (s   np) np ((np s) np)  s   np
s   np
7This follows the call–by–name evaluation paradigm. Normally, the latter postulates an additional dou-
ble negation ’layer’, as in ( B  
K    A  
K)  , identifying  A ÷ B K with ( B  
K    A  
K) . The use of
product types, however, allows for the simpler treatment pursued here, as explained in the main text (see
also the work of Yves Lafont & Streicher (1993)).
8In order to focus on the semantics of offered, we simplify our analysis by taking a drink to constitute
a single lexical entry.
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to inductively extract a  -term  D LG (coding a proof in minimal logic) from the deriva-
tion D of lady whom John offered a drink, telling us how the latter’s denotation is to be
obtained from those of the words it contains. In doing so, we understand the derivation
of a sequent     A (the only kind that we need to consider for the current example) to be
mapped into a function from computations of the types found in   to a computation of A.
In addition to the usual applications (M    N )  and abstractions ( x M )   , we
allow  D LG to be derived using pairings  M ,N      and projections ( lM   )  and
( rM   ) , although in practice we shall usually mention explicitly only the types of
bound variables. Initially, we have only the elimination rules ( E),( E) to deal with:9
D1 = John
np
(np s) np   (np s) np Ax a drink
np
(np s) np a drink   np s
 E
John ((np s) np a drink))   s
 E
The associated meaning recipe is obtained by decurried application:
 D1 LG =    s K(q   a drink LG,  , John LG  )
  ((q  a drink LG)  John LG)
parameterizing over lexical denotations  w LG of semantic type  A  
K for words w of
syntactic type A, and a free variable q of type  (np s) np  
K. Proceeding:
D2 =
o ered
((np s) np)  s   np
s  
D1
John ((np s) np a drink)   s
John (o ered a drink)   s   np
[ ]E
In the decomposition of ([ ]E) in LG, this gives us the term  D2 LG:
   s   np K( o ered LG   q (np s) np  
K,y s   np K  s  
K (y   , D1 LG ))
This term reminds us of Montague’s Quantify In:  o ered LG is essentially applied to an
abstraction over the occurrence of q in M1. Concluding our derivation D, we have:
lady
n
whom
(n n) (s   np)
D2
John (o ered a drink)   s   np
whom (John (o ered a drink))   n n
 E
lady  (whom (John (o ered a drink)))   n
 E
 D LG =    n K( whom LG   D2 LG,  , lady LG  )
With the lexical semantics, our task is to substitute appropriate terms in  D LG for
 lady LG     n  
K  that LG     (n n) (s   np)  
K
 John LG     np  
K  o ered LG     (s (s   np)) (np s)  
K
 a drink LG     np  
K
9We directly incorporate lexical substitutions in our derivations by writing
w
A for axioms when w is a
word that is lexically assigned the type A.
113such that the result becomes logically equivalent to:
   n .(   ze.((LADY z) (   ye((DRINK y) (OFFER z y JOHN)))))
We discuss for each wordw how its usual denotation  w NL in NL may be lifted to  w LG.
For this task, we assume to have at our disposal the constants in the following table:
Constant(s) Type Description (denotation)
  e   Existential quantiﬁcation
= e   e  Equality of entities
         Conjunction
JOHN e Entity
LADY, DRINK e  (First–order) Properties
OFFER e   e   e  Ternary relation
Table 1: Additional constants assumed for the construction of lexical denotations.
Thecases John LG and lady LG offerlittlechallenge: wesimply’lift’ JOHN (=  John NL)
and LADY (=  lady NL):
 John LG = (LIFT 
e JOHN)
 lady LG = (LIFT 
e  LADY)  
LIFT 
 
=def  x      (  x)  
Whereas for  a drink LG we can take   e  ye((DRINK y) (  y)). With whom, things
start to get more interesting. Our starting point is again a denotation in NL:
 whom NL =  q s   np  r n  xe((r x) (q x))
    (n n) (s   np) 
 whom LG, on the other hand, is to be of the form of a paired abstraction
  Q s   np  
K,   n K,R n  
K  M    ( s   np  
K  ( n K   n  
K)) 
(=  (n n) (s   np)  
K)
For M, we shall now explain the following to be a suitable instantiation:
(R  re (  (( whom NL  xe(Q  LIFT 
e x, p p )) r)))
This term is dissected step by step in the following series of equivalences:
M1 =def ( whom NL  x(Q  LIFT 
e x, p p ))
    re  xe((r x) (Q  LIFT 
e x, p p ))
   e    e 
 
Q     s   np K
=  np  
K   s K
 
M2 =def  re (  (M1 r))
    re (   xe((r x) (Q  LIFT 
e x, p p )))
   e  
 
      n K
= e    
M =def (R M2)
      
R     n  
K
= e     
The real challenge we ﬁnd with  o ered  
K. It is again to be an abstraction
114 Q( (np s) np  
K  s (s   np) K) 
N    ( (np s) np  
K   s (s   np) K)  
(=  (s (s   np)) ((np s) np)  
K)
Q takes terms of type  (np s) np  
K and  s   (s     np) K into the result type  . For
the ﬁrst of these arguments we take
N1 =def   Y  np  
K,   s K,X np  
K  (Y  ye(X  xe(  (OFFER u y x))))
   ( np  
K  ( s K   np  
K))  =  (np s) np  
K
featuring a free variable u (type e) as a place-holder for the extracted argument (i.e., the
indirect object). For the second argument of Q, we construe
N2 =def    Z np  
K,  s K ,w s  
K (w  p ((  p) (Z  ue(u = z))))
   (( np  
K   s K)  s  
K)  =  s (s   np) K
In essence, this term contains the recipe for construing the denotation of the gapped em-
bedded clause John offered   a drink. Crucially, it attributes to the denotation of the
extracted argument (the bound variable Z of type  np  
K) the property of being equal to u
(the free variable standing in for the indirect object in N1). We conclude our deﬁnition of
 o ered LG with an existential binding of u:
N =def (   ue(Q  N1,N2 ))     
With the denotations for each of the lexical items ﬁxed, extensive use of  -reduction
provides us with the following term of type  n  
K as the ﬁnal denotation:
(LIFT 
 n K  ze((LADY z)  ue ye((DRINK y) (OFFER u y JOHN) (u = z))))
Allowing us to obtain the desired result with the following equivalence (licensed by the
laws of predicate logic)10
 ue ye((DRINK y) (OFFER u y JOHN) (u = z))
   ye((DRINK y) (OFFER z y JOHN))
5. Conclusion
The previous sections saw the formulation of an analysis of extraction in the Lambek–
Grishin calculus. Its syntactic component was inspired by Moortgat’s type constructor
for discontinuity (quantiﬁer scope ambiguities constituting its original domain of appli-
cation), with the semantic component phrased in terms of a continuation semantics. In
the latter case, we relied on a  –calculus with equality in order to identify the extracted
argument with its gap position. An obvious direction for future research is as follows. Our
compositional semantics of §4 targeted our type schema for extraction in §2. However,
we have also considered in §3 a type D that can derive both (speciﬁc) instantiations of
this schema as well as types for non–extraction environments. Can our semantic analysis
of §4 be generalized so as to be applicable to D?
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116TOWARDS MORPHOLOGICALLY ENHANCED AUTOMATED
LEXICAL ACQUISITION
Kostadin Cholakov
Center for Language and Cognition Groningen
Abstract. In this paper we tackle the lexical coverage problem for large-scale hand-
crafted grammars. Since such grammars usually rely heavily on manually created
lexicons, their coverage and quality are crucial for the grammar performance. To
this extent, we propose accurate machine learning methods for automated lexical
acquisition and prove their high quality by applying them on a large-scale grammar
for Dutch. We also emphasise on the use of morphology in the acquisition process
and illustrate its importance.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
At present, various wide-coverage symbolic parsing systems for different languages ex-
ist and have been integrated into real-world NLP applications, such as IE, QA, grammar
checking, MT and intelligent IR. This integration, though, has reminded us of the short-
comings of symbolic systems, in particular lack of lexical coverage. The hand-crafted
grammars which usually lie at the heart of symbolic parsing systems are often strongly
lexicalised– the lexicon encodes various kinds of sophisticated linguistic information and
constraints. Naturally, such hand-crafted lexicons cannot cover all words in a language
which could cause lower coverage and accuracy results when, for example, the grammar
is applied on domains which contain many unknown words (i.e. words that are not listed
in the lexicon). Thus, it is crucial to ﬁnd accurate ways to extend them and improve their
quality.
In this paper we propose machine learning methods for the automated acquisition of
linguistic information for missing and incomplete lexical entries. We ensure the general
applicability and the quality of the algorithms we propose by applying them to a large-
scale grammar for Dutch.
1.2. Previous Work
There have been various approaches to the problem of lexical acquisition (LA). (Cussens
& Pulman 2000) describe a symbolic approach towards grammar extension with inductive
logic programming and (Erbach 1990, Barg & Walther 1998, Fouvry 2003) have followed
a uniﬁcation-based approach. However, these approaches suffer from the problem that the
generated lexical entries might be both too general or too speciﬁc. It is also doubtful if
these methods can be applied to large-scale grammars.
(Zhang & Kordoni 2006, van de Cruys 2006, Cholakov, et al. 2008) have taken a ma-
chine learning approach towards the problem of LA. They treat the problem as a classiﬁ-
cation task and, by using the linguistic knowledge that is already encoded in the grammar,
they assign a given word one or more categories from the lexicon. Such approaches are
considered to be formalism- and language-independent and can be applied to large-scale
grammars.
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ever, wemakesomemodiﬁcationsinordertoimproveitandthus, toachievebetterresults.
The most important one is the incorporation of more morphological knowledge into the
LA process. We use more morphological features during the classiﬁcation and generate
the paradigm of a given unknown word, so we can use the morphological information it
provides to enhance our learning algorithm.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the general
learning algorithm. Section 3 describes the experiments and the results. Section 4 illus-
trates the initial steps towards building a more sophisticated method for LA. Section 5
concludes the paper and presents some ideas for future work.
2. General Algorithm
2.1. The Alpino Grammar and Parser
In our experiments we use the Alpino wide-coverage dependency parser for Dutch which
is based on a large HPSG grammar (van Noord 2006). The grammar takes a ‘construc-
tional’ approach, with rich lexical representations stored in the lexicon and a large number
of detailed, construction speciﬁc rules (about 800). As an HPSG grammar, both the lex-
icon and the rule component of the Alpino grammar are organised in a multiple type
inheritance system.
At the moment, the lexicon contains about 100K lexical entries and a list of about
200K named entities. Each word is assigned one or more lexical types. The lexical types
encode various kinds of detailed morphosyntactic information:
(1) a. kind (child) noun(het,count,sg)
b. amuseert (to amuse) verb(hebben,sg3,intransitive), verb(hebben,sg3,transitive)
The lexical type for kind shows that the word is a singular countable noun that goes
with the het deﬁnite article which is used only with neutral nouns in Dutch. The verb
amuseert is assigned two lexical types because it can be used both in a transitive and an
intransitive way. Furthermore, the other features show that it is a present third person
singular verb form and it forms perfect tense with the auxiliary verb hebben. Due to the
detailed morphosyntactic information encoded in the lexical types, their number is very
large– there are about 20K of them in the Alpino grammar.
Since we follow the statistical lexical acquisition approach, the goal of our methods
is, given a target type inventory, to assign the correct lexical type(s) to a given unknown
word.
2.2. Parsing with Universal Typeset
The target type inventory for our experiments contains only open-class lexical types:
nouns, adjectives and verbs, under the assumption that the grammar is already able to
handle all other cases. Furthermore, we ignore infrequent types. A type is considered
only if there are at least 15 distinct words occurring in large Dutch newspaper corpora
( 16M sentences) which belong to it. This boils down to 641 types. For the purposes of
our experiment, we call them universal types.
Theﬁrststepinouralgorithmistoextract100sentencesfromlargecorporaorInternet
for each unknown word. These sentences are parsed with a different version of the Alpino
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‘best-only’ mode– for each of these 100 sentences only the parse which is considered the
best by the disambiguation model of the parser is preserved. Then, the lexical type that
has been assigned to the unknown word in the best parse is stored. When all 100 sentences
have been parsed, a list can be drawn up for each unknown word with the types that have
been used and their frequency:
(2) borstbeen (breast bone, sternum)
noun(het,count,sg) 77
noun(de,count,pl) 12
proper_name(sg,’ORG’) 4
v_noun(intransitive) 4
adjective(e) 2
tmp_noun(het,count,sg) 1
In this case, the most frequently used type, noun(het,count,sg) is also the correct one.
By doing this ﬁrst step, we allow the grammar itself to decide which lexical type is best
suited for a given unknown word. This is an efﬁcient way to incorporate the linguistic
knowledge that is already encoded in the grammar in the LA process.
It is important to note that Alpino is very robust– essentially, it always produces a
parse. If there is no analysis covering the whole sentence, the parser ﬁnds all parses for
each substring and returns the best sequence of non-overlapping parses. During parsing,
Alpino’s POS tagger (Prins & van Noord 2001) keeps ﬁltering implausible type combi-
nations. For example, if a determiner occurs before the unknown word, all verb types are
not taken into consideration. This heavily reduces the computational overload and makes
parsing with universal types computationally feasible.
2.3. Adaptation of the Disambiguation Model
For the parsing method to work properly, the disambiguation model of the parser needs
to be adapted. The model heavily relies on the lexicon and, based on training data, it
has preferences how to parse certain phrases. For example, it has a preference to parse
prepositional phrases as verb complements, if there is a verb with such subcategorization
frame. However, this does not make sense when parsing with universal types because
every prepositional phrase would get analysed as a verb complement and thus, if the un-
known word occurs with a PP, it would always be analysed as a verb which subcategorizes
for a PP.
To avoid this, (van de Cruys 2006) proposed to weight each universal type with the
actual frequency it occurs in the training data. We propose an alternative solution where
the disambiguation model is retrained on a speciﬁc set of sentences which is meant to ﬁne-
tune it in a way that allows it to handle an input containing a large number of unknown
words. 560 words which have between 50 and 100 occurrences in the newspaper corpora
have been selected and temporarily removed from the Alpino lexicon, i.e. made unknown
to the grammar. We make the assumption that low frequency words are typically not listed
in the lexicon and the words we chose are meant to simulate their behaviour. Then, all
sentences from the Alpino treebank which contain these words are extracted and used to
retrain the disambiguation model.
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We use both morphological features and features extracted from the parsing stage in a
statistical classiﬁer in order to predict the correct lexical type(s)of a given unknown word.
These features are given in Table 1.
Features
preﬁx of the unknown word (length is less or equal 4)
sufﬁx of the unknown word (length is less or equal 4)
the unknown word starts with a separable particle
the unknown word contains a hyphen
the most frequently used tags (80% threshold)
each attribute of these tags
the tags the Alpino unknown word guesser assigns to the unknown word
Table 1: Features used in the classiﬁer
ManyDutchverbscontainseparableparticleswhichareanimportantmorphosyntactic
property and should be considered as a separate feature during the classiﬁcation process:
(3) Ik ruim mijn kamer op.
I clean my room SEP PART
‘I am cleaning my room.’
We use a list of common separable particles to determine if the unknown word starts with
such a particle. Naturally, such an approach overgenerates but nevertheless, we found it
to be helpful for guessing the correct lexical types.
The lexical types which have been used in at least 80% of the parses in the parsing
stage are also used in the classiﬁer as separate features. For example, for the word in (2)
only the ﬁrst two types, noun(het,count,sg) and noun(de,count,pl) are considered. Further,
each attribitue of the considered types is also taken as a separate feature in an attempt to
enable the classiﬁer to make broader generalizations:
(4) a. noun(het,count,sg)– noun<het>, noun<count>, noun<sg>
b. noun(de,count,pl)– noun<de>, noun<count>, noun<pl>
Finally, Alpino employs an unknown word guesser which, based on the morphological
form of the unknown word, uses various heuristics to guess the right lexical type(s) for it.
It performs quite well in certain cases (e.g. compounds) and we decided to use the type(s)
predicted by the guesser as features in the classiﬁer.
A maximum entropy (ME) classiﬁer is used to predict the type(s) of a given unknown
word. The probability of a lexical type t, given an unknown word and its context c is:
(5) p(t|c)=
exp(
 
i  ifi(t,c))  
t  T exp(
 
i  ifi(t ,c))
where fi(t,c) may encode arbitrary characteristics of the context and   is a weighting
factor, estimated on training data, which maximises the entropy. Input to the classiﬁer
are features explained above and output are lexical types. It is important to note that if
a certain word has more than one lexical type in the lexicon (i.e. the word is ambiguous
according to the lexicon), during training, all its types are taken into account for each
context. This is an attempt to enable the classiﬁer to deal with natural ambiguity.
Totrainandtesttheclassiﬁer, 2600wordswith50to100occurrencesinthenewspaper
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is again done under the assumption that low frequency words tend to be unknown or
problematic for the grammar. 2000 words are used to train the classiﬁer and the remaining
600 form the test set.
3. Experiments and Evaluation
3.1. Initial Experiments and Results
The classiﬁer yields a probability score for each predicted type. In our experiments, for
each test word, only the types that sum up to 95% of the total sum of the probability
scores are preserved. Since one word can have more than one correct type, we evaluate
the results in terms of precision and recall. Precision indicates how many types found by
our method are correct and recall indicates how many of the lexical types of a given word
are actually found. The presented results are the average precision and recall for the 600
test words.
Additionally, we develop three baseline methods:
• naive baseline– each unknown word is assigned the most frequent type in the lexi-
con, namely noun(de,count,sg)
• POS tagger baseline– the unknown word is given the type most frequently assigned
by the Alpino POS tagger in the parsing stage
• Alpino baseline– the unknown word is assigned the most frequently used type in
the parsing stage
The overall results are given in Table 2. Table 3 shows the results for each POS in the
ME-based model.
Model Precision(%) Recall(%) F-measure(%)
Naive baseline 19.60 18.77 19.17
POS tagger baseline 30 26.21 27.98
Alpino baseline 45.40 38.72 41.79
ME-based model 79.71 81.58 80.63
Table 2: Overall experiment results
POS Precision(%) Recall(%) F-measure(%)
Nouns 85.93 88.49 87.19
Adjectives 69.18 79.93 74.17
Verbs 62.54 59.05 60.75
Table 3: ME-based model detailed results
The performance of the baseline methods is pretty low which conﬁrms that the task
of learning unknown words is not trivial. Though it is often argued that a POS tagger
might be sufﬁcient for such tasks, we see clearly that this is not the case here. The low
performance of the tagger baseline is due to the large tagset (641 tags) and the fact that the
1Naturally, we have not selected words which had been used for the retraining of the disambiguation
model
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POS tagger. Our method, on the other hand, does not suffer from such shortcomings and
it has the best performance. It also outperforms the F-measure result reported in (van de
Cruys 2006) by 6% despite that it uses a much larger target type inventory (641 types
against 340).
The results in Table 3 show that nouns are already easy to learn. Adjectives, on the
other hand, seem to be difﬁcult. This is partly due to the fact that Alpino employs a rather
complicated adjective system. Different distinctions exist for adjectives that can be used
predicatively, attributively and so on. These features are pretty difﬁcult to be captured by
the classiﬁer mainly because they are based on semantic properties and our features are
purely morphosyntactic. However, verbs cause most difﬁculties for the classiﬁer. Most
of the problems are due to the fact that the classiﬁer has difﬁculties capturing the right
subcategorization frames.
Here are some examples of the typical problems for the ME-based model:
• Too many wrong analyses for morphologically ambiguous words
(6) OESO-landen (countries of the OESO organisation) has 1 correct type but receives 25 pre-
dictionsbecauselandenisalsotheDutchverbfor‘toland’; eventheunknownwordguesser
guessed only verb types and thus, the word receives many verb predictions
• Often verbs and adjectives get predictions that differ only in the subcat frame:
(7) onderschrijf (to support) has 2 possible subcat frames but receives 8 predictions which
differ only in the subcat features
• De/het distinction for nouns– depending on their gender and number, Dutch nouns
are used either with the de deﬁnite article (for masculine and feminine, and also
plural) or the het deﬁnite article (for neuter)
3.2. Use of Word Paradigms to Enhance LA
Many of the wrong predictions could be avoided by enhancing the LA process with more
morphological information. The paradigm of the unknown word is one very good source
of such information. For example, since the deﬁnite article is distinguishable only in the
singular noun form, we can determine the correct article of a word, assigned a noun plural
type, if we know its singular form.
The knowledge we extract from the word paradigm could be then incorporated back
into the lexical type predictor in the form of additional features which is likely to improve
its performance. Another important advantage of using word paradigms is the fact that it
would allow the LA process to assign lexical types to all forms of the unknown word, i.e.
to learn the whole paradigm and not only a particular form.
We employ the method described in (Cholakov & van Noord 2009) where a simple
ﬁnite state morphology is applied to generate paradigms for each unknown word. Since
the morphology does not have access to any additional linguistic information, it generates
all possible paradigms allowed by the word structure.
The paradigm for verbs includes 6 morphologically distinguishable forms– the in-
ﬁnitive which is also the form for present plural in Dutch, 1st person singular present,
2nd/3rd person singular present, past singular, past plural and past participle. The
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adjectives consists also of 6 forms– the base, comparative and superlative forms plus
their inﬂected counterparts. When adjectives are used attributively in Dutch, they get an
-e sufﬁx. The only exception is when they precede a neutral noun which is not used with
a deﬁnite article or a pronoun: een duur hotel (an expensive hotel) but het dure hotel (the
expensive hotel).
Further, the web is used to validate the non-deterministic output of the ﬁnite state
morphology. We use Yahoo to search for all forms in a paradigm and we also apply
some simple heuristics to determine if there are enough search hits for all forms in a
given paradigm. If so, the paradigm is accepted as valid. For nouns, we are also able
to determine the correct deﬁnite article by comparing the number of occurrences of the
singular form with de and het. Some words have more than one valid paradigm. For
example, past participles can often be adjectives in Dutch.
After ﬁnding all valid paradigms for a given unknown word, we use the word form(s)
(e.g. plural de noun, inﬂected comparative adjective) as additional features in the type
predictor. The results are shown in Table 4.
POS Precision(%) Recall(%) F-measure(%)
Nouns old 85.93 88.49 87.19
new 91.19 89.89 90.54
Adjectives old 69.18 79.93 74.17
new 75.67 84.62 79.70
Verbs old 62.54 59.05 60.75
new 66.68 62.86 64.71
Overall old 79.71 81.58 80.63
new 85 84.10 84.55
Table 4: ME-based model improved results
The incorporation of additional morphological information signiﬁcantly improved the
performance of the classiﬁer– by 4% in terms of F-measure. Moreover, the number of
errors like the one given in (6) and errors due to a wrong noun article is extremely small.
The remaining wrong predictions represent the really hard cases, like wrong subcatego-
rization frames, for example, where morphology cannot help.
Since our goal is to improve the performance of the Alpino grammar and parser, we
have conducted an experiment with a test set of about 400 sentences which contain 405
unique unknown words, i.e. words that are not listed in the Alpino lexicon. The sentences
had already been linguistically annotated in order to provide a gold standard which the
performance of Alpino can be compared to. We employed our method to predict lexical
types for each unknown word. The unknown words were then added to the lexicon of the
grammar and the test sentences were parsed with this ‘extended’ version of Alpino. In
order to have a baseline for comparison, we have also parsed the test sentences with the
default Alpino version where the types of the unknown words are guessed by the built-in
unknown word guesser, mentioned in Section 2.
The experiments showed that our method has a slightly better performance. The ex-
tended Alpino version achieves 87.92% accuracy on the test sentences against 87.5% for
the default one. The improvement of 0.42% might look insignifﬁcant but it is a serious
step in the right direction. Alpino is already very robust and it is hard to outperform the
87.5% baseline it provides because the remaining 12% represent complicated linguistic
phenomena which are challenge for any state-of-the-art deep parser.
1234. Abstract Lexical Types
A possible solution for the remaining issues with the prediction process is a cascaded
classiﬁer architecture where we develop speciﬁc approaches to each problem. For the
input to such a classiﬁcation tool to be more accurate, we ﬁrst try to predict the POS
and the most important linguistic features of the unknown word correctly. What features
are considered to be ‘most important’ depends strictly on the given lexical type. To this
extent, we have analysed each of the 641 target types and transformed them into new ones
by removing non-crucial features. Subcat frames are always removed.
(8) a. noun(de,count,pl), noun(het,count,pl,measure)  noun(pl)
b. verb(hebben,inf,reﬂ), verb(hebben,pl,np_np), verb(zijn,pl,intransitive)  verb(inf)
In (8-a) we ignore the fact that the second type designates measure because it is not
crucial in this initial stage. Furthermore, both types designate plural nouns, so the nouns
are clearly countable and this feature is removed as redundant. Finally, since plural nouns
in Dutch always go with the de article, the de/het distinction is not important either and
we preserve only the main fact that both types designate plural nouns.
In (8-b) we ignore the subcat features. Since all 3 types do not designate past partici-
ples, it is not important on this stage to know about the auxiliary verb that is used together
with the participle to form perfect tense and thus, we ignore the hebben/zijn distinction.
Finally, since the inﬁnitive verb form is also the plural form in Dutch, we also ignore this
distinction and all 3 types are transformed to verb(inf).
By doing such transformations, we end up with a reduced target type inventory of
42 lexical types which we call abstract lexical types. Using these types, we perform the
lexical acquisition experiment described above. The results are shown in Table 5.
Model Precision(%) Recall(%) F-measure(%)
Naive baseline 19.60 18.77 19.77
POS tagger baseline 74.40 71.12 72.72
Alpino baseline 64.20 61.75 62.95
ME-based model 91.85 91.55 91.70
Table 5: Experiment results with the abstract types
The naive baseline has not changed because noun(de,count,sg) is still the majority
type in the lexicon. On the other hand, the performance of the other two baseline models
has improved due to the reduced number of possible outcome types and the much smaller
amount of morphosyntactic information they represent. It should be noted though that
even under such ‘ideal’ conditions, the performance of the POS tagger is still far from
state-of-the-art contrary to what would have been expected. Since similar results have
beenpreviouslyshownin(Zhang&Kordoni2006)and(Cholakovetal.2008), thisclearly
disproves a common opinion that a POS tagger could be sufﬁcient for the purposes of
sophisticated and linguistically interesting and useful LA.
The ME-based model still shows the best performance. We can rely on the accurate
results it provides and use them as an input to task-speciﬁc classiﬁers. In this way we
could be pretty sure that we do not send a noun to a classiﬁer designed for guessing the
right verb subcategorization frame, for example.
1245. Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper, we presented accurate machine learning methods for the problem of LA
for large-scale hand-crafted grammars. We applied them to the Dutch Alpino grammar
and achieved about 84.5% F-measure which proved their applicability and accuracy. We
also underlined the importance of morphology for the prediction process by using word
paradigms to incorporate more morphological information into it which has signiﬁcantly
increased its performance.
The fact that the morphological features are speciﬁc to Dutch, does not harm the
general language and formalism independence of the proposed LA approach. We have
illustrated once again that morphology plays a crucial role in the prediction process for
languages which exhibit a sufﬁciently large variety of morphological phenomena. The
conclusion we draw is that more morphological information, carefully encoded in the
form of suitable features, is very much likely to enhance signiﬁcantly the LA for such
languages. This sort of obvious fact has been often missed in the research.
Though morphology has improved the LA results, it will not help much for the pre-
diction of certain type features. For example, subcategorization frames and other purely
syntactic features will remain an obstacle. It is our opinion that the method of interac-
tion between the type predictor and a task speciﬁc component (in our case, the ﬁnite state
morphology) which we presented here is promising and in our future research we would
try to develop other task speciﬁc components and integrate the type predictor and them
into a uniﬁed system.
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Abstract
We propose a learning method with categorial grammars using inference rules.
The proposed learning method has been tested on an artiﬁcial language fragment
that contains both ambiguity and recursion. We demonstrate that our learner has
successfully converged to the target grammar using a relatively small set of initial
assumptions. We also show that our method is successful at one of the celebrated
problems of language acquisition literature: learning the English auxiliary order.
1. Introduction
Unsupervised learning of natural language grammar is a challenging task. One of the
challenges is learning a ﬁnite description, a grammar, of an inﬁnite language using a
ﬁnite amount of input. Besides, human languages are full of ambiguity, which contributes
to the challenge of the learning experience. In this paper we present a computational
language learner that successfully learns an artiﬁcial grammar exhibiting both challenges.
The method is based on learning a categorial grammar in an unsupervised fashion.1
Categorial Grammar (CG) is a lexicalized grammar formalism with a high level of
transparency between syntax and semantics. These features make CG an attractive for-
malism for computational studies of language acquisition. The lexicalized nature of the
CG reduces learning syntax to learning a lexicon, while the close connection between
syntax and semantics helps learning one using the other.
One of the earliest studies of CG learners was proposed by Buszkowski & Penn
(1989). Their system used uniﬁcation of type-schemes to determine categorial grammars
fromfunctor-argumentstructures. Kanazawa(1998)extendedthisalgorithmtolearnfrom
strings of words. A number of applied studies (e.g. Waldron 1999, Villavicencio 2002,
Buttery 2006) followed similar approaches to learn CG based grammars. Waldron (1999)
used a rule-based method to infer a CG from input labeled with basic syntactic types.
Villavicencio (2002) proposed a method that improves the performance of Waldron’s
system by describing an unconventional universal grammar based on CG, and using se-
mantically annotated input. Watkinson & Manandhar (2000) presented an unsupervised
stochastic learner which aims to learn a compact lexicon. They assumed that the set of
possible categories are known, which maps the problem of grammar induction to cate-
gorization. The system achieved perfect accuracy in an artiﬁcial corpus. However, its
performance dropped to 73.2% in lexicon accuracy and 28.5% in parsing accuracy when
tested on the more realistic LLL corpus (Kazakov, et al. 1998).
This paper proposes an unsupervised method to learn categorial grammars. The
learner is provided with a set of positive sentences generated by a target grammar. Un-
known categories are learned by applying a set of inference rules incrementally. When
1We use the term ‘unsupervised’ in the sense that the learner is not provided with the information about
thestructureoftheinputsentences. Althoughnon-standard, thisuseofthetermiscommonincomputational
linguistics literature (e.g. Klein 2005, Watkinson & Manandhar 2000)
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by the MDL principle (Rissanen 1989) is used to minimize the size of the grammar. We
intend to develop this algorithm further to learn from real language corpora. However,
in this paper we show that the learner is able to infer a recursive and ambiguous artiﬁcial
grammar and learn the English auxiliary word order from a set of input sentences that are
considered insufﬁcient for the task.
The next section gives a short introduction to CG. Section 3 describes our learning
architecture. Section 4 presents two experiments and discussion of the results together
with limitations of our approach. In the last section we provide brief conclusions and
address future directions.
2. Categorial Grammar
Categorial grammar (Ajdukiewicz 1935, Bar-Hillel 1953) is a lexicalized grammar for-
malism. CG describes all the language speciﬁc syntactic information inside the lexicon,
leaving only a small number of universal rules outside the lexicon. We present a very brief
introduction to CG here, more comprehensive description can be found in Wood (1993).
Every word in a CG lexicon is assigned to a syntactic category. A limited set of
categories constitutes the basic categories of the grammar. For example, S (sentence), NP
(noun phrase), N (noun) are commonly assumed to be the basic categories for English.
Complex categories, such as NP/N, S\NP, (S\NP)\(S\NP), are formed by combining any
two CG categories with a forward (/) or backward (\) slash. Given the lexicon with
categories of this form, the only rules of the CG are given in (1).
(1) Function application rules
Forward application A/B B   A (>)
Backward application B A\B   A (<)
CG as described above is weakly equivalent to Context Free Grammars, and cannot
model the complexity of natural languages adequately. However, there are extensions
such as Combinatory Categorial Grammar (CCG, Steedman 2000) that provide necessary
descriptive and theoretical adequacy by introducing additional operations. In this work,
we learn classicalCategorial Grammars, while making useof some ofthe CCG operations
in (2), namely composition and type raising, during the learning process.
(2) a. Function composition rules:
Forward A/B B/C   A/C (> B)
Backward B\C A\B   A\C (< B)
b. Type raising rules:
Forward A   T/(T\A) (> T)
Backward A   T\(T/A) (< T)
3. Learning by Inference Rules
In this section we ﬁrst introduce a series of inference rules used to perform grammar
induction. Then we will present the complete learning architecture along with an example
demonstrating the learning process.
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Our inference rules work when there is only one unknown category in the input. In the
rule descriptions below, the letters A, B, C and D represent known categories, X represents
the unknown category.
(3) Level 0 inference rules:
B/A X   B   X = A ifA  = S
X B\A   B   X = A ifA  = S
(4) Level 1 inference rules:
A X   B   X = B\A ifA  = S
X A   B   X = B/A ifA  = S
Wedeﬁnelevelasthenumberoffunctioningslashoperatorsinacategory. Functioning
slash operators are functors that take an argument of one type and result in another during
the derivation. Consequently, the basic categories are of level 0. The category S\NP
belongstolevel1. Notethatthecategoryofadverbs(S\fNP)\f(S\NP)belongstolevel
2. Although it has three slashes, only the slashes marked with subscript f are functioning,
i.e. can be used in a derivation.
Level 0 and level 1 inference rules can be successfully used to learn the category of
intransitive verbs, such as slept in Peter slept. The condition if A  = S in (3) and (4),
prevents learning a large number of incorrect categories.2 For example, S\S for the word
well from Peter slept well. As stated before, the category of adverbs belongs to level 2, so
we need a level 2 inference rule to learn this category.
(5) a. Level 2 side inference rules:
X A B   C   X = (C/B)/A
A B X   C   X = (C\A)\B
b. Level 2 middle inference rule:
A X B   C   X = (C\A)/B
Level 2 inference rules are divided into two parts: the side rule and the middle rule,
depending on whether an unknown category is at the beginning/end of a sentence or in
the middle.
Noticethatin(5b)thecategory(C/B)\Aisasviableastheinferredcategory(C\A)/B.
This can be shown by the following example of left-combining rule and right-combining
rule.
(6) a. left-combining rule:
A X B   C
left combining
                   
divideAXB
(AX) B   C
level1          
rule(4)
AX = C/B
divideAX             A X   C/B
level1          
rule(4)
X = (C/B)\A
b. right-combining rule:
A X B   C
right combining
                   
divideAXB
A (XB)   C
level1          
rule(4)
XB = C\A
divideXB             X B   C\A
level1          
rule(4)
X = (C\A)/B
2This is against the real world situation since the category S\S is a valid CG category. The problem
can be possibly solved by putting S in a less favorite position in the simple category preference principle in
later work.
129Figure 1: Index in the input string
As shown in the above example, left-combining and right-combining rules produce
different but equivalent outputs. Our algorithm uses the right-combining rule when re-
cursively dividing all the entities into two parts and whenever there are possibilities to
combine an unknown category with either the left one or the right one, we always com-
bine with the right one.3
It might seem that using (5b) we can learn the category of (S\S)/NP for the prepo-
sition with from the sentence Peter slept with Mary. But this will not happen: the level
2 inference rule is implemented by recursively calling level 0 and level 1 inference rules,
all of which have the condition if A  = S to prevent generating the category S\S. As
a matter of fact, none of the level 0-2 rules could help learning the category of with from
the sentence Peter slept with Mary. So we need to use a level 3 inference rule.
(7) a. Level 3 side inference rules:
X A B C   D   X = ((D/C)/B)/A
A B C X   D   X = ((D\A)\B)\C
b. Level 3 middle inference rules:
A X B C   D   X = ((D\A)/C)/B
A B X C   D   X = ((D\A)\B)/C
3.2. The Learning Architecture
The learning framework consists of three parts: the edge generator, the recursive learner
and the output selector. A schematic description of the learning process is provided in
Figure 2. Below we provide a detailed description of the three parts, along with demon-
stration of learning the ambiguous and recursive categories of with in Figure 1.
The Edge Generator implements a variation of the CYK algorithm, which employs
bottom-up chart parsing. Every known word in a sentence is an edge in the chart. The
edge generator then tries to merge any consecutive edges into a single edge recursively. In
order to produce as many edges as possible, besides function application rules (>,<), we
have also used the composition (> B,< B) and the type raising (> T,< T) rules. Table 1
shows all possible edges generated for the example in Figure 1.
The Recursive Learnerperforms grammar induction by the rules given in Subsection
3.1. The learning process ﬁrst tries to learn from level 0 or level 1 inference rules. If the
unknown word cannot be learned by level 0 or level 1 inference rules, higher level rules
are tried by recursively dividing all the edges in a sentence into two parts and then calling
level 0 or level 1 inference rules to learn (This process is also shown in (6)). Following
the simple category preference (SCP) principle, if a category can be inferred with a lower
level rule, we do not attempt to use higher level rules.
3We realize that this rule may lead to wrong choices for other languages, and plan to relax it in future
work.
130span rule used category span rule used category
1 (0, 1) >T S/(S\NP) 6 (0, 3) >B S/N
2 (0, 2) >B S/NP 7 (1, 4) > S\NP
3 (1, 3) >B (S\NP)/N 8 (2, 4) <T S/(S\NP)
4 (2, 4) > NP 9 (0, 4) < S
5 (5, 7) > NP 10 (0, 4) > S
Table 1: Generated edges in a chart
A B X C
cat span cat span cat span cat span
1 NP (0, 1) S\NP (1, 4) ((S\NP)\(S\NP))/NP (4,5) NP (5, 7)
2 S/(S\NP) (0, 1) S\NP (1, 4) ((S\NP)\(S\NP))/NP (4,5) NP (5, 7)
3 S/NP (0, 2) NP (2, 4) (NP\NP)/NP (4,5) NP (5, 7)
4 S/NP (0, 2) S/(S\NP) (2, 4) (NP\(S/(S\NP)))/NP (4,5) NP (5, 7)
5 S/N (0, 3) N (3, 4) (N\N)/NP (4,5) NP (5, 7)
Table 2: Categories learned from the rule A B X C   S
for the sentence in Figure 1.
For the input in Figure 1, the level 0 and level 1 inference rules are not enough. Only
the level 3 middle inference rules (7b) can be applied. Table 2 gives a list of all the
possible categories using this inference rule.
The Output Selector tests the learned categories produced by the recursive learner
and selects the ones that can be parsed using only function application rules. The cate-
gories that do not produce a valid parse with function application rules are discarded.
In Table 2, the sentence cannot be parsed using the category in row 4, so this category
is discarded. Rows 1 (or equal category in row 2), 3 and 5 provide the learned categories.
4. Experiments and Results
We conducted two experiments with our learning system. In the ﬁrst experiment, we
tested the system’s capabilities on an artiﬁcial language exhibiting a certain level of am-
biguity and recursion. In the second experiment, we tried to learn the English auxiliary
order, a well known problem in language acquisition literature.
4.1. Experiment 1: Learning an Artiﬁcial Grammar
For this experiment, we have created a small English-like artiﬁcial grammar. The lexical-
ized grammar that is used as the target grammar for this experiment is listed in Table 3.
The input to the learner consists of 160 sentences (2 to 7 words in length) generated by
the target grammar. Only correct sentences are used. The input sentences are unlabeled,
except for nouns (N) and noun phrases (NP). Thus the learner ﬁrst searches sentences
with only one unknown word and tries to learn this word. Then it takes into account
the learned category and searches for other sentences with unknown words. Using this
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Figure 2: Learning process using inference rules
Peter := NP Mary := NP with := (N\N)/NP
book := N green := N/N with := ((S\NP)\(S\NP))/NP
colorless := N/N sleep := S\NP furiously := (S\NP)\(S\NP)
a := NP/N telescope := N give := ((S\NP)/NP)/NP
the := NP/N saw := (S\NP)/NP read := (S\NP)/NP
run := S\NP
Table 3: Target grammar rules
“bootstrap”-like method the learner is expected to converge to the target grammar.
After only a single pass through input sentences, all categories in our target grammar
presented in Table 3 are learned correctly. The learned grammar includes only one lexical
item (with := (NP\NP)/NP) that is not in the target grammar. This, however, is a use-
ful generalization which allows deriving structures like [Peter [saw [Mary [with [a tele-
scope]]]]], while our original grammar does not.
4.2. Experiment 2: Learning Correct Word Order
The difﬁculty of learning English auxiliary order has also been used as a support for the
poverty of the stimulus (POTS) argument, and hence for linguistic nativism. Introduced
ﬁrst by Kimball (1973), the problem can be summarized as follows: the English auxiliary
verbs should, have and be occur exactly in this order and all of them are optional. The
claim is that while sentences containing a single auxiliary (8a–8c) or two auxiliaries (8d–
8f) are present in the input, sequences of three auxiliaries (8g) are not frequent enough.
Hence, it is not possible to learn the correct three-auxiliary sequence from the input alone.
132should := (Ss\NP)/(S\NP)
should := (Ss\NP)/(Sh\NP)
should := (Ss\NP)/(Sb\NP)
have := (Sh\NP)/(S\NP)
have := (Sh\NP)/(Sb\NP)
be := (Sb\NP)/(S\NP)
Table 4: Categories of some auxiliary verbs.
(8) a. I should go.
b. I have gone.
c. I am going.
d. I have been going.
e. I should have gone.
f. I should be going.
g. I should have been going.
h. *I have should been going.
The argument is controversial, and Pullum & Scholz (2002) have shown that there are
more three-auxiliary sequences in children’s input than claimed. In this study, we choose
another approach: we present our learner with sentences containing only one or two aux-
iliaries (as in (8a-8f)), and we test if it can correctly recognize and generate sentences
with three auxiliaries. The experiment setting is the same as in experiment 1. The only
additional information provided is the type of sentences, i.e. every given input is marked
with the “mood of the sentence”. As well as simple declarative sentences (S), we used
Sb, Sh and Ss for sentences with modal verbs be, have and should respectively.
Table 4 presents a fragment of the learned grammar. The derivation of the sentence
(8g) using the learned grammar is given in Figure 3. As can be veriﬁed easily, the lexical-
ized grammar presented in Table 4 would not allow sequences as in (8h). The categories
assigned to auxiliary verbs by the learner completely, and correctly derive the English
auxiliary order.4
Success of the learner is again due to its assignment of words to syntactic categories.
The categories induced from one- and two-auxiliary sequences in a logical way extend
naturally to three-auxiliary sequences.
4.3. Discussion
We have presented a learner that learns syntax using CG. One of the characteristics of
our method is that it learns from input without any structure, semantic annotation or neg-
ative evidence. Although there are theoretical results about learnability on only strings
(Kanazawa 1998), and more applicable research about learning from sentences annotated
with structures (Villavicencio 2002, Buttery 2006), applied work on learning from strings
4An alternative approach would be assuming that the sequences like ‘should have been’ are learned as
single units, at least at the beginning of the learning process. Lexical items spanning multiple input units are
considered by some of the related learners (e.g. Zettlemoyer & Collins 2005, Çöltekin & Bozsahin 2007).
However, to be compatible with the original claim, the learner presented in this paper assigns categories to
single input units.
133I should have been going.
NP (Ss\NP)/(Sh\NP) (Sh\NP)/(Sb\NP) (Sb\NP)/(S\NP) S\NP
>
Sb\NP
>
Sh\NP
>
Ss\NP
<
Ss
Figure 3: Derivation of the correct word order.
is rather limited. This study is our ﬁrst attempt to ﬁll this gap. Although the experi-
ments are based on artiﬁcial data, our aim is to further develop the method and apply it
on real-world linguistic input.
The simple inference rules used here are admittedly ad-hoc and we have not yet at-
tempted to provide the guarantee of convergence. Our main goal with this method is
to experiment with the possibilities of exploiting the information in the linguistic input,
rather than to ﬁnd a learning algorithm that is guaranteed to learn in a wide range of input
distributions. For the fragment of the English grammar captured by our artiﬁcial language
learning experiments, the results are promising.
The method is in essence similar to uniﬁcation based learner of Buszkowski & Penn
(1989), which learns from structurally annotated input. Unfortunately, Kanazawa’s ex-
tension of the algorithm to learn from strings is computationally intractable. The use of
ad-hoc rules and constraints instead of standard learning framework is motivated by the
aim of using of a reasonable amount of input and computational resources.
The input to our learner is partially annotated. This approach carries an afﬁnity to
the partial learning system described by Moreau (2004). However, crucially, the anno-
tation provided to our learner does not contain any structure. Moreau (2004) especially
makes use of high-frequency closed-class words with categories that give hints about the
structure of the input sentences. This is useful in practical computational linguistic ap-
plications, as it helps inducing a grammar with relatively small amount of annotation.
However, our approach is more plausible for language acquisition, as children are known
to learn nouns earlier than other word classes (Gentner 1982).
Another apparent limitation of our learner is that it only learns from the input that
contains only one unknown word. This avoids the combinatorial expansion of hypoth-
esized categories and keeps the required computational resources low, and this worked
ﬁne for our artiﬁcial grammar learning experiments.5 For language acquisition, this is not
a wildly wrong assumption. We assume that the children do not understand and, hence,
make use of complicated input at ﬁrst sight. However, the category of the word can still
be inferred, when the same word later appears in an understandable context.
The output selector only selects the categories that can be parsed by the AB grammars.
This could lead to inconsistency with the target grammar: if the target grammar can only
be parsed by more complicated CCG rules while the output selector only uses AB rules,
or if the target grammar can be parsed by AB rules while the output selector uses CCG
5It should also be noted that, the algorithm can be adapted to use the input with ‘k unknown words’ with
the expense of additional computational resources.
134rules. Here we do not think there will be big problems: the initial setting is to use AB
rules, when there are no candidates under AB rules, the output selector adjusts to more
rules to produce an output. The simple category preference guarantees that no matter how
complex rules are used, the output category will stay as simple as possible.
The inference rules are simple and even intuitive. Although there is no solid psycho-
logical evidence that children learn a grammar in an inference-rule-based way, the 100%
correct results in parsing and generation by our model suggests that it is sufﬁcient to as-
sume that children use a small set of rules together with a plausible inference procedure
for learning the categories of unknown words. The only other additional piece in our
learning algorithm is a preference towards simpler categories.
This method performs well on learning a typical language phenomenon such as learn-
ing English auxiliary order. We have shown that only being exposed to one- and two-
auxiliary sequences, our simple algorithm generalized correctly to sentences containing
three auxiliary verbs. Even if the POTS claims are correct, children can still learn correct
forms with simple inference mechanisms.
5. Conclusion
We described a method to learn categorial grammars using inference rules. Our method
has learned all the categories of the target grammar. We use simple logical and intuitive
inference rules to solve the problem of unknown categories in the input. The only addi-
tional aid provided to our learner is the simple category preference. Using only this set of
initial assumptions, our system is also able to learn a phenomenon that has been consid-
ered difﬁcult. The learner is able to infer English auxiliary order correctly without being
presented with all possible sequences.
However, it is necessary to note that our system has a number of limitations. First,
these results were obtained using data that was generated artiﬁcially. Second, since we
do not use any statistical inference mechanism, our system is not robust against noise.
Using statistical patterns in the input language, it may also be possible to relax some of
the assumptions presented here. This is a limitation when the amount of data is not large
enough to “bootstrap” the learner.
Future work includes developing the algorithm further and evaluating it on real data,
such as child-directed speech from CHILDES database (MacWhinney 2000).
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136EXTENDED QUALIA-BASED LEXICAL KNOWLEDGE FOR
DISAMBIGUATION OF JAPANESE POSTPOSITION No
Sumiyo Nishiguchi
Department of Language and Culture, Osaka University
Abstract. This paper proposes the elaboration of the qualia structure of the Gen-
erative Lexicon in Pustejovsky (1995) and the Extended Generative Lexicon theory
(Lenci et al., 2000). My proposal is based on the Japanese genitive postposition
no. The Japanese “NP1-no NP2” construction expresses a wider range of relations
between two entities than does the English possessive “NP1’s NP2,” such that the
Pustejovskian qualia roles encoded in NP2 do not supply the necessary relations be-
tween two entities, which Vikner and Jensen (2002) succeeded to certain degree. The
disambiguation of possessive relations requires that lexical entries be augmented by
incorporating a referential module comprising subcategories such as LOCATION,
TIME, and MANNER.
1. Different Types of Relations and Argument Reversal
The Japanese genitive marker is semantically very ambiguous. “NP1-GEN NP2” not
only expresses possession as in Naomi’s bag and inalienable relations as in Naomi’s face,
but also aspects such as location, accompaniment, property, and quantity, as presented in
Table 1.
Relation Japanese English English English
Possessive Possessive Compound Prepositional Phrase
I possession Naomi-no kaban Naomi’s bag *Naomi bag a bag of Naomi
II part-whole Naomi-no kao Naomi’s face *Naomi face the face of Naomi
III location Tokyo-no shinseki *Tokyo’s relative *Tokyo relative a relative (living) in Tokyo
IV time yugata-no koen *evening’s park evening park a park in the evening
natsu-no kyuka *summer’s vacation summer vacation vacation in summer
7-ji-no nyusu *7 o’clock’s news 7 o’clock news the news at 7 o’clock
V kaban-no hito *bag’s man the bag man the man with a bag
accompaniment boshi-no fujin *hat’s lady hat lady the lady with a hat
VI trade Kaban-no Kochi *Bags’ Coach Bags Coach Coach for bags
VII activity maaruboro-no *Marlboro’s Marlboro the country
kuni country country of Marlboro
biiru-no machi *the beer’s city *the beer city the city of beer
VIII property chisee-no *intelligence’s *intelligence a man of
hito man man intelligence
osu-no tora *male’s tiger a male tiger a tiger of
the male kind
aoi-me-no *blue eyes’ doll blue eyes doll the doll
ningyo with blue eyes
tsutsuji-no koen *azaleas’ park azalea park a park with azaleas
IX weight 1-kiro-no *1 kg’s 1 kg *the computer
pasokon computer computer of 1kg
X quantity 3-bon-no pen *three’s pen three pens
XI nise-no fukahire *fake’s shark ﬁn fake shark ﬁn
intensional property nise-no keisatsukan *fake’s police ofﬁcer fake police ofﬁcer
Table 1: Ambiguity of Japanese Postposition No
Note the reversal of the possessor argument between (I) and (V–VI). The possessor
argument is NP1 in (I), as in English Naomi’s bag whose possessor argument is Naomi.
On the contrary in (V), the possessor of the bag is NP2 hito “man” and there is no English
equivalent big bag’s person. In (VI) Kaban-no Kochi “Bags Coach,” Coach is a store, and
therefore the possessor of a bag. The controller-controllee relation is also reversed, for
137example, in Naomi-no kuruma “Naomi’s car” (type I), Naomi is the controller of the car,
i.e., NP2 the car is at Naomi’s disposal as in English the girl’s car (Vikner and Jensen,
2002). On the contrary, in boshi-no fujin “the lady with a hat,” NP1 boshi is at the person’s
disposal. Aoi-me-no ningyo “the doll with blue eyes,” literally, “blue eyes’ doll” in (VIII)
even expresses the part-whole relation in the reverse direction, compared with ningyo-no
me “the doll’s eyes.”
Such non-canonical relations, i.e., other than those expressing possession or a part-
whole relation, are more likely expressed in noun compounds such as magic land or
prepositional phrases using of, in, or with in English (Teramura, 1980,234)(Makishita,
1984,193).
Table 2 presents examples taken from Balanced Corpus of Contemporary Written
Japanese; here, the Japanese postposition no is translated into in in English since NP1  
no expresses location, time, and property.
Relation Japanese English English English
Possessive Possessive Compound Prepositional Phrase
III location Osuro kogai-no mura *Oslo suburb’s village *Oslo suburb village a village in the suburb of Oslo
Hachioji-shi-no Hachioji city’s Hachioji city a volunteer group
borantia guruupu volunteer group volunteer group in Hachioji city
IV time katsute-no ikioi *past’s force past force force in the past/
former inﬂuence
manatsu-no hyozan summer peak’s iceberg ?summer peak iceberg iceberg in the peak of summer
natsu-no kaidan-jiki *summer’s horror season ?summer horror season ?horror season in summer
VIII property jutai-no Shakuruton *serious condition’s *serious condition Shackleton in
Shackleton Shackleton serious condition
X quantity 9-nin-no esukimo *nine’s Eskimos nine Eskimos *Eskimos in nine
Table 2: Data Translated from Balanced Corpus of Contemporary Written Japanese,
2008 edition by The National Institute of Japanese Language
2. Problems with Deriving Different Types of Possessive Relations
from NP2
Possessive relations are ambiguous in both English and Japanese. For example, there is
more than one interpretation for John-no hon “John’s book.” John’s book may refer to the
book that John owns or the book that John wrote (Barker, 1995,87).
In view of such ambiguity, Partee (1997) assumes two syntactic types for John’s de-
pending on whether or not the following noun is inherently relational. If the following
noun is a non-relational common noun (CN) such as car, John’s composes with car which
is regular (et) type, and the relation between John and car is contextually supplied (1a).
On the contrary, when John is followed by inherently relational nouns such as brother,
employee and enemy, which are (e,et) type with an extra argument slot, the relation be-
tween John and his brother in John’s brother inherits kinship from the two-place predicate
brother (1b). (2) exempliﬁes the computation related to another relational noun, friend.
(1) a. Free R type:
Syntax: [John’s]NP/CN
Semantics:  Q P[John ( z[ x[ y[[Q(y)   R(y)(z)]   y = x]   P(x)]])]
b. Inherent relation type:
138Syntax: [John’s]NP/TCN (TCN: transitive common noun)
Semantics:  R P[John ( z[ x[ y[R(z)(y)   y = x]   P(x)]])]
(2) Syntax: [[John’s]NP/TCN[friend]TCN]NP
Semantics:  R P[John ( z. x[ y[R(z)(y)   y = x]   P(x)]](friend   of ) =
 P[John ( z. x[ y[friend   of (z)(y)   y = x]   P(x)]]
If we apply Partee’s theory to Japanese examples, most of the possessive relations
are unpredictable, and the contextually supplied relation R remains largely ambiguous.
Possession relation (I) is prototypical, and part-whole relation (II) can be derived lexically
from a possessive kao “face” (Barker, 1995). However, other possessee nominals are not
necessarily relational.
In order to reduce the cost of pragmatics, Vikner and Jensen (2002) apply the Qualia
Structure (Pustejovsky, 1995) of the possessee noun and type-shift even non-inherently
relational NP2 into a relational noun. For example, even though poem is not a relational
noun, John’s poem can be interpreted as the poem that John composed because the inter-
nal semantic structure of poem contains an author-of relation as AGENTIVE role. The
meaning shifting operator QA raises a one-place holder poem in (3a) into a two-place
holder in (3b). The type-shifted NP2 can now combine with the possessive NP, which has
a uniformly type ((e,et),(et,t)) so that the authorship relation is inherited from NP2 poem,
and R is no longer a free variable.
(3) QA(poem) =  x y[poem (x)   compose (x)(y)]
However, even Vikner and Jensen (2002)’s method is not sufﬁcient to systematically
compute the meaning of the Japanese ‘NP1-no NP2’ construction. For example, in terms
of location (III), shinseki “relative” in Tokyo-no shinseki “a relative living in Tokyo” is a
relational noun, i.e., relative-of x, but the relation between NP1 and NP2 is not relative
of but of location, namely, NP2 is in NP1. We also encounter a problem with boshi-no
fujin “the lady with a hat.” Since wearing a hat is not part of the qualia roles, that are
AGENTIVE (origin), TELIC (purpose), CONSTITUTIVE (part-whole) and FORMAL
(isa) roles, of the non-inherently relational noun fujin“lady,” even Vikner and Jensen’s
system is unable to supply the binder for R.
3. Selective Binding
Pustejovsky (1995) proposes selective binding when computing the meaning of the noun
phrases modiﬁed by non-intersective adjectives. For example, fast in a fast typist does not
denote a typist who is also generally fast in activities apart from typing, but speciﬁcally
a typist who is fast at typing. In other words, fast does not modify the physical presence
of the typist but it does modify the way the typist types; in other words, fast modiﬁes the
event argument of the TELIC quale of the noun typist—to type.
(4) a. a fast typist
b. [[fast typist]]= x[typist’(x) ... [TELIC= e[type’(e) agent(e)=x fast’(e)]]...]
139This section examines some of the aforementioned cases in which NP1   no phrases
modify the event argument of the qualia of NP2. Speciﬁcally, the postpositional phrases
denoting time, trade, activity, location and outstanding property selectively bind events
contained in the TELIC and AGENTIVE qualia. However, there remain many examples
in which selective binding does not apply as discussed in section 4.
3.1. TELIC Quale Modiﬁcation
3.1.1. Time
Some of the NP1   no phrases are temporal modiﬁers, such as 7-ji-no nyusu, or “7
o’clock news.” The purpose, or the TELIC role, of news is to describe current events
or information; therefore, 7-ji-no or “7 o’clock’s” modiﬁes the TELIC role of nyusu or
“news” so that the TELIC role of the 7-ji-no nyusu or “7 o’clock news” is to describe the
events taking place at 7 o’clock.
(5) 7-ji no nyusu “7 o’clock news’
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i
EVENTSTR =
h
D-E1= e1 PROCESS
i
ARGSTR =
h
D-ARG1 = y OBJ
i
QUALIA =
»
TELIC = DESCRIBE
“
e1 , x , y
”–
3
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
5
(6) [[7 o clock news]]= x[news’(x) [...TELIC= e[describe’(e, x, p) at-seven’(e)]...]
2
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
4
7-JI-NO NYUSU “7 O’CLOCK NEWS”
TYPESTR =
h
ARG1 = x MEDIA INFORMATION
i
EVENTSTR =
h
D-E1= e1 PROCESS
i
ARGSTR =
h
D-ARG1 = y INFO
i
QUALIA =
»
TELIC = DESCRIBE
“
e1 , x , y
”
  AT-SEVEN
“
e1
”–
3
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
5
3.1.2. Trade and Activity
Genitive phrases that represent trade and activity of the referent of NP2 in Table 1 are
considered to be modiﬁers of the event contained in the TELIC role of the NP2. For
example, in biiru-no machi “a city of beer” and Kaban-no Kochi “Bags Coach,” beer and
bags comprise the theme of the event in the TELIC role, i.e., the making act and the
selling act, respectively.
(7) biiru-no machi “a city of beer”
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6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
4
MACHI “TOWN”
TYPESTR =
h
ARG1 = x LOCATION
i
ARGSTR =
2
6
6
4
D-ARG1 = y HUMAN
D-ARG3 = z PHYS OBJ
D-E1 = e1 STATE
D-E2 = e2 PROCESS
3
7
7
5
QUALIA =
2
6
4
FORMAL = LIVE
“
e1 , y , x
”
TELIC = MAKE ACT
“
e2 , y , z
”
3
7
5
3
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
5
(8) [[biiru   no machi]] =  x[town’(x)    e2[TELIC = make act’(e2, y, z)   theme(e2)
= beer’]... ]
(9) kaban-no Kochi “Bags Coach”
2
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
4
KOCHI “COACH”
TYPESTR =
h
ARG1 = x STORE
i
ARGSTR =
2
6
6
4
D-ARG1 = y HUMAN
D-ARG2= z PHYS OBJ
D-E1 = e1 PROCESS
D-E2 = e2 PROCESS
3
7
7
5
QUALIA =
2
4
FORMAL = x
TELIC = SELL ACT
“
e1 , y , z
”
3
5
3
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
5
(10) [[kaban   no kochi]]=  x[Store’(x)  [TELIC=  e1[sell act’(e1, y, z)] theme(e1)
= bag’]...]
3.2. AGENTIVE Role Modiﬁcation
3.2.1. Location
A locative genitive phrase chikaku-no or “nearby” in chikaku-no koen which means “a
nearby park” modiﬁes the event contained in the AGENTIVE role of the park; in other
words, the park was created in a nearby location.
(11) chikaku-no koen “a nearby park”
2
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
4
KOEN “PARK”
TYPESTR = ARG1 = x outdoor’s location
ARGSTR =
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
D-ARG1 = w HUMAN
D-ARG2 = y HUMAN
D-ARG3 = l LOCATION
D-ARG4 = t TIME
D-E1 = e1 PROCESS
D-E2 = e2 PROCESS
3
7
7
7
7
7
7
5
QUALIA =
2
6
6
6
6
6 6
4
FORMAL = x
CONSTITUTIVE =
n
LAWN, BENCH, FOUNTAIN,...
o
TELIC = RECREATIONAL ACTIVITY
“
e1 , w , x
”
AGENTIVE = MAKE ACT
“
e2 , y , x
”
3
7
7
7
7
7 7
5
3
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
5
141(12) [[a nearby park]]= x[...AGENTIVE= e1[make act(e1, z, x) in-neighborhood’(e1)]...]
Osuro kogai-no mura or “a village in a suburb of Oslo” can be analyzed in a similar
manner. Here, a village in a suburb of Oslo exists in the location in a suburb of Oslo since
the construction time, therefore, Osuro kogai-no or “in a suburb of Oslo” predicates the
location where the village was formed.
2
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6
6 6
4
MURA “VILLAGE”
TYPESTR =
h
ARG1 = x LOCATION
i
ARGSTR =
2
6
6
6 6
6
6
4
D-ARG1 = y HUMAN
D-ARG2 = z PHYS OBJ
D-ARG3 = a HUMAN
D-E1 = e1 STATE
D-E2 = e2 PROCESS
D-E3 = e3 PROCESS
3
7
7
7 7
7
7
5
QUALIA =
2
6
6
6 6
4
FORMAL = LIVE
“
e1 , y , x
”
TELIC = MAKE ACT
“
e2 , y , z
”
AGENTIVE = MAKE ACT
“
e3 , a , x
”
3
7
7
7 7
5
3
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7
7 7
5
(13) [[a village in a suburb of Oslo]]= x[village’(x) [AGENTIVE= e3[make act(e3,
a, x)   in-Oslo-suburb(e3)]...]]
3.2.2. Outstanding Property
NP1 can be an outstanding property of NP2. Since azaleas are the outstanding feature of
the park, tsutsuji-no “with azaleas” modiﬁes the event in the AGENTIVE role of the park.
(14) tsutsuji-no koen “a park with azaleas”
(15) [[a park with azaleas]] =  x.park’(x)   [AGENTIVE =  e1[make act(e1, z, x) 
with-azaleas’(e1)]...]
Azaleas were planted at the time of building of the park, and hence, the feature of azaleas
modiﬁes the AGENTIVE role.
4. Extensional Module Modiﬁcation
4.1. Augmenting Qualia Structure with a Referential Module
Even though many Japanese postpositional phrases predicate events of one of the qualia
of the possessee nominals, we need to account for other cases that cannot be explained by
the existing qualia modiﬁcation.
When possessive nominals represent temporary or changeable features of the pos-
sessee nominals, there exists no bindee within the four qualia. For example, the following
patterns cannot be accounted for within the existing framework:
(16) a. TIME: yugata-no koen “an evening park”
b. LOCATION: Tokyo-no shinseki “a relative (living) in Tokyo”
142c. ACCOMPANIMENT: boshi-no fujin “the lady with a hat lady”
d. PROPERTY: jutai-no shakuruton1 “Shackleton in serious condition”
Inordertoaccommodatenounmodiﬁcationbypostpositionalphrasesthatdenotetem-
porary location, time, accompaniment, and property, I propose that additional information
be encoded into the lexicon. Speciﬁcally, I suggest adding a referential module into Gen-
erative Lexicon (GL) (Pustejovsky, 1995):
Referential Module:
1. TIME = AT
2. LOCATION = IN
3. MANNER = WITH
Musan (1999) assumes that all noun phrases have the time argument. For example, in
(17) below, the person referred to as the intern could have been a hard-working intern in
the past or at present. It is possible that he was not an intern when he worked hard as far
as he is an intern at present. In other words, the time argument of the intern can refer to
the past or the utterance time.
(17) The intern worked hard.
Because all physical objects usually occupy some space and time (Sowa, 1999), LO-
CATION and TIME are subcategories of the REFERENTIAL module.
The following sections demonstrate how the extended GL renders the genitive modi-
ﬁcation that cannot predicate the events in the present qualia structure.
4.2. Locative Modiﬁcation
The lexical input for shinseki or “relative” in GL does not allow modiﬁcation by a loca-
tive genitive phrase Tokyo-no or “in Tokyo,” since Tokyo-no “in Tokyo” does not modify
the FORMAL role of shinseki “relative” because Tokyo is not the location for the kin-
ship relation but the location of the referent of a relative. This word does not modify the
AGENTIVE role of shinseki “relative” either, since the kinship relation between this rela-
tive and another relative could have been formed in another location. Therefore, selective
binding is not available for such locative modiﬁcation.
(18) Tokyo-no shinseki “a relative (living) in Tokyo”
2
6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6
4
SHINSEKI “RELATIVE”
TYPESTR =
»
ARG1 = x RELATIVE
ARG2 = y HUMAN
–
EVENTSTR =
»
E1 = e1 STATE
E2 = e2 PROCESS
–
ARGSTR =
h
D-ARG1 = z HUMAN
i
QUALIA =
2
6
4
FORMAL = KINSHIP RELATION
“
e1 , x , y
”
AGENTIVE = KINSHIP RELATION
“
e2 , z , x
”
3
7
5
3
7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7
5
1Taken from Balanced Corpus of Contemporary Written Japanese, 2008 edition by The National Insti-
tute of Japanese Language
143Therefore, we incorporate location as part of the referential module such that the lo-
cation of a relative can be modiﬁed by the locative postpositional phrase.
2
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
4
SHINSEKI “RELATIVE”
TYPESTR =
»
ARG1 = x RELATIVE
ARG2 = y HUMAN
–
EVENTSTR =
2
4
E1 = e1 STATE
D-E1 = e2 TRANSITION
D-E2 = e3 STATE
3
5
ARGSTR =
"
D-ARG1 = z HUMAN
D-ARG2 = l LOCATION
#
QUALIA =
2
6
4
FORMAL = KINSHIP RELATION
“
e1 , x , y
”
AGENTIVE = KINSHIP RELATION
“
e2 , z , x
”
3
7
5
EXT =
»
LOC = IN
“
e3 , x , l
”–
3
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
5
2
6 6
6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
4
TOKYO-NO SHINSEKI “TOKYO RELATIVE”
TYPESTR =
»
ARG1 = x RELATIVE
ARG2 = y HUMAN
–
EVENTSTR =
2
4
E1 = e1 STATE
D-E1 = e2 TRANSITION
D-E2 = e3 STATE
3
5
ARGSTR =
"
D-ARG1 = z HUMAN
D-ARG2 = l LOCATION
#
QUALIA =
2
6
4
FORMAL = KINSHIP RELATION
“
e1 , x , y
”
AGENTIVE = KINSHIP RELATION
“
e2 , z , x
”
3
7
5
EXT =
»
LOC = IN
“
e3 , x , l
”
  IN-TOKYO’
“
e3
”–
3
7 7
7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
5
(19) [[Tokyo   no shinseki]] =  x[...[LOC =   e3[in-Tokyo’(e3)]...]
4.3. Temporal Modiﬁcation
The temporal genitive phrase such as yugata-no or “evening’s” does not modify any of
the AGENTIVE or TELIC role because yugata-no koen “a park in the evening” means
neither the park build in the evening nor that build solely for visiting in the evenings.
Rather it refers to the appearance of a park during an evening visit. Thus, walking in the
evening park means walking in the park in the evening.
(20) Yugata-no koen-o sanposhi-ta.
evening-GEN park-ACC walk-PAST
“(I/we) walked in a park in the evening.”
Hence, yugata-no or “evening’s” modiﬁes the referential time of the park.
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6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
4
YUGATA-NO KOEN
“A PARK IN THE EVENING TIME”
TYPESTR = ARG1 = x outdoor’s location
ARGSTR =
2
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
4
D-ARG1 = w HUMAN
D-ARG2 = y HUMAN
D-ARG3 = l LOCATION
D-ARG4 = t TIME
D-E1 = e1 TRANSITION
D-E2 = e2 STATE
D-E3 = e3 PROCESS
3
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
5
QUALIA =
2
6
6
6 6
6
6
4
FORMAL = x
CONSTITUTIVE =
n
LAWN, BENCH, FOUNTAIN,...
o
TELIC = RECREATIONAL ACTIVITY
“
e3 , w , x
”
AGENTIVE = MAKE ACT
“
e1 , y , x
”
3
7
7
7 7
7
7
5
EXT =
2
6
4
LOC = IN
“
e2 , x , l
”
TIME = AT
“
e2 , x , t
”
  IN-EVENING’
“
e2
”
3
7
5
3
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
5
4.4. Accompaniment by Manner
Carrying a hat or bag is a temporary feature, that does not modify any inherent qualia
roles. It does, however, modify the MANNER role in the EXTENSIONAL structure as
shown below.
(21) boshi-no fujin “a hat lady”
2
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
4
FUJIN “LADY”
TYPESTR = ARG1 = x human
ARGSTR =
2
6 6
4
D-ARG1 = l LOCATION
D-ARG2 = y PHYS OBJ
D-E1 = e1 STATE
D-E2 = e2 STATE
3
7 7
5
QUALIA =
h
FORMAL = x
i
EXT =
2
6
4
LOC = IN
“
e1 , x , l
”
MANNER = WITH
“
e1 , x , y
”
3
7
5
3
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
5
2
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
4
BOSHI-NO FUJIN “THE LADY WITH A HAT”
TYPESTR = ARG1 = xhuman
ARGSTR =
2
6
6
4
D-ARG1 = l LOCATION
D-ARG2 = y PHYS OBJ
D-E1 = e1 STATE
D-E2 = e2 STATE
3
7
7
5
QUALIA =
h
FORMAL = x
i
EXT =
2
6
4
LOC = IN
“
e1 , x , l
”
MANNER = WITH
“
e1 , x , y
”
  WITH-HAT’
“
e1
”
3
7
5
3
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
5
(22) [[boshi   no fujin]] =   x[lady’(x)    e[manner(e)=with-hat’]]
1454.5. Computation
As far as compositional calculation of meaning is concerned, I assume that the   operator
and the   operator lower the types of CN into (e). The use of the   operator follows its use
for Japanese nouns in Cann et al. (2005).
(23) boshi “hat”:   x.hat’(x): some x satisfying hat’(x), if there is one
fujin “lady”:  y[lady’(y)]: the unique x satisfying person’(x), if there is such a thing
no:  X Y y[Y(y)   R( x.X)(y)]
boshi-nofujin“theladywithahat”:  y[lady’(y)  e[manner(e)=with’( x.hat’)(y)]
5. Conclusion
Japanese genitive postpositions cannot be disambiguated in terms of the existing qualia of
the possessee nominals. We need to augment the lexical input by adding another module,
REFERENTIAL or EXTENSIONAL structure. As Vikner and Jensen (2002) did not
propose any method for restricting the quale to be used for type-shifting, the present
analysis does not provide any suggestions for identifying the quale to be used for the
interpretation of the possessive noun phrases. However, it provides the enriched lexical
entry which enables access to the sense of NP2 and determines the semantic relation
expressed by Japanese genitive postpositions.
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147CAN DP BE A SCOPE ISLAND?
Simon Charlow
Department of Linguistics, New York University
1 Introduction
Sauerland (2005) uses data from inverse linking—cf. May (1977)—to motivate QR out of
DP and proposes to derive Larson’s (1987) generalization regarding the scopal integrity of
DP via an economy-based constraint on QR (cf. Bruening 2001).
This squib is in four parts. I ﬁrst lay out Sauerland’s (2005) three arguments for QR
out of DP. I present (a slightly modiﬁed version of) his mechanism for constraining QR. I
show that it both over- and under- generates. I conclude with some alternative explanations
for the readings Sauerland takes to motivate QR out of DP.
2 Sauerland’s data
2.1 Modal intervention
Sauerland points out that (1) can be true if Mary doesn’t have any speciﬁc individuals in
mind and doesn’t want to get married twice (say she’s placed a classiﬁed ad indicating she
wants to meet and marry a man from either Finland or Norway):
(1) Mary wants to marry someone from these two countries. (Sauerland’s ex. 8a)
Sauerland concludes that (a) the non-speciﬁcity of Mary’s desire suggests that the indeﬁnite
remains within the scope of the bouletic operator O, and (b) the fact that Mary needn’t
desire two marriages requires that these two countries be outside the scope of O. In sum,
the scope ordering is 2 > O >   and requires QR out of DP:
(2) [these two countries]x [Mary wants [ w .PRO marry [someone from x]   in w ]]
The ﬁrst of these points seems correct. If the semantics of want involves quantiﬁcation
over want-worlds w , this scope ordering entails that the individual Mary marries can vary
with each w 
Mary. This derives a non-speciﬁc desire.
Point (b) is more subtle. Depending on the semantics assigned to want, scoping two
over it may be insufﬁcient to derive the disjunctive reading. In brief: the existence of two
individuals x such that Mary marries x in each of her want-worlds w  still requires, on a
naïve semantics for want, that Mary marry twice in each w . More sophisticated semantics
for want—e.g. Heim (1992)—may obviate this worry.
Grant that scoping two over want can derive the disjunctive reading. Sauerland’s
(2005) point then requires that leaving two within the scope of O be incompatible with a
disjunctive desire. We return to this below.
1482.2 Antecedent-contained deletion
Sauerland corroborates this observation by noting the grammaticality of “wide” non-
speciﬁc readings of ACD constructions like (3):
(3) Mary wants to marry someone from every country Barry does.
(3) can be true if (a) neither Mary nor Barry has anyone speciﬁc in mind and (b) the ACD
is resolved “wide”—viz. anaphoric to the larger VP want to...
As before, the ﬁrst of these points suggests that the indeﬁnite remains within the scope
of want. Additionally, standard assumptions require that the DP containing the ellipsis site
QR past the verb heading the antecedent VP in order to resolve the antecedent-containment
paradox—cf. May (1985). The scope ordering   > O >   again requires QR out of DP.
2.3 Negation intervention
Finally, Sauerland echoes Huang’s (1998) observation regarding (4):
(4) John didn’t see pictures of several baseball players.
(4) has a reading judged true if there are several baseball players x such that John didn’t see
any pictures of x—several > ¬ >  . Sauerland assumes that the scope of the existential
quantiﬁer marks the LF position of the bare plural (a proposition I dispute below) and
safely establishes that the cardinal indeﬁnite occupies an LF position above negation. The
by-now-familiar conclusion is that this reading requires QR out of DP.
3 Larson’s generalization and constraining QR
Larson (1987) observes that a QP external to a DP X must scope either below or above all
scopal elements in X (i.e. no interleaved scope):
(5) Three men danced with a woman from every city. (*  > 3 >  )
(6) Several students ate a piece of every pie. (*  > several >  )
The conclusion usually drawn from this datum is that QR out of DP is illicit. Inverse
linking instead results from QR of the embedded QP to a DP-adjunction position:
(7) [DP [every city]x [DP someone from x   ]] left
This approach is adopted in e.g. May (1985); Rooth (1985); Büring (2004). If QR into DP
is likewise illicit, Larson’s generalization is derived.
3.1 Superiority
Sauerland rejects DP’s scope island-hood, arguing that subjecting QR to Superiority in the
sense of Richards (1997); Bruening (2001) accounts for generalizations (8) and (9).
(8) QP1 [QP2 [QP3]]   *QP3 > QP1 > QP2 (Larson 1987)
(9) O [DP [QP]]   QP> O > DP (Sauerland 2005)
149We don’t dwell on the syntactic minutiae of Sauerland’s account here. It will be sufﬁcient
to note that the relative scope of two QPs can be reversed iff the reversal is required for
interpretation. This is effected by ordering QR of higher QPs before QR of lower QPs
and requiring that QR be to the nearest node of type t (thus the lower QP in general lands
below the higher one).1 “Canonical” inverse scope is derived by total reconstruction of the
subject QP (which Sauerland conceptualizes in terms of subject movement at PF).
Sauerland assumes that absent DP-internal clausal syntax, DP-embedded QPs are
uninterpretable in situ. Accordingly, theyQR to thenearest nodeof typet. If theembedding
DP is quantiﬁcational, this entails a scope inversion (note that surface scope readings of
inversely linked constructions are predicted impossible, something we revisit in §4.1).
If the QP-containing DP is itself uninterpretable—e.g. in object position—a proper
characterization of Superiority (cf. Bruening 2001; Charlow 2009) requires that it QR
before the embedded QP.
This is all that’s needed to derive Larson’s generalization in the extensional case.
(10) [vP [QP1 three men] danced with [QP2 a woman from [QP3 every city]]]
Two scenarios are possible. Either (a) QP1 moves to [Spec,TP] at LF (it QRs), or (b) it
moves there at PF (it doesn’t). In the ﬁrst case each QP QRs. The only inversion required
for interpretation is between QP2 and QP3, and so the scope ordering 1 > 3 > 2 is derived.
In scenario (b) QR applies twice. One inversion comes for free (QP1 and QP2; since QP1
doesn’t raise, QP2 goes to the nearest node of type t—viz. above QP1), and one is required
for interpretation (QP2 and QP3). Superiority also requires that QP2 raise over QP1 before
QP3 raises out of QP2. Thus the scope ordering 3 > 2 > 1 is derived. In both scenarios
QP2 and QP3 scope together relative to QP1.
3.1.1 Non-QP operators
The following constructions replace the subject QP with an intensional operator/negation:
(11) Mary wants [TP PRO to marry [QP1 someone from [QP2 these two countries]]]
(12) [NegP not [vP John see [QP1 pictures of [QP2 several baseball players]]]]
Both structures require QR of QP1 and QP2 to a TP/vP-adjunction position for interpreta-
tion. QP2 may subsequently continue climbing the tree. It’s free to raise over want/not;
Superiority doesn’t come into play. Thus the scope ordering 2>O >1 is derived (similarly,
the ACD example is predicted grammatical).
4 Problems with the account
4.1 Surface scope
As noted in §3.1, Sauerland’s account predicts that a DP-embedded QP can never scope
inside its embedding DP.
(13) John bought a picture of every player on the team. (Sauerland 2000’s ex. 40a)
(14) John bought a picture of each player on the team. (Sauerland 2000’s ex. 40b)
1This oversimpliﬁes the mechanism Bruening and Sauerland propose. I don’t think this affects any of my
points. See Sauerland (2000); Charlow (2009) for further discussion.
150(15) Everyone/no one from a foreign country eats sushi. (after Heim & Kratzer 1998 221, ex. 1)
As Sauerland (2000) notes, example (13) has a reading on which it’s true if John bought a
single picture with everyone in it and false if he bought many individual pictures but no
single picture with everyone. Though this reading seems to require surface scope (viz.
  >  ) Sauerland suggests it may stem from a “group interpretation” of wide-scoping
every player on the team—i.e. roughly equivalent to all the players on the team. If a group
interpretation is unavailable for e.g. each player on the team in (14), Sauerland argues, we
have an explanation for why surface scope (viz.   >  ) is “unavailable” here.
A few comments are in order. First, the ungrammaticality of   >   in (14) is actually
not clear. Though the surface-scope reading may be marked, this follows from each’s
oft-noted strong preference for wide scope. Second, the grammaticality of (15) on its
surface-scoping reading—viz. every/no x such that x is from a foreign country is such that
x eats sushi ( /¬  >  )—cannot be answered by appeal to group interpretations of the
embedded QP. A theory of inverse linking must, it seems, account for “surface” linking.
Absent an ad hoc appeal to abstract clausal syntax inside DP, Sauerland (2000, 2005)
cannot.
4.2 Reliance on covert clausal syntax
Rooth (1985); Larson (1987) observe that QPs embedded in nominal intensional comple-
ments can be read de dicto:
(16) Max needs a lock of mane from every unicorn in an enchanted forest.
(16) (Larson’s ex. 4a) has a reading on which it’s true if Max is trying to perform a spell
which requires him to pick an enchanted forest and then procure a lock of mane from every
unicorn in it. Max’s need in this scenario is nonspeciﬁc with respect to both unicorns and
locks of mane, suggesting that both remain within the scope of the intensional verb need.
The DP-as-scope-island approach to inverse linking predicts this state of affairs. QR of
the embedded QP targets the DP-internal adjunction site rather than the nearest node of
type t. The embedded QP can—indeed must—remain within the scope of need.
Something more needs to be said on Sauerland’s account. Following Larson et al.
(1997) he proposes that intensional transitives take abstractly clausal complements. Infor-
mally, the syntax of (16) is something like Max needs PRO to have... The inﬁnitive clause
offers a type-t landing site for the embedded QP below need. Abstract clausal syntax in
complements of intensional transitives is thus an essential feature of Sauerland’s account.
4.3 Double-object behavior in intensional cases—an over-generation issue
Consider now the following two cases:2
(17) Two students want to read a book by every author. (*  > 2 >  )
(18) Two boys gave every girl a ﬂower. (  > 2 >  )
Example (17) lacks the starred reading—unsurprisingly given Larson’s generalization.
Example (18)—discussed by Bruening in unpublished work, and given as Sauerland’s
2I thank an anonymous reviewer for comments which helped me sharpen this point.
151(2000) ex. 49—permits an intervening scope reading (i.e. on which boys vary with girls
and ﬂowers with boys).
(19) [QP1 two students] want [ [QP3 every author]x [[QP2 a book by x]y [PRO to read y]] ]
(20) [QP1 two boys] gave [QP3 every girl] [QP2 a ﬂower]
(19) and (20) represent intermediate steps in the derivations of (17) and (18), respectively.
In (19) QP2 has raised from object position, and QP3 has raised out of QP2. The difﬁculty
for Sauerland here is that (19) and (20) are predicted to license the same subsequent
movements—the numbering is intended to highlight this. If in both cases QP1 moves only
at PF we may derive the following structures:
(21) [QP3 every pie]x [[QP1 two students] want [x [[QP2 a piece of x]y [PRO to eat y]]]]]
(22) [QP3 every girl]x [[QP1 two boys] gave x [QP2 a ﬂower]]
This is a good result for (18) but a bad one for (17). In sum, Sauerland predicts that
though inversely linked DPs in extensional contexts obey Larson’s generalization, those
in intensional contexts do not. The contained and containing QPs in (17) are incorrectly
predicted to behave like the indirect-object (IO) and direct-object (DO) QPs in (18) (viz.
permitting 3 > 1 > 2).
Note, moreover, that appealing to the obligatoriness of the QR in (22) as compared to
the non-obligatoriness of the QR in (21) won’t help:
(23) A (different) child needed every toy. (  >  )
(24) Two boys want to give every girl a ﬂower. (  > 2 >  )
(23) possesses an inverse-scope reading (on which children vary with toys), and (24)
possesses the interleaved scope reading that (17) lacks. As per Sauerland’s assumption,
the syntax of (23) is actually as in (25):
(25) [a (different) child] needed [PRO to have [every toy]]
(26) [two boys] want [PRO to give [every girl] [a ﬂower]]
QR of every toy/girl above the subject isn’t obligatory in either case. In both instances
obligatory QR targets a position below the intensional verb (and thus below the subject
QP). In short, Sauerland needs to allow non-obligatory QR to reorder subject and object
QPs. Ruling this mechanism out in order to save (17) dooms (23) and (24).
4.4 ECM QPs—an under-generation issue
The following constructions are grammatical when the ECM indeﬁnite scopes below
the matrix-clause intensional operator O (evidenced by NPI grammaticality in 27 and a
nonspeciﬁcally construed indeﬁnite in 28) and the bracketed QP scopes above O:3
(27) Frege refused to let any students search for proofs of [at least 597 provable theorems]
(28) Frege wanted many students to desire clear proofs of [every theorem Russell did]
In (27) the bracketed QP can be (indeed, on its most salient reading is) construed de re.
Frege need never have wanted anything pertaining de dicto to  597 provable theorems.
3For Sauerland, anyway. I discuss below why I don’t think de re diagnoses wide scope.
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considered unprovable, but by our reckoning he engaged in no fewer than 597 erroneous
dissuasions. For Sauerland this requires 597 > refused. In (28) wide ACD resolution is
permitted. As Sauerland observes, this suggests that the bracketed QP scopes at least as
high as wanted.
Both of these “wide” readings are compatible with O >  ECM, a situation Superiority
predicts impossible. Obligatory QR of the bracketed QPs in both cases targets a node
below the ECM indeﬁnite (N.B. the verbs in the inﬁnitival complements are intensional
transitives; on the Larson et al. analysis of these constructions their complements are
clausal; obligatory QR of the bracketed QPs thus targets a position below the inﬁnitival
intensional transitive). If the ECM indeﬁnite stays within the scope of O, Superiority
predicts—barring total reconstruction of the indeﬁnite4—that the bracketed QP will be
unable to take scope over O, contrary to fact. I return to both of these constructions in §5.
5 Re-evaluating Sauerland’s data
5.1 Modal intervention?
Does the non-speciﬁc disjunctive-desire reading of (1)—repeated here as (29)—require
QRing these two countries over the intensional operator? Here’s some evidence it doesn’t:
(29) Mary wants to marry someone from these two countries.
(30) (Pointing to “Toccata and Fugue in D minor” and “O Fortuna” on a list of classical music)
When these two songs play in a movie, someone’s about to die.
(31) a. The paranoid wizard refuses to show anyone these two amulets.
b. The paranoid wizard refuses to show more than two people these two amulets.
(32) a. You may show a reporter (lacking a security clearance) these two memos.
b. [Ms. Goard] declined to show a reporter those applications.
c. At least some states consider it to be attempted murder to give someone these drugs.
d. When you give someone these viruses, you expect to see a spike as gene expression
changes.
(33) #Mary wants to marry someone from every Scandinavian country.
(34) #When every Stravinsky song plays in a movie, someone’s about to die.
To the extent that (29) can express something felicitous, so can (30), despite the fact
that QR of those two songs over the modal operator when is blocked by a tensed clause
boundary. Speciﬁcally, (30) needn’t quantify over situations in which two songs play. The
availability of a disjunctive reading in this case (viz.  when either of those two songs
plays in a movie, someone’s about to die) suggests that QR out of DP may not be required
for a felicitous reading of (29).
Example (31a), whose inﬁnitival complement hosts a double object conﬁguration,
corroborates this assessment. Double object constructions are known to disallow QR of
the DO over the IO—cf. Bruening (2001). Here the NPI/nonspeciﬁc IO remains within
the scope of the downward-entailing intensional operator refuse. Accordingly, these two
amulets cannot QR above refuse. Nevertheless, the most salient reading of (31a) involves a
wizard who doesn’t show anyone either of the two amulets.5 Similarly (31b) permits a
4The aforementioned anonymous reviewer notes that total reconstruction as generally understood only
applies to A-chains, not QR chains. True enough.
5Superiority theorists may counter that NPIs aren’t subject to QR and thus that the DO is free to QR over
anyone in (31a). This leaves (31b) and (32) mysterious. Additionally, Merchant (2000) shows that NPIs can
host ACD gaps, suggesting they QR, after all—cf. that boy won’t show anyone he should his report card.
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of three or more people.
Similarly, (32a) allows a disjunctive construal of these two memos. On this reading,
you are conferred permission to show any reporter lacking a security clearance either of
the two memos (and possibly both). So you’re being compliant if you show such a reporter
memo #1 but not memo #2. This is again despite a nonspeciﬁc IO, which should prohibit
QR of these two memos to a position over the deontic modal. Examples (32c)–(32d)
likewise permit nonspeciﬁc IOs alongside disjunctively construed DOs, despite double
object conﬁgurations (and a tensed clause boundary in 32d).6
Finally, (33) and (34) lack felicitous readings (given certain norms surrounding mar-
riage and ﬁlm scores). They are incompatible with scenarios in which Mary wants to marry
once, and every Stravinsky song playing in a given situation isn’t a clue about anything.
This suggests that plural demonstratives may be necessary for disjunctive readings of
(29)–(32).7
In sum, (30)–(32) show that QR over an intensional operator cannot be necessary for
a disjunctive construal of a plural demonstrative. Examples (33) and (34) show that in
certain cases the plural demonstrative is a necessary component of the disjunctive reading.
These facts follow if we assume that disjunctive readings in these cases aren’t (necessarily)
due to QR over an intensional operator but may instead arise when plural demonstratives
occur in the scope of modal (or downward-entailing, cf. §5.2) operators.8
5.2 Negation intervention?
Recall Huang’s (1998) negation-intervention cases—e.g. (4), repeated here as (35):
(35) John didn’t see pictures of several baseball players (at the auction).
As Huang (1998) observes and Sauerland conﬁrms, constructions like (35) allow a reading
with several > ¬ >  . Several baseball players x, in other words, are such that John didn’t
see any pictures of x.
Independently motivated semantic apparatus for bare plurals helps explain these data.
If DP is a scope island, scoping several over not requires QRing the bare plural over not:
(36) [[several baseball players]x pictures of x]y [John didn’t see y]
We assume following Chierchia (1998) that bare plurals sometimes denote kinds and that
combining a kind-level argument with a predicate of objects creates a type-mismatch
resolved by an operation called ‘D(erived) K(ind) P(redication).’ Following Magri (2004),
the semantics of DKP is as follows:
(37) For any P denoting a predicate of objects:
DKP(P) =  x.[ y : y   x][Py], where y   x iff y instantiates the kind x.
DKP generalizes to n-ary relations in the usual way (cf. Chierchia 1998 fn. 16), introducing
an existential quantiﬁer within the scope of the shifted verb.
6(32b)–(32d) were obtained via Google search. They can be accessed at the following links: 1, 2, and
3—each of which displays the nonspeciﬁc-IO/disjunctive-DO reading.
7Though plural indeﬁnites seem to work similarly in certain cases. See §5.2.
8Disjunctive readings might involve something like a free-choice effect or exceptional scope (i.e. scope
out of islands which doesn’t require QR out of islands).
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linked readings is conﬁrmed by (a) the felicity of (38) and (b) the absence of a several >
  > ¬ reading for (35) (repeated as 39):
(38) Pictures of several baseball players are rare.
(39) John didn’t see pictures of several baseball players (at the auction).
Returning to (36), note that the trace y left by QR of the bare plural will (presumably)
be kind-level.9 This creates a mismatch between see and the bare plural’s trace y. DKP
applies to  see y , introducing an   within the scope of a ¬:
(40)  z.seeyz   DKP  z.[ x : x   y][seexz]
This derives several > ¬ >  , despite the prohibition on QR out of DP.
5.2.1 Plural indeﬁnites and demonstratives under negation
Other factors may be at work in these cases. Recall (31a), repeated here as (41):
(41) The paranoid wizard refuses to show anyone these two amulets.
(42) The paranoid wizard refuses to show anyone several (of his) amulets.
As noted previously, (41) requires the NPI IO to remain under refuse, while permitting a
(disjunctive) reading truth-conditionally equivalent to 2 > refuse. Interestingly, the same
goes for (42), which replaces the demonstrative with a plural indeﬁnite and admits a
(disjunctive) reading equivalent to several > refuse. In both cases scope freezing should
prohibit QR of the DO over the IO to a position above refuse. It is hypothesized that these
readings instead result from disjunctively construed DOs.
Might QR of (35)’s inversely-linked bare plural over negation thus be unnecessary for
a reading which gives several apparent scope over negation? Consider the following cases:
(43) John didn’t read any books by these two authors. (  2 > ¬ >  )
(44) John didn’t read any books by several authors. (???   several > ¬ >  )
These examples replace (35)’s bare plural with full determiner phrases. (43) allows a
(disjunctive) reading equivalent to 2 > ¬ >  , whereas the disjunctive reading of (44) is
borderline ungrammatical. Why this might obtain is unfortunately beyond the scope of
what I can consider here, but it shows that the QR+DKP story may be necessary for (35)
but not for an example with a plural demonstrative in lieu of the plural indeﬁnite.10,11
5.3 ACD and scope shift
Sauerland’s ACD data remains to be discussed. (45) is grammatical with a nonspeciﬁc
indeﬁnite and wide ACD resolution, suggesting QR out of DP.
(45) Mary wants to marry someone from every country Barry does.
9Pictures of several baseball players will denote something like the set of predicates   of kinds such that
for several baseball players x, the y =  pictures of _x^  (where  _x^  = x) is such that  y = 1.
10The contrast between (42) (permits a disjunctive reading) and (44) (doesn’t) is also unexplained.
11Note also that the contrast between (43) and (44) doesn’t follow for Sauerland, who permits the
embedded QP to QR over negation in both cases.
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QR which isn’t required for interpretation. A similar claim is made in von Fintel & Iatridou
(2003), who distinguish “ACD-QR” from “Scope-QR”—viz. QR which doesn’t resolve
antecedent containment. von Fintel & Iatridou note that ACD licenses QR across a tensed
clause boundary and negation, both islands for Scope-QR:
(46) John hopes I marry everyone you do.
(47) John said that Mary will not pass every student that we predicted he would (say...).
In the following I consider some additional evidence in favor of an ACD-QR mechanism
distinct from and more powerful than Scope-QR.
5.3.1 ACD and DE operators
Examples (48) and (49) differ in that (49) hosts an ACD gap, whereas (48) does not. The
reading of (49) we’re interested in involves wide ACD resolution:
(48) Mary denied kissing everyone. (??  > deny)
cf. Mary imagined kissing everyone. (  > imagine)
(49) Mary denied kissing everyone Barry did. (  > deny)
QPs headed by every do not readily QR over downward-entailing operators—cf. Beghelli
& Stowell (1997); von Fintel & Iatridou (2003).12 (48) doesn’t permit   > deny without
focal stress on everyone. The wide ACD reading of (49), by contrast, permits (actually,
requires)   > deny (note that although Barry is focused, everyone is not).
5.3.2 Double object constructions
Imagine a scenario as follows: a bus full of Red Sox players pulls up. Mary and Barry
both mistake them for the Yankees. Each of them wants to give the same presents to some
player (or other?) on the bus.
(50) Mary wants to give a Yankee everything Barry does.
(50) is grammatical with a Yankee read de dicto—as required by the mistaken beliefs
of Mary and Barry in our scenario—and wide ACD resolution, pace Bruening (2001).13
Whether this reading permits gift recipients to vary with gifts is a more difﬁcult matter.14
Nevertheless, the grammaticality of a wide ACD site hosted in a DO (  > O), combined
with a de dicto IO (O >  ), requires subverting double-object scope freezing.
(51) The paranoid wizard’s wife refuses to show anyone the same two amulets her husband does.
(51) is grammatical with wide ACD. Given the NPI IO, this requires 2 > O >  . Again,
ACD QR subverts the prohibition on QR of DO over IO in double object conﬁgurations.
12N.B. these authors only consider QR of every over not.
13Larson (1990) discusses an example like (50) in his fn. 10 but doesn’t consider whether it allows the IO
to be read de dicto. Bruening (2001) considers two examples like (50)—his (27a) and (27b)—but concludes
they don’t admit a de dicto IO, contrary to the judgments of my informants and myself.
14As Bruening correctly notes, Mary gave a child every present Barry did is grammatical but doesn’t
allow girls to vary with presents (*  >  ). He proposes that both IO and DO QR, the DO since it contains the
ACD gap and the IO to get out of the DO’s way (i.e. to preserve Superiority). Thus IO > DO is preserved.
Examples (50) and (51) suggest that this may not be the right approach.
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Recall (28), repeated here (slightly modiﬁed) as (52):
(52) Frege wanted a student to construct a proof of [every theorem Russell did]
Previously we focused on how (28) represented a problem for Sauerland. Superiority
predicts that a nonspeciﬁc reading of the ECM indeﬁnite will be incompatible with wide
ACD resolution, contrary to fact.
Note, however, that this reading represents a problem for just about anybody. Speciﬁ-
cally, its grammaticality entails a violation of Larson’s generalization:15
(53) [every theorem Russell wanted a student to construct a proof of x]x[Frege wanted a
student to construct a proof of x]
LF (53) entails that a QP intervenes between a DP-embedded QP and its remnant! In other
words: the same strategy that Sauerland uses to argue that DP isn’t a scope island allows
us to construct examples wherein Larson’s generalization doesn’t. But of course we don’t
want to conclude that Larson’s generalization doesn’t ever hold.
In sum, since ACD-QR can cross islands, Sauerland’s ACD examples aren’t dispositive
for the DP-as-scope-island hypothesis.
6 Conclusions
This squib has offered evidence that the conclusions reached in Sauerland (2000, 2005)
favoring QR out of DP may not be warranted. Most seriously, the mechanism Sauerland
proposes to derive Larson’s generalization only really works for extensional cases, over-
generating when inversely-linked DPs occur in intensional contexts. Sauerland’s account
also struggles with “surface-linked” interpretations of inversely linked DPs, a reliance on
covert clausal syntax in intensional transitive constructions, and ECM interveners which
should block certain readings but appear not to.
On closer inspection, readings analogous to those which Sauerland takes to motivate
QR out of DP occur in constructions where (we have independent reason to believe that)
QR above a certain relevant operator isn’t an option. Importantly, each of Sauerland’s
arguments for QR out of DP is given a double-object-construction rejoinder. I have
speculated that plural demonstratives/indeﬁnites in the scope of modal/negation operators
can be construed disjunctively in the absence of QR. Additionally, if (following Chierchia
1998) the scope of an   quantiﬁer isn’t diagnostic of the LF position of a kind-denoting
bare plural, Huang’s negation-intervention cases don’t require a split DP.
Finally, in line with von Fintel & Iatridou (2003), I’ve provided new arguments that
ACD-QR can do things Scope-QR can’t: namely, scope an every-phrase over a downward-
entailing operator, carry a DO over an IO in double object conﬁgurations, and precipitate
violations of Larson’s generalization.
Some of the criticisms I’ve mounted against Sauerland will also militate against
Bruening’s (2001) characterization of QR as Superiority-governed. Additionally, it remains
15Similar comments don’t apply to (27). As many authors—e.g. Farkas (1997); Keshet (2008)—have
shown, scoping a QP over an intensional operator may be sufﬁcient for a de re reading of that QP, but it
cannot be necessary.
157to be determined to what extent plural demonstratives and indeﬁnites behave as a piece
with respect to disjunctive readings, why this might be the case, and what any of this has
to do with modals/negation. I must leave consideration of these matters to future work.
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Abstract. I introduce a mildly non-planar subclass of proof nets (Girard 1987) as an
abstraction over derivational ambiguity in Combinatory Categorial Grammar (Steed-
man 2000). Proof nets encode the linear order of a sentence, its scope relations and
(long distance) dependencies, and its syntactic structure and semantics — via the
Curry-Howard correspondence — simultaneously and unambiguously.
1. Introduction
Derivations in most variants of categorial grammars (CGs) are valid proofs in linear logic
(Girard 1987), or a subtype thereof, e.g. Lambek Calculus (Lambek 1958). Parsing a
sentence with a CG corresponds to proving a sequent. Different derivations can denote
thesame -termviatheCurry-Howard correspondence. In linearlogic, proofnetsabstract
over this spurious ambiguity. A proof net denotes exactly one  -term; and different proof
nets denote different  -terms. Thus one can use proof nets to abstract over spurious
ambiguity in CG parses.
Proof nets for derivations in the Lambek calculus enjoy the property of being pla-
nar. Lambek calculus is weakly equivalent to context-free grammars (Pentus 1993). So
planarity corresponds to context-freeness. In this paper,I exploreproof nets as a presenta-
tion of parses in a mildly context-sensitive categorial grammar: Combinatory Categorial
Grammar (Steedman 2000, Steedman & Baldridge to appear, henceforth CCG). The pro-
cess of parsing (with or without proof nets) is an entirely different matter, which I will not
address here.
2. Combinatory Categorial Grammar
I repeat basic deﬁnitions for CCG, and address derivational ambiguity. In search for an
unambiguous and transparent presentation I brieﬂy discuss a normal form and a chart
presentation, which both turn out unsatisfactory. A satisfactory solution is found with
proof nets, in the section hereafter.
2.1. Deﬁnition of CCG
As its name suggests, CCG is a combinatory logic characterized by a set of recursively
deﬁned categoriesand rules how to combinethem. Let CAT0 bethe set ofbasic categories,
e.g. {S,NP,N,PP}. The set of categories CAT is the smallest set such that
• CAT0   CAT
• A\B, A/B   CAT iff A   CAT   B   CAT
A note of caution: Talking about CCG, it makes sense to use Steedman’s result left-
most notation, which I do throughout the paper. Read A\B (A/B) as “yielding A if given
B on the left (right)”.
160CCG is a lexicalized formalism. Each word in a sentence introduces a category. There
are no empty words.1 For semantic interpretation via the Curry-Howard correspondence,
a typed  -term is assigned to every category. Types and categories match structurally; see
Roorda (1991). The variant of CCG I will use in this paper is given by the following set
of combination rules, along with their interpretation:
(>) right functional application X/Y : fY : a   X : f(a)
(<) left functional application Y : aX \Y : f   X : f(a)
(>B) right functional composition X/Y : f Y/Z : g   X/Z :  z.f(g(z))
(<B) left functional composition Y \Z : gX \Y : f   X\Z :  z.f(g(z))
(>B ) forward crossing composition X/Y : fY \Z : g   X\Z :  z.f(g(z))
(<B ) backward crossing composition Y/Z : gX \Y : f   X/Z :  z.f(g(z))
(>T) forward type-raising X : a   T/(T\A): f.f(a)
(<T) backward type-raising X : a   T\(T/A): f.f(a)
Variants of CCG come with specialized rules, e.g. for conjunction, or generalized
composition (Steedman & Baldridge to appear). We will only consider the rule set given
abovein thispaper. CrossingrulesessentiallymakeCCG amildlycontext-sensitivegram-
mar formalism (ibid.). That is why I include them here. I will not use type raising pro-
ductively here, but pre-compile the necessary type raises into the lexical categories.
2.2. Derivations in CCG
A derivation in CCG is a sequence of rule applications, which turns an initial string of
lexical categories (a sentence) into a single resulting category. For any given input string,
there may be more than one successful derivation (if any), conceptually due to two dif-
ferent reasons. The ﬁrst one is syntactic ambiguity; if the sentence has more than one
reading, we want a different derivation for each. The second one is spurious ambiguity:
Two derivations are equivalent if they correspond to the same  -term, after  -conversion.
Example1. Anormalandanequivalent incrementalderivationtreeinCCG. For -terms,
see example 4. The original type of ‘a’, NP/N, is internally raised to (S/(S\NP))/N.
‘What is your opinion ...’ (from a CCG annotation of the Switchboard corpus (Reitter,
et al. 2006))
NP\NP
(NP\NP)/NP
of
NP
NP/(S/NP)
what
S/NP
S/(S\NP)
(S/(S\NP))/N
a
N
N/N
good
N
router
(S\NP)/NP
(S\NP)/PP
is
PP/NP
like
1Hypothetical reasoning as in related calculi ﬁnds its counterpart in the compositional rules.
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(NP\NP)/(S/NP)
(NP\NP)/NP
of
NP/(S/NP)
what
S/NP
S/PP
S/(S\NP)
(S/(S\NP))/N
(S/(S\NP))/N
a
N/N
good
N
router
(S\NP)/PP
is
PP/NP
like
The two derivations shown are constructed to be as left- or right-branching as pos-
sible, corresponding to an incremental derivation or to phrase structure (in English), re-
spectively. For example, ‘a good router’ is constructed via application only in the normal
form, but with composition and application in the incremental form.2 Between the two
example derivations, there is a variety of equally valid derivations.3 Note that CCG does
not employ traces, and therefore the fact that ‘what’ also serves as an argument to ‘like’
escapes the eye.4
It is desirable to abstract over this spurious ambiguity, toencode the result without the
processof thederivation. Thisis not accomplished by a normal form,which is unique, but
does denote the application of certain rules where several choices are possible, as shown
for ‘a good router’.
In CYK-parsing of context-free grammars, a chart abstracts over spurious ambigu-
ity. Chart-parsing techniques are also used for CCG, and for our example they yield the
following chart (2).
Example 2. The chart for our example.
NP\NP 
NP
S/NP 
S/PP
NP , S/(S\NP)
(NP\NP)/(S/NP) NP/N N (S\NP)/NP
(NP\NP)/NP NP/(S/NP) NP/N N/N N (S\NP)/PP PP/NP
of what a good router is like
I shall not prove soundness and completeness of the chart presentation here, as the
following argument renders its use impractical. As it is, there is no information on how a
cell was derived. If I includeit, the ambiguityfor the categories marked with  is retained.
Neither is satisfactory: we want both unambiguous and complete information.
In linear logic, this is given in the form of proof nets (Girard 1987). In the next
section I show how to convert a CCG derivation into a proof net, and how proof nets
capture syntax and semantics transparently.
2A rule of generalized composition would allow total incrementality here. It would also ﬁll more cells
in the chart (example 2).
3Reitter et al. (2006) suggest the incremental analysis comes closer to human sentence processing, es-
pecially under time pressure.
4CCGbank (Hockenmaier & Steedman 2007) captures these directly in an additional dependencystruc-
ture. This actually reveals more dependencies than seen in proof nets.
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A proof net is a visualization of a proof in linear logic (Girard 1987, Roorda 1991). It
consists of two parts: a list of tree expansions of the lexical categories, and a pairwise
linking of their leaves. This linking has to satisfy several correctness criteria, depending
on the logic.
Proof nets can be used for categorial grammars, if their derivations are valid proofs.
Here I identify properties of proof nets for CCG, calling them mildly non-planar proof
nets. Crossing composition leads to non-planar nets. The Curry-Howard correspondence
carries over.
3.1. Deﬁnition and construction of proof nets
From Roorda (1991) and Morrill (2000), I repeat the following basic deﬁnitions, adapted
to Steedman’s notation. Further deﬁnitions which are needed later are also included.
Category trees are binary branching trees. Each node carries a category labeled with
input (•) or output ( ) polarity, and a  -term. They are recursively expanded from lexical
categories (along with lexical semantics) by the followingrules. The dashed lines denote
steps (up, down, left, right) on the semantic trip (Carpenter & Morrill 2005, Lamarche
1994).
•-expansions: A/B• : f
A• : f(x) B  : x
A\B• : f
B  : x A• : f(x)
 -expansions: A/B  :  x.y
B• : x A  : y
A\B  :  x.y
A  : y B• : x
Every lexical category has input polarity. Following the path from its root only over
•-nodes we reach the head leaf of the tree.
A proof frame is a sequence of category trees with roots A , A•
1, ..., A•
n where A is
theresult category andA1 to An are the lexical categories of wordsw1 to wn in a sentence.
The result receives output polarity.
An axiom linking is an exhaustive, pairwise matching of leaves of category trees, such
that each leaf A  is connected to a leaf A•. Each axiom link denotes substituting the
semantic variable of the  -node with the  -term of the •-node. The semantic trip step (left
or right) is from A  to A•.Aproof structure is a proof frame with an axiom linking on its
leaves. A proof net is a proof structure satisfying two criteria:
(a) The axiom linking is planar (no crossing links).
163(b) Every cycle5 (over axiom links and edges of the rule expansions) crosses one  -
expansion (Morrill 2000).
Planarity is required for Lambek calculus (Lambek 1958)andsimilarcategorial gram-
mars, but not for linear logic in general. Let a proof structure satisfying (b) but not (a) be
a non-planar proof net.
Semantics Starting from the  -term of the result node, and following the semantic trip,
all substitutions denoted by the links are carried out. (b) guarantees that this results in a
valid  -term. A logical form (LF) tree depicts both the semantic trip and the unreduced
 -term (see example 4). We call links to head leaves primary and all others secondary.
Primary links build the LF tree, secondary links are interpreted as abstractor (binder) and
variable (trace); see the curved arrows in the example.
The tree retains all directions, resulting in a directed  -calculus; cf. Wansing (1992).
Planar proof nets translate to LF trees retaining the linear order of words. Non-planar
proof nets either violate the linear order, or require crossing branches.
3.2. Turning a CCG derivation into a proof net
Derivations in a categorial grammar which correspond to proofs in a type calculus (Lam-
bek (1958) and descendants) are straightforward to turn into proof nets. Constructing the
proof net for a given CCG derivation is as follows. First we convert the derivation to a
raising-free form by raising the necessary types already in the lexicon, as in example 1.
We then construct the proof frame and ﬁnd the partial linking.
Each instance of an application or composition rule identiﬁes a pair of (possibly
complex) categories B  and B•. As an abbreviation, we might connect them directly (see
especially ex. 5). In full: The sequence of terminal nodes from expanding B  is that from
B• with linear order and polarities reversed. Each terminal is linked to its counterpart,
yielding a nested linking.
Crossing rules “bury” nodes under their links, because the two terminal sequences are
not adjacent. To connect the buried nodes, links have to cross (also see ex. 5). Thus
planarity (a) is not satisﬁable for CCG.
The remaining open category X• is connected to the result node, which then is X .
The same holds for complex categories as said before. Then there are no more open
terminals; the net is complete.
Example3. Thesentencefromexample1asaproofnet(minimallyabridged). Itabstracts
over which CCG rules were used. Thus it depicts the normal form, the incremental form
(see example 1), and all possible others simultaneously. The long distance dependency
is manifested in a direct link (from the content-NP•-node of ‘what’ to the argument-NP -
node of ‘like’).
5Not to be confused with paths on the semantic trip, which does not allow cycles.
164NP     what
NP/(S/NP)•
NP• S/NP 
NP• S 
a
(S/(S\NP))/N•
S/(S\NP)•
S• S\NP 
S  NP•
N 
good
N/N•
N• N 
router
N•
is
(S\NP)/PP•
S\NP•
NP  S•
PP 
like
PP/NP•
PP• NP 
Example4. Thefollowingtreeshows thesemantictripfortheexamplesentence. Primary
links, which are unary branchings, are directly substituted; secondary links appear as
arrows. Category labels are inherited from the CCG parse / the proof net. Pre-terminals
are annotated with (sketched) lexical  -terms. The tree’s bracketing structure over the
lexical  -terms reads as the unreduced  -term for the sentence. I have added reduced
 -terms for non-terminal nodes.
NP : like (a good router ,what )
NP/(S/NP): Q.Q(what )
what
S/NP :  t1.like (a good router ,t 1)
S : like (a good router ,t 1)
S/(S\NP): P.P(a good router )
(S/(S\NP))/N :  x P.P(a (x))
a
N : good (router )
N/N :  n.good (n)
good
N : router 
router
S\NP :  t2.like (t2,t 1)
NP2 S : like (t2,t 1)
t2 S\NP :  r.like (r,t1)
(S\NP)/PP :  q r.q(r)
is
PP :  o.like (o,t1)
PP/NP :  m o.like (o,m)
like
t1
NP1
Example 5. This net depicts a CCG derivation with <B , for a sentence from the CCG-
annotated Switchboard corpus (Reitter et al. 2006). Depending on the derivation, <B 
is either used to combine ‘was’ with ‘really’ and again to add ‘not’; or to combine ‘was’
with ‘really not’ (constructed via composition). The proof net denotes both, and in any
case <B  leads to crossing links.
S     that
S/(S\NP)•
S• S\NP 
was
(S\NP)/NP•
S\NP• NP 
really
(S\NP)\(S\NP)•
S\NP  S\NP•
not
(S\NP)\(S\NP)•
S\NP  S\NP•
a very good experience
NP•
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Characteristic for combinatory rules is the identiﬁcation of a  -node with a •-node. The
•-node itself might arise from functional composition, so it is not represented by a single
node in the net. I capture this in criterion (c). Directionality is expressed by a bipartite
criterion (d).
(c) Every  -expansion is part of a cycle (Morrill 2000), and all those cycles are bal-
anced: Their traversal involves going up an edge as many times as going down. See
e.g. the S/NP  -node in the expansion of ‘what’ in ex. 3, and follow the circles it is
part of, counting steps up and down. In the LF tree this amounts to well-nestedness
of abstractions: the arrows in ex. 4 do not cross.
(d ) Primary links have the same direction as the preceding left or right step (ignoring
any intervening steps up) on the semantic trip. That is to say, arguments wanted on
the right (left) are on the right (left).
(d  ) Secondary links go from a right daughter in an expansion to a left daughter, or vice
versa. In theLF tree thismakes binders and traces both left (or both right)daughters
(cf. example 4), because order is reversed in  -expansions.
I call proof structures satisfying (b)–(f) mildly non-planar proof nets. They are less
restricting than planar proof nets, yet more restricting than proof nets in general. My
choice of combinatory rules in section 2.1. restricts proof nets for CCG even more. Let
reachability (of A from B) denote existence of a path on the semantic trip (from B to A).
On LF, reachability is dominance. Let a gap be a sequence of root nodes spanned over
by a (primary) link  . Let the governing node A for   be deﬁned as the node reachable
via the longest path from   such that every step up has to be cancelled out by a later step
down. There are two restrictions on gaps.
(e) Coherence: All roots in the gap are reachable from the governing node. This might
be via  , but:
(f) If a (primary) link  , reachable from  , leads to a word in the gap (that is,   and  
cross),   and   must not have the same direction.
Criteria (b)–(f) deﬁne CCG proof nets, for the variant of CCG used here.
Proposition 1. Every CCG derivation yields a CCG proof net, that is, a net satisfying
(b)–(f).
The proof follows the construction of the net. Furthermore all criteria are designed to
be valid for (this variant of) CCG. We omit it here, for sake of more space for the proof
for the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Every CCG proof net denotes a valid CCG derivation.
166Proof. The proof proceeds in a constructive, bottom-up way. I ﬁrst prove the existence of
two adjacent words connected via a primary link; then prove that they in fact are combin-
able by a rule; and ﬁnally treat them as one word to continue the argument recursively,
thus proving that there is a valid CCG derivation for any CCG proof net.
1. Primary links form a directed acyclic graph G over the words. Take the path H
given by starting at any leaf of G and going back until encountering a branching (a word
with more than one argument), or the root of G. By condition (e) on gaps the links in
G\H never cross those in H, so they do not account for non-adjacency of linked words
in H.
Assume H without adjacent connected words. Without loss of generality, assume the
ﬁrst link   goes right, leaving a gapx. If the next link   goes right again, call the new gap
x and continue there. If   goes left, spanning over  , x is rendered unreachable: Because
of (f), no succedent link may cross   or  . Thus   goes left and stays within x, leaving
a new gap y. The next link   renders y unreachable, if it leaves x, in either direction.
Continue with   as the new  ,   as the new   and a new gap y. Each new link either
leaves a containing link, rendering the remaining gaps unreachable, or opens a new gap.
Therefore, no ﬁnite graph H without adjacent, connected words exists.
2. Now I prove the combinability of adjacent words a and b connected via a primary
link  . By construction of H, the argument side of   (A    A•) may have maximally
one argument itself, so A• is the head of B•
2 , which is either the category of b or of the
head-daughter thereof. By deﬁnition of primary links, A  is the head of the non-head
daughter B 
1 of a. By virtue of (c) not only the cycle over B 
1 and B•
2 is balanced, but
also all cycles over parts of these categories, if they are complex. This amounts to perfect
symmetry: B1 = B2. Thus a and b combine via functional application or composition.
3. Now reduce those two words into a single category tree according to the combi-
nation rule, inheriting all remaining links. Treating two adjacent words as one does not
add any nodes or links to the net, and it retains all relative positions. Hence the net still
satisﬁes (b)–(f).
This argument applies recursively, until there is only one word left, to be combined
with the resulting category tree. We have thus found a CCG derivation for an arbitrary
CCG proof net.
Proposition3. CCG proofnets standin a bijectionto equivalence classes ofCCG deriva-
tions.
Proof. All equivalent derivations are mapped to the same net. Assume the opposite. The
proof frames are the same, so the nets differ in their linking. Different linkings denote
different semantics by deﬁnition. Contradiction to the derivations’ equivalence.
The net denotes all equivalent derivations because of prop. 1
4. Conlusions and future work
Proof nets abstract over derivational ambiguity in categorial grammars. A proof net is
an unambiguous presentation of the linear order, the dependencies (by direct links), and
scope relations (by precedence on the semantic trip) of a sentence. Syntactic structure and
semantics stand in (Curry-Howard) correspondence.
167I have identiﬁed the properties of proof nets for a certain mildly context-sensitive, yet
almost arbitrary variant of CCG, given by the rule set in section 2.1.. Accordingly, I call
them mildly non-planar. Not too surprisingly, this notion is not as natural a subclass of
proof nets compared to the notion of planarity. Future research may reveal a landscape of
subclasses of proof structures corresponding to the variants of categorial grammars. Spe-
cial interest lies on multimodal CCG. Also, a better treatment of type raising is desirable.
The work reported here is part of joint work with Christian Pietsch (University of
Bielefeld) and our supervisor Gerhard J¨ ager. We have compiled a preliminary proof net
corpus from a CCG annotation of the Switchboard corpus (the one used by (Reitter et al.
2006)),containingabout65,000sentencesofspokenlanguage. AconversionofCCGbank
(Hockenmaier & Steedman 2007) is planned. In subsequent research we will utilize it
in data-oriented methods (e.g. for parsing) by deﬁning reasonable sub-structures of the
nets, exploiting the direct links between grammatically dependent words. We will also
investigate syntactic priming between these sub-structures.
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